

"Traditional Concepts and the Greek Reality"  
by Theodore A. Coulombis

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## IX

### *Traditional Concepts<sup>1</sup> and the "Greek Reality"*

THEODORE COULOMBIS

The basic assumption of this paper is that a man's theoretical exposition or explanation of his environment<sup>2</sup> will be heavily influenced, if not determined, by his very environment (his personal micro-sphere so to speak) and the historical experience with which he is most conversant. We often hear, these days, criticism of works of theory in international relations in terms of "culture boundness," "historical captivity," "personalization of the universal, or universalization on the basis of introspection. These indeed are basic limitations to the theorist and to admit them is a mark of sophistication and courage as well as altruism (especially for the policy-scientist who might be committing commercial suicide by exposing his trade's weaknesses). But can these limitations, when known, be overcome? And if they could, should they be overcome?

The question I am posing here is very difficult—at least for me—to answer. Could a political scientist be divorced from his

<sup>1</sup> Traditional theory of international relations for the purposes of this paper, refers to the works of the realist, historical sociologist, and international legal/institutionalist approaches to international relations and should be differentiated from the works of the behavioral, systems or scientist persuasion.

<sup>2</sup> For our purposes explanations with relevance to the discipline referred to as international relations (politics).

culture, its influence and conditioning effects? Could he, for instance, employ concepts such as "political and economic development" without referring to culture-bound terms? Development presupposes change, change presupposes measurability and both presuppose a sense of direction (a set of goals). The analyst's means of identifying the effectiveness of reaching predetermined goals are of course culture-bound. The goal itself—be it modernization, industrialization, secularization, consumerism, or democracy—is also culture-bound. At this stage, at least, it appears that "culture-boundness" is next to impossible to overcome if not an outright undesirable objective.

What about "historical captivity"? This is merely saying that one cannot and should not afford to theorize regarding political behavior merely on the basis of historical data, because the "what has been" or the "what is" does not necessarily forecast the "what will be." Again, one can accept this as a limitation, but when hard pressed to offer ways and means of overcoming it, there is a crisis of unavailable alternatives. If one cannot theorize about international politics on the basis of what has happened to date, what should one do? Not theorize at all? Theorize on the basis of what has not happened? Try and develop a healthy mixture between historical fact and probable alternative contingencies such as, "Would World War I have taken place if the mosaic of Archduke Francis Ferdinand had missed his target at Sarajevo on that fateful day?"

My answer is that a student of international politics will have to settle for historical experience as his source data, while realizing the dangers and the limitations of the exercise. But what else can he do? Can he become a global social engineer and experiment at the international level, controlling and varying units as large and diverse as nation-states, and measuring responses to his stimuli? The political scientist obviously could not, nor do I think would he choose to experiment (assuming he had an opportunity to do so), knowing that miscalculation in one of his experiments could precipitate a war<sup>3</sup> with mass losses among his human "guinea pigs." Well, one could argue, maybe the political scientist cannot experiment in the real world, but he can definitely do so in a "stimulated" environment without much gain, loss of life, or even sweat on the part of anybody. Without going deep into the controversy surrounding the value of "simulation" as an approach to the study of international

<sup>3</sup> E.g., Great National Product, per capita income, productivity of labor, percentage of population employed in farming, levels of sophistication in terms of harmonizing conflicting interests in the national interest formulation process—just to mention a few examples.

<sup>4</sup> War, of course, being one of the major conditions with which the field of international relations is preoccupied; i.e., what causes it, how it is used, how it can be limited, how it can be avoided.

relations, let me say that I see its relevance and usefulness as an educational exercise (training laboratory for potential or actual decision makers), but can hardly accept it as a substitute for historical experience—that massive, impersonal integrator of myriad variables least of which are not "pure chance" or "good and bad luck."

The basic question that besets the leading thinkers of the young articulation of international relations is whether one can safely advance a general theory of international relations which will stand the tests of time (past and future) and place (specific regional application) and mood or nature<sup>2</sup> of decision makers, just to name a few factors. To resort to the old cliché, one can hardly say anything safely these days! We live in a relativistic world, a world of "swaking definitions" of pragmatic or "system relevant" concepts, or "truths" arrived at by sampling degrees of "intersubjective coincidence of preferences." If we were to disregard the word "safely," however, we could and we should advance general theories of international relations, conscious that by virtue of the vastness of the undertaking conceptualization could only be achieved at the risk of distortion.

