

George Anastasio, the reviewer, a lecturer in liberal arts at the University of Chicago and a professor of political science at Rosary College, has been declared persona non grata by the Greek Government because of his articles about American policy in Greece. His knowledge of the country, his political astuteness and his feeling for the Greek people permit him to offer insights that enable one to evaluate more clearly the present political situation in Greece and to judge more accurately U.S. policy toward Greece.

The article follows:

GEORGE OF THE JOURNALISTS: A REVIEW OF TWO BOOKS

(By George Anastasio)

The two books reviewed on this occasion are John A. Katria's *Evilness in Greece: The Colonels Come to Power* (St. Louis: E. P. Dutton Co., 1971; 317 pages, \$9.95), and Edward Stockton's *Phoenix With a Regress: A Journalist's Interior Report on the Greek Revolution* (Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press, 1971; 304 pages, \$7.95).

Both of these excessively partisan books can be useful for the discerning American reader. Edward Stockton, an American freelance journalist living in Greece, attempts to make a case for the Greek colonels who seized power in Athens in April 1967. John A. Katria, a Greek journalist with a very good reputation (who now lives in Mississippi), makes the case against the United States which will probably be accepted some day by most Greeks, a case which sees the colonels as little more than American agents. Perhaps, indeed, that day has already come. The Stockton book, despite its effort to say all that can be said for the colonels—and, even more significant, despite its willingness to ignore much of what can be said against them—has not been received altogether enthusiastically in Athens. Mr. Stockton remains enough of a journalist to reveal here and there (often almost inadvertently) marked deficiencies in the regime he defends. In addition, one can deduce the colonel's shortcomings by noticing the subjects skirted by their apologist. Most revealing may be the manner in which the long-standing torture charges are handled by Mr. Stockton. He will not say outright that there has not been widespread deliberate recourse to torture as official government policy. Rather, he argues that such charges cannot be "totally proved or disproved" and then proceeds to treat them as trivia. If not even fraudulent, p. 184. The colonels themselves have been obliged to admit, both by the vituperative denials they issue and by the respectable deeds they conceal, that neither their program nor their country's plight has justified reliance on the torture which is alleged by their critics.

Had Mr. Stockton been willing to assess the torture charges, to apply the standards and accept the kind of evidence he relies upon to condemn the misdeeds of the colonel's predecessors, he would have been obliged to recognize the existence since 1947 of systematic torture unknown in any West European country today and unprecedented in peacetime Greece. Had he been willing to conduct the inquiries which foreign journalists can still make in Greece, he would easily have confirmed dozens (if not hundreds) of cases of savage torture, cases which have been documented in even greater number in James Beck's *Barbarians in Greece* (New York: Walker and Co., 1970) and in the thousand-page report (issued in 1970) of the Commission on Human Rights of the Council of Europe. For anyone to attempt to justify torture and slavery by a claim to such available evidence is to raise serious doubts

about his reliability. The reader should be reminded of the kind of perverse self-deception, if not even dishonesty, which permitted intelligent men to agree for so many years Stalin's barbarism.

Success has been had to torture and to continued repression because the colonels have not been able, in their five years in acquiescence of the Greek people, The United States has been guided into its present support of the regime by repeated assurances of a speedy return to constitutional government and free elections. It should be evident that the colonels have neither the intention of ever giving up power voluntarily nor the ability to retain it constitutionally. Certainly, one does not need much personal exposure to these unwhifful army officers to realize they are crude opportunists who are ruthless, self-righteous and dangerous. "We have all heard, we all know," George Sefiris (the Nobel Laureate poet) observed in Athens in March 1966, "that in dictatorships of the Greek type, which Greece may yet tragically wait at the end, inauspicious. . . . The longer this abnormal situation lasts, the greater the evil."

