


"The Balkans" by Theodore A. Coulombis



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THE BALKANS

Theodore A. Coulombis

The moment was apt for business, so I said, "Let us settle about our affairs in the Balkans. Your amici are in Rumania and Bulgaria. We have interests, missions, and agents there. Don't let us get at cross-purposes in small ways. So far as Britain and Russia are concerned, how would it do for you to have ninety per cent predominance in Rumania, for us to have ninety per cent of the say in Greece, and go fifty-fifty about Yugoslavia?" While this was being translated I wrote out on a half-sheet of paper:

Rumania	
Russia	90%
The others	10
Greece	
Great Britain (in accord with U.S.A.)	90
Russia	10
Yugoslavia	50-50
Hungary	50-50
Bulgaria	
Russia	75
The others	25

I pushed this across to Stalin, who had by then heard the translation. There was a slight pause. Then he took his blue pencil and made a large tick upon it, and passed it back to us. It was all settled in no more time than it takes to set down.¹

It was in such a simple and clear-cut fashion that Churchill and Stalin defined the security interests of the great powers on October 9, 1944, at 10 o'clock at night at the Moscow conference at the Kremlin. The notorious "percentages agreement" is one of the best indications of

¹ Winston S. Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1953), p. 227.

what "balance of power"—that time-tested rule of diplomacy and strategy—is all about. In his memoirs, Churchill recalls with a bit of discomfort the possible cynicism with which decisions involving millions of people were made.² But emotion and morality apparently have no place in affairs of state.

The gist of the Moscow agreement was that Britain considered Greece (and by extension, Turkey) nonnegotiable, while the U.S.S.R. deemed Rumania and Bulgaria all-important and wished their exclusive control. Yugoslavia, divided equally, was to be under the influence of him who could best influence it.

The durability of this "off-the-coff" agreement is unquestionable. The United States has inherited from Britain, via the Truman Doctrine of 1947, the responsibility of guarding the Western world's interests in Greece and Turkey.³ These interests could best be defined as Western military and ideological presence in Greece and Turkey, or its converse—which is perhaps more accurate—denial of access and utility of this strategic real estate to the Soviet Union. The Soviets, in turn, continue to maintain their presence or heavy influence in Bulgaria and Rumania. Yugoslavia alone has managed, since 1948, to toe an independent line, trading freely with both sides in the cold war, arguing or agreeing selectively with one side or the other, and denying the use of its territory to both.

The story of this paper could end here. Its main premise is that there has been no radical change in U.S. security requirements in the Balkans. The United States still considers its presence (or Soviet absence) in Greece and Turkey fundamental to its strategic interests. Further, it understands the "balance of power" as a situation in which Yugoslavia's

² "... there was a long silence. The scrawled paper lay in the centre of the table. At length I said, 'Might it not be thought rather cynical if it seemed we had disposed of these issues, so fatal to millions of people in such an offhand manner? Let us burn the paper.' 'No, you keep it,' said Stalin." Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy*, pp. 227-28.

³ A. J. P. Taylor seems to contradict the view of the vital strategic importance of the Balkans. Characteristic of his viewpoint is the following quotation: "The policy of forestalling Soviet Russia in the Balkans was an invention of the post-war years, purely encouraged by Churchill himself when he became anti-Roman in 1946. There is no contemporary evidence for it. On the contrary, all the strategies—Soviet, British, and American—were designed with the sole object of defeating Germany however much they differed on the way to do it. The postwar outcry sprang from the belief that the Balkans and east-central Europe were important in the Balance of Power. This is an illusion. They had perhaps some strategic value, though only in the sense that, if Soviet armies were on the Danube, an invasion of Russia by the western powers would have to start from farther off. Otherwise the states concerned were liabilities, not sources of strength." Taylor agrees, then, with Bismarck that the Balkans "are not worth the bones of a Pannonian, or any other sort of peasant." See Taylor, *English History 1914-1945* (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 576-77.

neutralist role is insured. Similarly, the U.S.S.R. has made clear that Bulgaria and Rumania rest securely in its own sphere of influence, and has respected Western preeminence in Greece and Turkey; or at least it has not been prepared to risk war in order to gain a foothold in either nation.⁴ The United States and the Soviet Union appear, then, to have reached a *modus vivendi* in the form of a stable balance in the Balkans.