Now let us look into the relevance<sup>3</sup> of the exercise into which we are about to embark. I think it would be a useful task to test the degree of "culture boundness" or "closed historical period captivity" of general (system) or regional (subsystem) theories of international relations by applying them to different regions than the ones which gave rise to them, or, equally, to different time periods. Dankwart A. Rustow, for instance, has proposed a comparison of theories deduced from nineteenth century European development (political and economic) against the very clear and present problems of development in the less developed countries (LDCs)<sup>4</sup> of the world today. In the spirit of this fine suggestion I can justify the taking of your time with the study which follows; namely, how would some of the basic concepts of traditional international relations—which I submit mirror the experience of Western

<sup>2</sup> We are dangerously assuming here that human nature is neither good nor bad, but essentially determinable, varying among different men and within individuals (i.e., it is not at all incommensurable that a situation will exhibit characteristics of "goodness" in one situation or "badness" in another depending on assessable and varying factors, including what he had for breakfast).

<sup>3</sup> If you ask me relevance is what, I would answer relevance to the slowly accumulating body of theories and/or approaches to international relations.

<sup>4</sup> One's list should be taken all in the spirit of wide participation with escalating euphemisms as this composite term has undergone. One started with "backward countries" moved to "underdeveloped countries" abandoned this entire term for the dynamism of "developing countries" to reach acknowledgment of accomplishment which the title "less developed countries" connotes.

great powers—face under the scrutiny of Greece's historical experience?<sup>5</sup>

The last question to ask would, then, be what to do with the results of our comparison should we find that Greek history does not fit the concepts of traditional theory. Should we amend general theory to fit the Greek experience? Of course not! Should we ignore the lessons learned from our study? That would be going to the opposite extreme. The middle road would be to suggest that general theories of international relations should be supplemented with subtleties which, for the purposes of microanalysis, tend to gain in accuracy at the expense of wider applicability (the characteristic of the general theory). At the expense of appearing to belabor the obvious, let me say that both general and microanalytic theoretical approaches are necessary depending on the interests of the researcher and the needs of the research consumer (audience).

### *Sovereignty and Independence or Intervention?*

Traditional theory of international relations has postulated the concepts of national sovereignty (autonomy) and legal equality as basic cornerstones of the international system. In legal theory, at least, a sovereign nation enjoys total independence over its internal affairs (internal sovereignty). This is all fine in a world where the distinction between internal and external affairs can be disinterestedly arrived at. But such a distinction presupposes the existence of an effective international legal order which, at best, is a "gleam in the eye" among the idealists or the utopians of the profession.

Historical experience illustrates that powerful nations can afford to be "more sovereign" than medium-sized or weak nations. Political analysis reveals a world where "might makes right" or with the "victor is the justice" with all the concomitant pressures, promises, threats, cajolery, appeals and belies that render weak and strategically located nations independent in name only.

Greece serves an excellent example of the contest by great and intermediate powers for influence or control<sup>6</sup> of a small, relatively weak nation, located at the crossroads of East and West. In one word this fate spells "intervention." Two or three examples will suffice to illustrate that the modern history of Greece has afforded her few interludes free of

<sup>5</sup> With emphasis on the period following World War I.

<sup>6</sup> The temptation to suggest analogies between Greece and Vietnam is strong, but will be resisted by the author.

external influence and intervention.<sup>18</sup> What are, then, the theoretical implications of strong dependence of Greek political elites on foreign influence centers? Let us look at the record of history before we attempt to answer this question.

Most historians agree that Greece's independence from the Ottoman Empire could not have materialized without the acquiescence and ultimate support of Europe's great powers. The birth of the Greek nation in 1829 coincided with the rise of uncompromising conflicts among Greek politicians facilitating, thus, foreign intervention.<sup>19</sup> One of the earliest results of foreign intervention in the affairs of the newly born state was the imposition of the monarchical system of government in 1832. The Greek political world was divided from the outset into warring factions of Francophiles, Anglophiles, and later Germanophiles. The unhappy history of conflict, narrow-minded political maneuver, external intervention and overall stagnation became the trademark of nineteenth century Greek politics.