The colonels were able to seize power in 1967 because of the imprudent and irresponsible feuding among the recognized politicians in Greece during the preceding decade. This feuding, which was magnified with the aid of an article printed in a prestigious constitutional review in 1965, is exhibited in the Katria book. Mr. Katria's disregard of the practical consequences of what he writes is an instructive example of the public policy in which Greek and American journalists indulged before the colonels struck. His intemperate denunciations of the Greek monarchy can only impede the forging of an effective anti-colonel coalition. Similarly, his refusal and republicans alike, who now find themselves in opposition to the colonels. How unrealistic his program is may be seen in the conditions he sets forth for the replacement of the colonels by an acceptable regime: there is about such pronouncements considerable fantasy, as if the colonel's opponents are now able to decide who will govern Greece. It does not seem to be realized, that is, that the colonels are likely to remain in power for a generation, barring chance developments or a serious international crisis.

The only prospect for dislodging the colonels, once entrenched, depends upon judicious support by the United States of the Greek people in their desire to rid themselves of their tyrants. But the influence of the United States has been fading, and with this the colonels have dared become more open in their contempt for the free world, its institutions and its concerns. I have, since the end of the 1960s, known several elite Greek political figures who are alive today as well as all the principal members of the colonel's conspiracy. If really would mind to have any one of the former (e.g., King Constantine, F. Kanellopoulos, C. Karamanlis, G. Mavros, C. Mitsotakis, A. Papandreu, G. Radis, O. Vaidalis, H. Vachos) as my guest for more or all of the colonels' reign, I would not object. It seems the colonels seem to me, as an American, to have much more in common (such as a genuine respect for civilization) than any of them have in common with the colonels now in power.

Who is really responsible for the emergence of these colonels? Mr. Stockton virtually ignores the notorious role of the United States in the making and unmaking of the Greek revolution since the Second World War. He recognizes that virtually all the leading men in Greek political life between 1945 and 1947 (including the King) refused to do the sensible thing, which would have been to accept so much as a constitutional difference. Mr. Katria's emphasis,

George Anastasio, "George of the Journalists: A Review of Two Books," 118 CONG. REC. E8149 (Sept. 27, 1972).

## REVIEW OF TWO BOOKS ON THE RULING REGIME IN GREECE

HON. DON EDWARDS

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, September 26, 1972

Mr. EDWARDS of California. Mr. Speaker, I would like to call to your attention an article that appeared in a somewhat abbreviated form in the Saturday Review, February 12, 1972. A review of two recently published books on the ruling regime in Greece, this article pointedly reminds us of the highly criticized and deservedly questionable role of the United States, both past and present, in Greek affairs. The American Government has actively supported and publically assisted the military junta now in power with both statements of approval and shipments of arms. Such actions blatantly contradict the ideals of democracy and freedom that the United States claims to represent.

on the other hand, is upon the failings of the Right and upon the decisive interventions of the United States. He does not appreciate the extent to which frequent street demonstrations and public services were in 1945 and 1947 (for which the Center and the Left were largely responsible and of which he now writes with nostalgic approval) also helped prepare the way for the colonists. Many appeasement Greeks, albeit mistakenly, saw these disturbances as harbingers of a breakdown of civil order and of a return to the civil war of a generation before. Mr. Katriza virtually ignores that war and its traumatic effect upon contemporary Greece, an effect which may be seen both in the reluctance of the King to permit blood to be shed in reuniting the colonists and in the concern of the colonists themselves that their regime not be identified publicly with elections. There would be much more violent resistance to the colonists among disaffected Greeks today but for the tacit consent on all sides that the inexcusable vendettas of the 1940s should not be revived.

Mr. Katriza's insistence that the American C.I.A. is really behind the colonists does not recognize that such control need not be pointed in order for one to understand what happened in Greece in April 1967. To insist upon the C.I.A. as decisive is to underestimate the shortcomings of Greece of all parties. It is to be a primer of that taste for the corporatorial and the dramatic (with the degradation of the role of chance in human affairs) which can make Greeks both so engaging and so exasperating. It ignores, furthermore, the growing realization among Greeks of all persuasions (at least among those who have remained in Greece) that something was seriously wrong with the old way of doing things, that leaders of all parties contributed to the mutual irresponsibility and posturing which permitted barbarians in khaki to install themselves as the saviors of their troubled country.