But this analysis, so far, presupposes that the Balkan countries⁵ have no will or interests of their own, and that they are and will remain obedient or unwitting servants of the interests of their overseers. This has been the case in the past, but will it continue?

The Balkan nations sprang from the deteriorating appendages of the Ottoman empire, as a result of revolution and war, in the nineteenth century. Notwithstanding their common poverty and revolutionary heritage, they have grown up in an atmosphere of mutual suspicion and hostility, frequent territorial (irredentist) disputes, and strong, at times uncompromising, nationalism—if not chauvinism. They have been so fragmented by hostility that they have systematically invited external powers to control their destinies. There are indeed only three basic characteristics of modern Balkan history. Foreign intervention, extreme nationalism, and politico-economic backwardness.⁶ These must be understood well by any nation wishing to calculate its security interests in the area.

Great powers have traditionally competed for influence and control within each of the Balkan nations, supporting now one and now another of the local political forces in return for reasonable concessions. Also, these great powers have added their weight to one nation or another in order to maintain the precarious balance that has given the Balkans the image of troublemaker and the "powder keg" of Europe. The post-World War II period is unique in the history of the Balkans in the sense of narrowing the origins of external pressures and influences. This is the result of the division of responsibilities (spheres of influence) between the U.S.S.R. and Britain. (As mentioned earlier, the United States assumed Britain's role in 1947.)

Each of the Balkan nations, however, still exhibits a varying degree of susceptibility to foreign control. Yugoslavia probably best represents the

⁴For instance, the U.S.S.R. was cool to the effort of the Greek communists (1946-1949) to turn Greece into a "people's democracy" because it knew that all the Communists were doing was bringing the United States on Balkan territory. See Edgar O'Ballance, *The Greek Civil War* (New York: Praeger, 1966), pp. 51, 75.

⁵Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Albania, and Greece (and by extension, Turkey) will be discussed in this paper.

⁶Charles and Barbara Jelencik, *The Balkans* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), p. 129. See also L. S. Stavrianos, *Balkan Federation* (Hamden, Conn.: Anchor Books, 1964), who in *The Balkans Since 1943* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1958).

case of successful defection or escape from any great-power control. Rumania has recently become a similar case. But the examples of 1956 Hungary and 1968 Czechoslovakia are somber warnings against any radical severing of the umbilical cord with the Soviet womb.

On the other side of the spectrum, we see, under a climate of detente, polycentrism, and post-Vietnam disorientation, great pressures building in pre-1967 Greece and Turkey toward loosening the American apert strings. Both countries wish to promote low-key, defensive participation in NATO and to increase economic and cultural cooperation with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. It has been argued by some analysts that the Greek coup of April 21, 1967, represents the American counterpart of the Czech invasion; that is, that the Greek revolutionary junta acted as an agent of American interests becoming alarmed with the anti-American or neutralist policies that a George Papandreu government (following the scheduled elections of May, 1967) might conceivably have pursued.⁷

Tito's Yugoslavia, by adopting a "diplomacy of balance,"⁸ has tried to walk the tightrope of non-alignment and play one "cold-warring" power against the other. Tito has been eminently successful, so far, in maintaining his country's independence and sovereignty, although he has frequently vacillated in and out of military and economic dependency, first with the U.S.S.R. and later (1949-1954) with the United States and NATO. In fact, in 1953 and 1954, he reached the point of entering a political and military pact with Greece and Turkey and thus indirectly aligning Yugoslavia with NATO.⁹

The second major characteristic of the Balkan nations is strong, if not uncompromising, nationalism. Suffice it to say that even to the present time, there are basic territorial questions separating all Balkan nations,