The nineteenth century ran out its course giving frequent occasion to one or another of the great powers to blockade Greece to collect public debts, to protect resident aliens (nationals of the great powers), or to prevent Greece from exercising her sovereign right of going to war without the approval of the great powers. In short, to treat Greece as a protectorate (of the condominium type).

Let us focus for a minute on the highpoint of external inputs to Greece's decision-making complex—the period of 1914-18—involving the crisis surrounding the decision of Greece's stand in World War I. Greek politicians and public were divided into two large and hostile camps. On one side were the Rightists, supporting King Constantine I, who were sympathetic to the Central Powers and Kaiser Wilhelm. They argued for benevolent neutrality toward the Central Powers. On the other side were the Greek republicans, headed by Eleftherios Venizelos. They argued in favor of entry into the war on the side of the Entente, convinced that the Entente would be victorious and that Greece as a result

<sup>18</sup> For a perceptive and more detailed historical analysis of foreign intervention in Greek internal affairs, often denying the Greek politician's habit of inviting external intervention (the concept of attractive assistance or passive provocation) see, in Greek, Alexis A. Kymon, *Greek Foreign Policy* (Athens, 1952).

<sup>19</sup> The pattern was as follows: the great powers would irresponsibly support Greek politicians who would best protect divided great power interests in Greece. Greek politicians, in turn, would accept foreign monetary assistance and other means of support as a means of attaining and securing power and displacing their opponents. From a small nation's point of view, then, one is tempted to discuss international relations in terms of the efforts of great powers to "divide and conquer" the political forces of weaker nations, or of unscrupulous misaligned local politicians putting their political ambitions above the national interest.

would regain large portions of territory then under Ottoman control.<sup>20</sup> This internal division was aggravated by the agents of the warring powers hoping that "their men in Greece" would eventually take over.

Late in 1916 the Republicans (obviously with Anglo-French blessings) revolted against King Constantine I and set up a *de facto* (immediately recognized by the Entente) government in Thessaloniki from where they declared war on the Central Powers. Half a year later, yielding to relentless Entente pressures, King Constantine abdicated in favor of his son Alexander and Venizelos returned to Athens to lead a united (albeit by external pressures) Greece. A short-lived unity followed, but it contained the divisive seeds of royalism vs. antiroyalism (or republicanism) which has been plaguing Greek affairs to the present time.

The interwar period resembles the nineteenth century pattern, exhibiting instability, misery, depression, war, and defeat in the hands of Turkey; mass migrations and exchanges of populations and a constant conflict between the forces of royalism and republicanism. The military coup *d'état* was a frequent method of institutional change. After numerous coups and counter-coups involving the transition from monarchy to republic and back to constitutional monarchy, Greece, following yet another coup, on August 4, 1936, became a dictatorship. The dictatorial period was suspended by World War II and the unprovoked occupation of Greece by the Axis powers, which could be also described as intervention having no holds.

From this brief account of foreign intervention into Greek internal affairs or even foreign policy-making processes, one could draw some tentative conclusions. Greece, as a case study, shatters the pure theoretical construct of impensable sovereignty and independence of nations, since even a cursory perusal of its modern history suggests that its internal politics as well as foreign policies were subject to penetrations and interventions of foreign powers which were eagerly welcomed. In fact, solicited, by Greek politicians benefiting from such interventions.<sup>21</sup> To the historically oriented Greek scholar, therefore, time-honored prin-

<sup>20</sup> This attitude supports an interventionist modification to the realist theory on balance of power which is easily attacked in tests from the viewpoint of the balance's responsibility. *I.e.*, to draw its weight on the side of weakness and tip the overall balance against those displaying the status quo. On the other hand, the tendency for a small nation to bring its case to war would be to identify the stronger side and join it thus destabilizing further the disturbed equilibrium.