The most obvious feature of the Stockton book for Americans should be the display of the Americans as by-product and participant, well-meaning and determined, restorers of law and order. It is to the credit of Greek politicians and journalists that no not-of-our-land among them can be recruited by the dictatorship to serve as its apologist. This, however, irrepressibly passionate they have been, they do retain the sense of honor after acceptance of their position. Would a similar picture among us remain constant for five years to attract any serious support from established leaders and writers?

The colonists and their associates, usually the most disreputable elements in the army and out, realize that the best means of execution is that they should surrender power. That is, they realize that propaganda bargains have not secured for them genuine public support. It is significant, for instance, that the newspapers which are described by Mr. Stockton as most closely identified with the colonists are found (elsewhere in his book) at the bottom of the list of circulation figures for Athens newspapers, p. 164. Even he recognizes (Always on an aside), "The danger to the future of Greece lies in the lowering of spirit and sterility in a citizenry no longer used to the sterility of free thought. If the Revolution permits, its drive for conformity could produce a generation too sheltered to be fully responsible." p. 222. (That which the colonists call a "revolution" is called by their opponents a "military takeover" or a "blotting.")

The colonists do not, and indeed cannot, solve any of the serious problems of their country. Instead, chronic ailments are concealed, hearted and deception are substituted for much-needed reforms; and the future is casually mortgaged to the desperate efforts of opportunists to do what they can to perpetuate themselves in power. Short-term specialists for the colonists should be

reminded of the military regime in Pakistan which was long extolled as a competent government but which was eventually revealed as having merely postponed (and hence made even more difficult) responsible treatment of problems of longstanding seriousness.

One need not assume, in order to anticipate that Americans will be discredited for a long time to come in Greece, that the United States covertly engineered the colonists' coup. Our public conduct since April 1947, in supplying the colonists arms and other tonnage of legitimacy and eyes of approval, suffices to earn for us a legacy of potentially explosive bitterness of which Mr. Katriza's book is but a warning. Greek separatists and royalists will dispute Mr. Katriza's explanation of what happened in Athens before 1967; but they will not want to challenge his denunciations of what the United States has and has not done since the colonists seized power. The most prudent course for the United States in the years ahead, in an area so important to the interests of the free world, may be to encourage Greece to burden itself against further American meddling by having live-and-let-live political and economic association with Western Europe. Perhaps such an association can help supply that constitutional moderation which a faction-ridden Greece has all too often lacked. *Federalist No. 19* comes to mind.

#### Note.

"Accompanied" should be "accompanying" at line 57, column 1, page E8150 of this review.

See, for other recent discussions by George Anastaplo bearing on the subjects of this review,

- i) The Constitutionalist: Notes on the First Amendment (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1971);
- ii) "Canada and the Dilemmas of Decent Men," 116 Conn. Rec. E11057 (Jan. 2, 1971);
- iii) "American Policy in Greece: A Declaration of Bankruptcy," 117 Conn. Rec. E13889 (Dec. 17, 1971);
- iv) "Military Men and Political Questions; What the American Visitor Can Learn from Greece Today," 117 Conn. Rec. E6129 (June 17, 1971);
- v) "American Aid and Greek Tyranny: A Memorandum," 116 Conn. Rec. E10520 (Dec. 18, 1970);
- vi) "Swan Song of an Eagle: America in Greece," 117 Conn. Rec. E8492 (July 29, 1971);
- vii) "Preliminary Reflections on the Pentagon Papers," 118 Conn. Rec. S11560 (July 24, 1972);
- ix) "Vietnam, Insubordination and Self-Government," 118 Conn. Rec. E8414 (Oct. 5, 1972).