⁷Andrew G. Papandreu, "The Greek Dictatorship Not a Domestic Affair," *The Greek Observer*, No. 4, June 1969, p. 7, and "Greece: Warning to the World," *ADA Magazine* (May, 1968), pp. 6-8, also "The Greek Problem is Really an American Problem," *New York Times Magazine* (July 21, 1968), p. 36. For a different point of view favoring the colonels' government, and the necessity of the Greek coup *d'état*, see Savas Constantinopolis, "In Defense of the Colonels in Athens," *Atlas* (November, 1967), pp. 28-32, and D. George Kossovas, "The Origins of the Greek Military Coup, April 21, 1967," *Orbis* (Summer, 1969). See also the comments made in a speech by Robert M. Allan (the president of Litton International Development Corporation) delivered at the Statler-Hilton Hotel, Boston, on April 7, 1968, on the occasion of the 147th anniversary of Greek independence. The speech was entitled "Greece: Birthplace of Modern Economic Development."

⁸Stephen S. Anderson, "Yugoslavia, the Diplomacy of Balance," *Current History* (April, 1969), p. 212.

⁹On the Balkan pact, see the excellent study of John O. Itridia, *The Balkan Triangle* (The Hague: Mouton Press, 1968) discussing the background and causes for the birth and death of this alliance across ideological boundaries.

among them Transylvania, Bessarabia, Macedonia, Kosovo, Northern Epirus, Vuyvodina, Istria, Carinthia, and, of course, Cyprus. These questions normally lie dormant, but they can appear and escalate quickly during times of crisis in intra-Balkan relations. All of the Balkan countries are involved with conflicting claims on one another's territories and populations. There is no doubt, therefore, that nationalism has proven itself as the most potent and durable force in the Balkans, stronger than international communism or functional federation, pacifism, or any other form of regional unity and confederation.

Albania's post-World War II behavior is most illustrative as a case study of the force of nationalism. Immediately after the removal of the Axis forces (in 1944-1945) the Albanian Communists, under heavy sponsorship from Tito's Yugoslavia, gradually established themselves in power. Yugoslavia poured economic and military technicians into Albania, set up "joint" Yugoslav-Albanian companies (much in the "Sov-Rom style" of the Soviets in Rumania) and proceeded toward the rapid integration of Albania into an expanded South Slav federation. The outbreak of the Tito-Stalin dispute was all that saved Enver Hoxha, the Communist leader of Albania, from becoming a regional official in a Yugoslav federation. He immediately denounced the economic ties with Yugoslavia, which were allegedly exploiting his country, and joined Stalin and the Cominform in the shrillest condemnation of Yugoslavia.¹⁰ "Titoists" in Albania, such as Koci Xoxe, were purged as traitors to the national integrity of Albania and agents of Yugoslav imperialist designs.¹¹

The historic visit to Belgrade of Kaushelev and Bulganin in 1955 marked a thaw in Soviet-Yugoslav relations and consequently worried Albanian leaders as to their fate. Could Albania become a prize for Yugoslavia's return to the Soviet bloc? Out of despair and isolation in the late 1950s, Albania frantically sought support from alternative sources by improving its relations and trading with "capitalist" Italy and gravitating toward the Chinese once the Sino-Soviet dispute surfaced. Naturally a lot of ideological sugar coating was spread over the substance of these shifts and maneuvers, primarily designed to accomplish two things: maintain Albania's sovereignty and independence and insure the continued control of its governmental apparatus by Enver Hoxha and his deputy Mehmet Shehu.

Yugoslavia's policy, throughout the postwar years, is also highly indicative of strong collective or "federal Nationalism." Yugoslavia has in the postwar years jealously guarded its territorial integrity. The explosive question over Trieste, for instance, was solved peacefully primarily be-

cause of Yugoslavia's extreme isolation and desperation resulting from the Soviet-Yugoslav rift.

Greece, in its turn, has come to the brink of war with Turkey three times over the disputed territory of the island of Cyprus. Greek-Albanian relations are still in a technical state of war, and Greek military planners never cease referring to the paper-thin slice of vulnerable territory separating Bulgaria from its coveted "window on the Aegean."