<sup>21</sup> Greek expatriate neo-cons John Herz's assertion regarding the permeability of Greece's foreign boundaries. Of course Herz's view of permeability is predicated on the obvious/technology interdependence of allied nations in the postwar era. While Greece's traditional dependence on great powers was primarily a function of close contact or linkage of communication between Greece's political class, on one hand, and influence groups (primarily foreign offices) of the great powers.

principles of international law such as sovereign equality, independence, non-interference in the domestic affairs of nations could appear at best as utopian goals for the future rather than characteristics of an observable international system of behavior.

#### *International Anarchy vs Domestic Order*

According to traditional theory of international relations the nation state is the significant unit in the international system. Nations are said to conduct their international relations in an environment of quasi-anarchy, where war is the normal condition; diplomacy could be said to be war waged by different means—just to reverse Clausewitz for a minute. It is further asserted that international relations differs from political science (the study of national politics) in that the latter is concerned primarily with order, organization, and control while the former with politics of war, disorder, and disorganization. Of course, numerous exceptions are allowed to these general rules. For instance, it is readily admitted that revolutionaries, internally divided, unstable nations display international behavior in their internal relations, while multinational blocs ("security communities") living in peace, interdependence, and cooperation represent at times behavior expected within stable nations.

In the case of Greece, it could be said unequivocally that the theory of unity of national action<sup>14</sup> finds little practical expression. Greeks have been time after time divided into warring and uncomprehending factions, often denying one another the right of "Greekness" and in fact referring to one another in the unkindest fashion with terms such as "infectious," "phobotsis," "rotarchofascists," "junta," "sidewalk," "negligible quantity," and the like. In their continuing struggles, divided Greeks are often willing to ally with foreigners in order to neutralize, exterminate, or at least defeat their civil antagonists; Greece's folklore has demonstrated this trend with a cynical proverb: Questioner: "Who blinded you?" Answer: "My brother!" Questioner: "No wonder the wound is so deep!"

The student of international relations who seeks to verify assertions

<sup>14</sup> This is surprising in a nation that has a long and glorious history, a fine culture, little dislocation in religion, or social stratification in terms of socioeconomic factors by virtue of titles, caste, etc.; this, in turn, leads one to wonder whether linguistic, racial, religious, cultural, or ethnic homogeneity necessarily result in the development of civility and harmonious communities. It is almost impossible to question on this subject as well. Switzerland (not to mention the United States), a multi-ethnic unit which affirms the proposition that homogeneity does breed civility. This should give some shadow and reflection to leaders of developing nations who feel that tribulation or multi-ethnicity does overcome will bear the fruits of unity of national action.

such as "orderly national units usually interact in a quasi-anarchic international arena" will be hard-pressed against the historical experience of Greek national and foreign policies. Greece, under analysis, definitely emerges internally divided so radically as to prevent the theorist from calling it a cohesive, orderly, national unit.

Let us momentarily examine Greece's history of the 1940's in order to verify the case of positing Greece's internal political disunity and instability.

During the Axis occupation (1941-44), the seeds of a fundamental internal political division were planted in Greece. The Communists infiltrated a large National Liberation Front, and much in the manner of Yugoslavia's Partisans, playing down Marxist slogans and emphasizing patriotic and anti-fascist aims, they managed to create a strong organized base of operations in the countryside from which they could lead later for a total takeover of the country. The effective rival group of the Communists for postwar takeover in Greece was the Greek government in exile, operating in London and Cairo during the war years.

At the end of the war, once more, Greece became the apple of discord between two rival internal groups (Communists and Nationalists) and two rival external groups (Soviet Union and the United States).<sup>15</sup>

From December 1944 to January 1945 the Greek Communists made a desperate bid to take over the government by force of arms. It took the combined strength of the Greek Army and 60,000 British regulars and many days of bitter street fighting in Athens to force them to the trace table. The Communists did not give up after this setback. In fact, they regrouped their forces in the mountains, refused to disarm or integrate with the Greek National Army, and waited for the total defeat of Germany so that the Soviets would be free to give them greater assistance, unimpeded by any wartime alliance obligations.<sup>16</sup> By 1947, the Communist forces, once more, were in partial to total control of the greater portion of rural Greece. The British were announcing their in-

<sup>15</sup> The Soviet Union had written Greece off as a sphere of influence (probably without the knowledge of the Greek Government) in the famous "percentages agreement" reached in Moscow on October 9, 1944 between Stalin and Churchill. The two leaders agreed informally as to their desired spheres of influence (and joint influence areas) in the Balkans and Eastern Europe.

<sup>16</sup> Of course such expectations—especially in terms of Soviet help—might have been quite unrealistic. A helpful analysis of the Greek civil war argues, in fact, that the Soviets were disappointed with the Communist insurgents in Greece, because they were acting as a slight delaying American presence in the Balkans which Stalin wanted to avoid at all costs. See D. G. Koussios, "The Truman Doctrine and Stalin: The Birth of a Disappointed Twenty Years Later." (Unpublished paper delivered by D. G. Koussios at Inter-University Research Colloquium on Russia and Eastern Europe, Institute for Euro-Soviet Studies at George Washington University, Washington, D.C.)

ability to continue aiding and supporting the Greek nationalist government. Greek nationalist politicians were bickering with one another as usual, the country's industrial plant was destroyed, the government was disorganized, and public confidence gone. In short, Greece was a ripe plum ready to fall into the lap of communism.

Then, as a *deus ex machina*, on March 12, 1947, the Truman Doctrine was pronounced and the United States succeeded Britain as the economic supporter and politico-military advisor of Greece. Following two more years of bloody guerrilla war, the Greek Armed Forces decisively defeated the Communists, thanks to their fine tactics and determination as well as the material support and advice offered abundantly by the United States.

The fight against the Communist guerrillas involved advice and aid, and therefore intervention and control of the British and, later, US aid and diplomatic missions. During the period from 1945-49, it would not be an exaggeration to say that no major decision could be taken and no significant law passed by the Greek government without the advice and the informal concurrence of the British and later the Americans. These interventions were not unwelcome by the Greek governments of the period, whose primary concern was to win the civil war. At that time sensitivity over sovereignty and independence in internal affairs was a luxury which could have been hardly afforded. Greece, throughout this period, could not be considered, therefore, independent, or sovereign, or nationally cohesive (in terms of speaking with one voice with respect to her foreign policies).

The situation, therefore, could be described more as one of disorder and war at the national level and orderly interdependence at the regional level under the rising leadership of the United States. If one were to focus on the subsystem of West European nations (which later organized around the North Atlantic Treaty Organization) as a separate universe for analysis, within that subsystem there was hardly anarchy or a state of war. Greece was a dependent nation, in a lower hierarchical position than either the US or Britain and to a considerable extent controlled by the directives of those two countries.<sup>17</sup>

All this leads the analyst to conclude that within the Western Defense system of nations (at least during that period 1945-56) one could say that the norm was order, cooperation, control, and interdependence; in sum, peace rather than war! Greece could not exhibit considerable

<sup>17</sup> On the other hand relations of Greece vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and eastern European countries could be said to be in a perpetual state of suspicion, tension, and rearmament; in short, war waged by different means.

flexibility in her foreign policy given the fact that she was receiving large amounts of economic aid from the US and even larger amounts of military aid in terms of weapons and equipment and other supplies. The Greek military establishment was primarily Western supplied and logistically supported. The continuation of this support could be easily made conditional on the degree of coincidence of Greek foreign policies with US and NATO interests. So any theoretical hypothesis providing autonomy in the foreign policy formulation process proves in this case highly inapplicable.

#### National Interest or Political Interest?

Following the defeat of the Communists in 1949, Greece<sup>18</sup> continued her close military association with the United States, sought to reconstruct and redevelop her warshattered economy, to prevent any resurgence of communism and to secure peacetime guarantees for Greek independence and territorial integrity. In 1952, sponsored by the United States, Greece and Turkey became permanent members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and bound their defenses integrally with those of the West European and North American nations. The Greek parliament in 1952 overwhelmingly approved the accession of Greece to NATO and proclaimed it as the triumphant fruition of a long-time sought objective of Greece, i.e., to secure a peacetime guarantee of her territorial integrity by the Great Powers of the West.