Each Balkan nation, jealous of its neighbor, seeks protection by or augmentation from powerful sponsors; there is no question, therefore, that nationalist issues have kept the Balkans so divided that foreign penetration has been a logical result. This situation has prompted two authors writing on the Balkans to pose the following rhetorical question:

Since the actions of the non-Balkan powers have always quite obviously and naturally been dictated by their own national interests, a question arises: Why do the Balkan people not cooperate with one another and resist foreign interference? They are united in many ways. The Albanians, the Bulgarians, the Greeks, the Serbs, and the Rumanians are Orthodox; the Yugoslavs and the Bulgarians have very similar languages. They all suffer from the consequences of foreign control and economic backwardness.¹²

Notwithstanding all these hard and fast conditions, the Balkan nations have never managed to break through the bounds of narrow nationalism and to attempt functional or political regional arrangements. At best, most attempts for Balkan federation or alliance have been ideological and utopian assertions of rhetoric and at worst, short-lived alliances designed to balance some members of the Balkans against some others.¹³ The chief historian of the area, for instance, refers to the Balkan Pact of 1934 as a pact "concerned primarily with the maintenance of the territorial status quo and . . . directed against Bulgaria."¹⁴ The Balkan Pact of 1934 was much in the same spirit, despite the fundamental changes in the social systems of the Balkans after World War II.

The third characteristic condition of the beleaguered Balkan peninsula is economic backwardness coupled with periods of either near chaotic political instability or harsh authoritarian dictatorship imposed from extreme right or extreme left elements. In times of democracy most Balkan nations have gravitated toward multiparty systems, personality-oriented rather than issue-oriented parties, and changing electoral laws.

¹⁰ Jelavich, *The Balkans*, p. 133.

¹¹ It has been a favorite pastime of status quo nations of Greece and Yugoslavia to enter defensive pacts designed to protect them from "revisionist" Bulgaria. See L. S. Stavrianos, *Balkan Federation*, pp. 124ff.

¹² Stavrianos, *Balkan Federation*, p. 358.

¹³ See Robert Lee Wolf, *The Balkans in Our Time* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961), pp. 367ff.

¹⁴ Wolf, *The Balkans in Our Time*, pp. 379-80.

As could be expected, these conditions lead to contested elections, coalition governments, frequent party shifts and defections, and a generally fertile ground for intervention, be it external or internal. Internally, such a political melee encourages dictatorial elements to usurp authority. Then, when the dictatorships (whether rightist or leftist) come to power, allegedly to remedy conditions of corruption, nepotism, and instability, they are unpopular enough domestically to need external aid and support to maintain their viability. Once more the invitation to foreign intervention and penetration is ever present.

The economic backwardness of the Balkans has been attributed primarily to factors of climate and geography as well as the debilitating effect of hundreds of years of stalling and inefficient occupation under the Ottoman empire. Whether economic backwardness is responsible for the recurring extremes of political instability (in democracy) on one hand or the oppressive dictatorship (in fascist, Communist, or purely authoritarian regimes), on the other, is a matter of speculation best left to "pantologists," interdisciplinarians, or Marxists.

There is no doubt that in the post-World War II era all Balkan nations have made great efforts and considerable progress in economic development, combatting illiteracy, ill health, and citizen neglect—factors named as the causes of mistakes and misfortunes of the past. Economic growth, it is to be hoped, will continue without destructive and destabilizing social and political effects on the much-harassed Balkan peoples.

The outlook for the future is relatively predictable today. Rumania,¹⁸ with an internally directive regime, is progressively gaining popularity at home and acceptance abroad by employing policies of independence vis-à-vis the U.S.S.R., rapid industrialization (Rumanian style) regardless of common guidelines, and eclectic or pragmatic policies vis-à-vis the rest of the world. The Nixon trip attests to the approval on the part of the United States (perhaps no more than approval and, God forbid, no commitment) of nationalist reassertion in Eastern Europe.

Bulgaria remains the staunchest advocate of Moscow's supremacy in the Balkans and the Communist movement in general.¹⁹ This dependent role is perhaps dictated by the Bulgarian leadership's assessment of what is in the small country's best national interest. As the years go by, the Communist regime in Bulgaria is likely to gain additional acceptance at home and rely less on Soviet external support. In the meantime, however, it is natural for Bulgaria to gravitate toward the U.S.S.R., since her traditional adversaries (Greece, Yugoslavia, and Turkey) currently have cool and correct relations with the Soviets. Undoubtedly—in times of

detente and thaw—Bulgaria will continue to seek better trade and cultural relations with the West and other Balkan nations, but her close strategic orientation toward the U.S.S.R. is likely to continue for a long time.