The question which should be asked here is whether NATO accession and Greek-American association were indeed to the benefit of the Greek national interests. But before one can proceed and answer this question he should have a definite idea, after all, about what the "national interest" is. Theorists of international relations are still debating whether an objective concept (and, therefore, a set of policies relating to it) of national interest could be arrived at, or whether one should refer to national interest as a set of preferences and/or perceptions of relevant policy makers.<sup>19</sup> Regardless of whether one adopts the objective or subjective view of national interest, when it comes to the process of interest formulation or articulation, one must recognize the paramountcy of the element of "compromise", national interests, whether expressed in terms of foreign or domestic policies, are in the last analysis—to use Hans J.

<sup>18</sup> Missing for Greek governments of the period.

<sup>19</sup> For a representative discussion of the concept of national interest see Hans J. Morganthau, *Politics Among Nations* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf & Co., 1960), pp. 8-9, and Myron A. Kaplan, *System and Process in International Politics* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1957), pp. 151-61.

Morgenthau's terminology—"a compromise between divergent sectional interests."

What, indeed, were the national interests of Greece in terms of specific policies to be followed by the country in the post-World War II environment? Traditional theory counseled the Greek diplomatist and soldier to seek the maximization of Greek power within the limits of prudence and peaceful coexistence. But the haunting question remained of how best to employ and organize the country's human and material means in order to accomplish the desired ends (as dictated by national interests which, unfortunately, were not compromiseable by the country's politicians). Greece, after World War II, could be said to have had at least the following objective national interests:

A. Continued national existence (survival)

- (1) Reconstruction
- (2) Development
- (3) Territorial Security
- (4) Restoration of some territories administered by neighboring nations which were claimed by Greece on the basis of historical claims or the presence of Greek populations there, or for strategic reasons, etc.

Not too many Greeks could disagree about the desirability of reconstruction and development or the need for territorial security. The problem arose on the how: i.e., the method of employing available means in order to bring about the desired and collectively accepted ends. The Communists, for instance, felt that the socialist system could best guarantee reconstruction and rapid development and industrialization. They felt that Greece, by becoming a people's democracy, could best guarantee her security and could press hard on territorial claims from Turkey (Thrace) and Britain (Cyprus). The Greek nationalists, on the contrary, felt that communism meant enslaving Greece, stifling her progress and development, and surrendering possibly large territories in Macedonia and Epirus to placate the neighboring people's democracies. The Nationalists played up claims against the northern Communist neighbors and soft-pedaled claims against Turkey and, before 1952, claims for the island of Cyprus from the British, while the Communists reversed the emphasis on territorial claims.

Both groups, Communist and Nationalist, sought and accepted foreign support in order to fight and possibly prevail on each other. Naturally, in return for the support sought and received, they were asked for some conceptions. Namely, to toe the line, support the United Nations posi-

tion, cooperate with, understand, and love the nation whose support they accepted, trade with it and be its dependable ally.

The agonizing question here is: why were the Greeks fighting each other. Were they fighting because of ideological reasons, i.e., whose system and method should prevail? Or were they fighting merely as to who would control the country (fighting that is for power<sup>20</sup> pure and simple), legitimizing the quest with an ideological sugar-coating and seeking external support in the process? These are hard questions to answer on an either/or basis. The Greeks fought for power, but their fight was unquestionably aggravated by their uncompromising ideologies which underlaid progress as the total elimination of their mutual opponents (an impossible task, I would think, for as soon as the opponents had been eliminated the victors would tend to divide themselves once more into proponents or opponents).<sup>21</sup> Power alone, or material improvement without any qualifications with respect to values (i.e., power for what purposes?) would be an inadequate explanation of the reason why the Greeks fought so many interstate wars. One could attempt to apply a Thucydidean explanation for the fight asserting that its motivations were fear, interest, and honor (not for loss of life, interest in the improvement of material and social conditions of living, and honor as the attainment of glory and respectful recognition by one's fellow-men.

The missing element, when everything else is said and done, in the "national interest formulation process" in Greece is the basic element of compromise. Some disagreement and competition are, of course, healthy manifestations if they exclude ~~all-out~~ conflict. But the Greek example illustrates the law of diminishing returns brought about by uncompromising conflict. A system of directive and monolithic unity is often doomed to stagnation and lack of imagination. It is in the democratic process through constructive criticism and counter-criticism that competitive interaction creates progress, imaginative activity, and growth. But when criticism abandons the bounds of regulated competition and becomes a struggle for mutual extermination, one can only expect that power will gravitate in the hands of extremists who will justify forcible

<sup>20</sup> In the sense of working authority in an officially recognized position and controlling the decision-making process.

<sup>21</sup> A recent book, curiously creating considerable controversy, the *Survival of the Fittest* from Ilya Prigogine (New York: Doubleday, 1967) in fact goes as far as to suggest that a world of perpetual peace and harmony could have such deleterious effects on the human condition and organization that it would be advisable to continue fabricating crises and "false symbols" in order to perpetuate concepts such as relevance, importance, security, survival, and the like.

assumption of power and limitation of civil liberties in the interest of order, justice, equality, or higher truth.

The national interest of Greece, in the last analysis, was defined as a result of a monumental struggle (the civil war), rather than through a process of debate and political agreement where influence and persuasions are substituted for bullets and bayonets. The nationalist Greeks chose to join the camp of Western nations. Was that a free and ideal choice or merely the acceptance of the inevitable? This is indeed a hard question for Greece, it has been argued by its modern strategists, could not defend herself against any superpower controlling the Mediterranean. The Anglo-Americans clearly controlled the great sea and Greece had no alternative but to seek to ally with them and accept their support and guarantees. Greece had territorial claims against all her neighbors (with the possible exception of Yugoslavia). But her chances of getting any claims satisfied against Turkey, Britain, or Italy by force or threat of force were not only minimal, but, indeed, dangerous and likely to lead her into unthinkable adventures. Of course there was always the choice of remaining neutral.<sup>22</sup> But in this case Greece could not count on the support of either of the great powers for any of her territorial claims. Among other criticisms of the Communists, therefore, one could include that of backing the wrong horse, that of the USSR in the Mediterranean.

Generally the Greek posture case supports heavily John Herz's concept of national inadequacy to provide effective and unequivocal defense and deterrence for each national unit. The nuclear weapon and the electronic revolution have rendered the business of autarkic defense and logistic support extremely risky—in fact prohibitive—for most, not to say all, nations. Greece felt that by virtue of belonging to NATO she could afford to rest at a very low rate (whatever the price of alignment and dependence may be) the advantages of an American produced and operated strategic nuclear deterrent.

The Communists, having lost the military game decisively, continued charging enthusiastically that Greek association with NATO was foolishly, rendering the country a US protectorate, condemning her to remain agrarian—therefore a good market for Western industrial goods—and exposing her to the horrible dangers of absorbing a nuclear war on her own soil. On the other hand, having apparently realized that there was no appeal among most Greeks to an idea of a "Greek Peoples Democracy," the Communists argued for a foreign policy of nonalignment.

<sup>22</sup> The question remains unstated about whether a strategically vital nation such as Greece could survive in a permanently neutral status before great power elements would start competing as to who would install a friendly government there.

withdrawal from NATO and promotion of plans for a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans or greater part of Europe.

Greece's membership in NATO has been brutally tested since at least 1950 with the effort of the Cypriots to gain independence from Britain and later to secure self-determination. Despite the fact that Greece and Turkey often found themselves at the end of tremendous NATO pressures to negotiate and compromise over Cyprus, both countries have restricted their reaction to NATO pressures to hard diplomatic complaints, additional trade and cultural agreements with the Soviet Union and East European nations, and a watchful waiting or protracted low-key conflict prosecution over the simmering and on-surface insoluble issue.