Yugoslavia²⁰ should perhaps receive the highest marks for maintaining relative immunity from external intervention and control and exercising an independent, self-initiated foreign policy. Tito, in his pursuit of a policy of balanced diplomacy, nonalignment and neutralism, has attained for himself and his country prestige disproportionate to his nation's size and power. Yugoslavia will most likely continue to play the role of the "honest broker" between blocs in times of East-West friction. In times of detente, however, Tito (or his successors) could spearhead federative or confederative schemes in the Balkans and eastern Mediterranean (strongly assisted by Rumania) designed to create neutral, demarcated safety zones. Such a zone would result should the Soviet and U.S. Sixth fleet leave the Mediterranean—a recent Tito wish—to avert a future accidental clash that might have catastrophic nuclear consequences.²¹ All these schemes, of course, are likely to remain unfulfilled suggestions as long as the present balance of power situation perpetuates itself.

Albania²² maintains and will continue to maintain strong, nepotist, authoritarian rule in a backward and poor country that exists in utter isolation from its Balkan and European environment. The leaders of Albania will continue advocating the appropriate "doctrinal mix" designed to secure external support—be it from the U.S.S.R. or China—against two relatively powerful neighbors (Greece and Yugoslavia) that would allegedly divide and devour her given a free hand. These fears may be somewhat exaggerated in view of the fact that few nations (including Greece and Yugoslavia) would welcome the burden of inheriting territories that would become economic liabilities for their relatively more advanced populations.

Greece²³ (and under very similar conditions, Turkey) finds itself a

¹⁸ For background, see Robert F. Byrnes, ed., *Yugoslavia* (New York: Mid-European Studies Center, 1957).

¹⁹ Tito answering a question in a news conference said recently: "We had thought the presence of the Soviet fleet would contribute to a solution [of the Middle East crisis] and so we felt it was positive. But we are now afraid that one day it might come to a conflict between them [U.S.S.R., United States], because one never knows when a situation may explode. It would be better if neither fleet were there, that they did not concentrate there, but we must accept the facts as they stand." *American Current History* (April, 1969), p. 217.

²⁰ For background see Steve Stredny (ed.), *Albania* (New York: Mid-European Studies Center, 1966). See also Nicholas C. Pans, *The People's Republic of Albania* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1969).

²¹ C. M. Woodhouse, *The Story of Modern Greece* (London: Faber & Faber, 1968); D. George Koussios, *Revolution and Defeat* (London: Oxford University Press, 1965); T. A. Coulombis, *Greek Political Reaction to American and NATO*

¹⁹ For background see Stephen A. Fischer-Galati, ed., *Romania* (New York: Mid-European Studies Center, 1957).

²⁰ See L. A. D. Collins, ed., *Bulgaria* (New York: Mid-European Studies Center, 1957).

stance ally of the United States, bound to it through NATO and direct bilateral agreements. Postwar Greek progress and redevelopment had a late start owing to the costly and traumatic (in terms of political aftermath) civil war in 1946-1949. The 1950s, however, were years of relative governmental stability and considerable economic progress. But throughout the 1950s the Greek military establishment enjoyed large-scale independence from political control. When, in the mid-1960s, Greece was visited by a series of political crises, a small team of army mid-career officers assumed governmental control by *coup d'état* and established an interim dictatorship whose long-range aim was to reestablish a "modern and safe democracy."²¹ Following over two years of military rule, the George Papadopoulos regime shows few, if any, signs of repeating the Turkish pattern of the 1960s, which retained the control of power to politicians, proclaimed elections, and maintained the armed forces only as an auxiliary guarantor of the stability (that is, Western orientation) of the country. Instead George Papadopoulos appears to be digging in for a long term in power. He has purged large numbers of military officers, restaffed the governmental apparatus with reliable men, and put "plaster over an allegedly broken-boned Greece."²² Pressures from NATO countries and the United States are likely to intensify in the direction of reestablishing democracy in its birthplace; however, if Papadopoulos survives, it is not unlikely that he, too, will make a dramatic volte-face to gain external support from the "best bidder." And so it is possible, in the personalized vocabulary of political science, a new term will appear timidly next to terms such as "Stalinism," "Titoism," and "Nasserism"—"Papadopolism."