Greece today is once more in the midst of a political crisis which has resurrected old ghosts of division. The split between King Constantine and the Papandreu (father and son) appears to have reawakened the old wounds of royalism vs. antipapalism. Greek politics (at least at the verbal level) reached a very high level of tension and recrimination following the dismissal (forced resignation) of elderly Prime Minister George Papandreu by young King Constantine on July 15, 1963. The Papandreu-led Center Union following the "July crisis" pursued a highly emotional, indignant, and populist campaign that cried for modernization in Greece. Namely, limitation of the King's power as provided for by the spirit not the letter of the constitution; radical social and political reforms; and, in the field of foreign policy, while accepting the desirability of remaining in NATO doing so only with the proviso that Greek independence and dignity (interests) would be safeguarded. The Conservatives and the King, for their part, felt that the Papandreu by pursuing irresponsible and dramatic policies were willingly or otherwise becoming dupes of the Communists and raising interference for an eventual communist thrust to take over the country. Once more the Greek Center and Right movements were divided—apparently beyond reconciliation—as to the "what" constituted the national interests, or to put it less emphatically, as to who would rule the country.

The military takeover of April 21, 1967 has resulted in the suspension of political activity by the current government which claims to have assumed power so as to frustrate the latest and most ominous attempts of the Communists to subvert the country by infiltrating the Center Union Movement. The announced intention of this government is to return Greece to constitutionalism but to do so entirely new and "healthy" foundations: *i.e.*, revising the constitution and providing a new structure which will ensure executive continuity and stability as well as "clarify" the role of the king. Once more one could conclude that consensus build-

ing in Greece is an extremely painful process, often requiring force or the threat of its use to bring it about. Naturally, one should not discount here the importance of the influence which can be exerted on any Greek government by its NATO allies and especially the United States.

Serious pressures have been placed on Greece in a careful public and private campaign among Greece's NATO allies urging the military government to return rapidly to constitutionalism. Unless Greece decides to decrease public and private communications with these Western countries, it is highly likely to yield to these external pressures (assuming that stated policies will coincide with actions). In any case it will be illuminating to watch the outcome of Greece's latest adventure.

What, then, are some of the failings that could be conceptually expressed regarding the Greek post-World War II case? That in a country like Greece, prone to internal division, unable often to contain political conflict within the rules of the game, strategically located to invite foreign influences, it is indeed exceedingly hard to divide internal from foreign politics. In the struggle for power between competing factions, external support is sought and foreign policy platforms become a key method through which Greek politicians can hope for the backing of one great power or another. The clear implication for the student of Greek affairs (and possibly for the student of other small powers who fall in the orbit of great power antagonisms and communications) is that he could not possibly study Greek domestic policies without understanding great power inputs to them, nor could he understand Greece's foreign policies<sup>22</sup> without reference to the dependencies of Greece vis-à-vis the US and other NATO powers.

Greece, in sum, does not fit by far the theoretical model which pictures national units as sovereign, independent, and engaging in atomistic irresponsibility in international relations. Rather it appears that the international relations of Greece in the Atlantic Community subsystem, indeed, reverse the assertions of traditional theory. That is, Greece as a member of the Western Security community is an orderly participant of a quasi-harmonious system, while in its internal politics one encounters a minimum of systemized interrelations and a great proclivity among the political parties to destroy rather than merely convince or outwit opponents. To the culture-bound Greek theorists of international relations, the temptation will be great to consider international dependence, intervention, and manipulation as the key characteristics of international intercourse, rather than sovereignty, independence, and equilibrated coexistence.

<sup>22</sup> E.g., Greece's UN policies and votes.

There is no more representative and appropriate picture of the Greek concept of international relations (possibly any other country's concept also) than the one painted by Greece's immortal poet Constantine P. Cavafy in his poem "Expecting the Barbarians." Here Cavafy describes the activity in Rome the day when the barbarians are expected to come in and take over. He slowly builds a fever pitch of excitement and anticipation. All the daily, routine, mundane processes are about to be fundamentally affected. From lawmaking to dress or political oratory, the coming of the barbarians will bring about the winds of change. But eventually all the excitement dissipates and the daily despair of once more confronting the familiar is descending upon all the inhabitants. And so the poem closes:<sup>23</sup>

Why are the streets and squares clearing quickly,  
and all return to their homes, so deep in thought?  
Because night is here but the barbarians have not come.  
Some people arrived from the frontiers,  
and they said that there are no longer any barbarians.  
And now what shall become of us without any barbarians?  
These people were a kind of salvation.<sup>24</sup>

<sup>23</sup> Constantine P. Cavafy, *The Complete Poems of Cavafy*, trans. Rex Dallas (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1961), p. 18.