What has the post-World War II policy of the United States been toward the Balkans? The application of the balance of power system vis-à-vis Soviet (and more recently, Chinese) presence in the area is perhaps the best summary description. Toward Greece and Turkey the United States has followed an alignment policy of close association, heavy military and economic aid, the construction of American bases on

their territories, coordination of armed forces through NATO, and good cultural and economic relations.

Toward Yugoslavia, since the split with the U.S.S.R. in 1948, the United States has followed a most benevolent policy indeed. It has spent well over \$2 billion in helping Tito with economic and military aid. By encouraging the Balkan Pact (between Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey in 1954),²³ the United States has almost found itself in the paradoxical position of having to rush to the defense of one Communist regime against the possible encroachments of another.

The U.S. policy toward Bulgaria and Rumania, as with the rest of Eastern Europe, has been one of economic isolation and political condemnation (at least verbally). More recently the United States has adopted a "new look" toward Eastern Europe by abandoning policies of "liberation," or "rollback," for "building bridges" or employing "peaceful engagement." These tactics are designed to increase trade, ameliorate cultural relationships, and more or less consolidate the East-West détente, thus relaxing the cold war somewhat but not enough to disturb the institutional trappings of the East-West adversary relationship.²⁴ Even more recently, the policy of peaceful engagement seems to have run into some great snags. First there is the psychological reaction to the Czech invasion, which sobered up many prophets of "gradual autonomy-building" in East Central Europe. Also, the lack of any substantive response from the United States has once more—as with Hungary and Poland—reminded the world of the imperatives of "balance of power," of "spheres of influence," and of the necessary gap between the ideal or desirable and the real or prudent policies. Further, the continuing Vietnam stalemate has antagonized large segments of the U.S. Congress to the point of opposing policies of freer trade with Eastern European countries, which are simultaneously supplying Hanoi with war materials.²⁵

So the prospects for the next ten years are for a continuation of the geopolitical and geostrategic balance of power-policy of the United States toward the Balkans based on the triptych calling for alliance

²¹ Influences (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966), and for perhaps the most valuable survey on modern Greek politics, see Jean Meynaud, *Les Forces Politiques en Grèce* (Montreal: Etudes de Science Politique, 1965). See also Keith A. Legg, *Politics in Modern Greece* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1965).

²² The suspension of constitutional freedoms in Greece was the source of considerable embarrassment to the United States, under whose protective umbrella this retrogressive development occurred.

²³ For illustrations see Marcus Wheeler, "Greek Political Perspectives," *Le Spectateur International* (English edition), III, No. 1 (January-March, 1965), 339. See also Theodore A. Coulombis, "Greece: Balloets or Bayonets," *World Affairs*, Vol. CXXX, No. 4 (March, 1968).

²⁴ See Iatrides, *The Balkan Triangle*, pp. 133ff., for an excellent discussion of the implications of the pact.

²⁵ See Andrew Kohutski, "East Europe and the United States," *Current History* (April, 1966), pp. 201ff. For the most clear-cut statement of this "new look," see Lyndon B. Johnson's address before the National Conference of Editorial Writers, New York, October 7, 1966, Department of State Bulletin (Oct. 24, 1966). For a scholarly introduction to this "new look" see Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Alternative to Partition* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968). And for a brilliant criticism of the Brzezinski position see Stanley Hoffman, *Gallner's Troubles: Or The Setting of U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), pp. 485-92.

²⁶ See Kohutski, *op. cit.*, pp. 203ff.

with Greece and Turkey, support for an independent, non-hostile Yugoslavia, and maximum feasible economic and cultural cooperation with Bulgaria and Rumania, designed to encourage the liberalization of their regimes and (but within prudent limits) increase their autonomy vis-à-vis the U.S.S.R.

In the short run, therefore, it pays the United States as well as the U.S.S.R. to support in deeds, if not in words, policies of national exclusivism (within safe limits) rather than federalism in the Balkans. As long as the Balkans are divided, suspicious of one another, and warring, they will be fertile ground for external intervention. Of course this attitude may change as the U.S. government's estimate regarding the "objective" requirements of security (which are usually subjective) changes.²⁰ For instance, the day may come when we cease relying on overseas fixed bases for logistic support, or military capability for definition of influence and strategic presence. The nuclear equation may very well push the superpowers toward a policy of mutual disengagement and the development of mutually guaranteed "pacification" zones. Our very understanding of terms such as power, influence, and security may take altogether new forms. Instead of units of military or institutionalized presence, influence and power may be gauged in economic and cultural and, in any case, interpersonal rather than intergovernmental terms. This is a vision, indeed, of the far future, when the present alliance systems have been dissolved, the cold war lines blurred, and the division of Europe ended.

What will the Balkans do then? What can they do today? The road for the Balkan people is two-branched and they are at the crossroads today; it seems they will continue to be at the same crossroads for many decades to come. If they stay on their present path, extreme nationalism and protracted conflict will remain their lot. Even if the United States and U.S.S.R. should decide to disengage from Balkan politics, middle-range powers such as Britain, France, Germany, Czechoslovakia, and China would rush to fill the vacuum. Penetration would continue as in the past, only from different sources.

What, then, are the lessons of history for Balkan planners? If they wish to minimize external intervention, they must create a regional

²⁰ President Richard Nixon addressing the North Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C., said: "We in America continue to consider Europe's security to be our own." And thus he added, "It is not enough to talk of European security in the abstract. We must have the elements of insecurity and how to remove them." In Robert Ellsworth, "The Future of the Atlantic Alliance," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LX, No. 154 (June 16, 1969). Of course Mr. Nixon is approaching optimism as extreme optimism in hoping that elements of insecurity can be removed. Professor Samuel Sharp in his lecture entitled "Changing Security Requirements by Great Powers" (appearing elsewhere in this volume) wittily referred to "perfect security" as "death."

union, which would naturally limit narrow national ideals, interests, and prerogatives. Before countries like Rumania, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey can seriously advocate schemes for federal or confederal union in the Balkans, some hard, empirical studies must be conducted to determine the "integrability index" of the Balkan peninsula. Is it economically advantageous, for example, for each of the Balkan nations to enter into a regional customs union or common market? How far is integration to go? Should one begin with economic and social cooperation as the "functionalists" would argue, or should one admit that unless there is a fundamental political understanding all partial efforts toward cooperation will meet with failure? To borrow Karl Deutsch's term,²¹ is the Balkan peninsula a "security community"? If not, if the chances for integration are minuscule because of economic or geographic or ethnic or religious or even myth-made incompatibility, then all talk urging a Federal Balkans is either irrevocably utopian, an exercise in frustration, or a ritualistic weaving of a phrase merely because its texture is good.

Whither, then, the Balkans? Todor Zhivkov, the Premier of Bulgaria, made the following impassioned pleas on the twenty-fifth anniversary of Kemal Ataturk's death. He said:

May the Balkan peninsula never again become a battlefield, nor a battlefield for military operations, but may it become a region of peaceful coexistence, of mutual economic and cultural cooperation between the states for the welfare of our peoples.²²

But the hard question still remains: Cooperation and welfare and peaceful coexistence on whose terms and how implemented? And so we pessimistically return to "Balkanization" as usual.

²¹ Karl W. Deutsch et al., "Political Community and the North Atlantic Area," *International Political Communities* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1966), pp. 1-61. See especially p. 57 where he outlines essential conditions for community amalgamation. It would be an extremely useful contribution indeed if a study were completed measuring the "security-community" indices of the Balkans, using the methodological guidelines of the Deutsch school.

²² See Todor Zhivkov, *For Peace, Friendship and Solidarity* (Sofia: Foreign Languages Press, 1966), p. 468.