

Greece. But, it should be noted, it may not matter, in assessing the influence of American policy upon Greek affairs, whether we actively deliver military aid to the colonial regime. It does matter whether we are believed by the Greek people to be detouring such aid. Instead, the colonists would prefer to have us present publicly to providing their military aid, while not actually doing so, than to have us repudiate publicly our aid while continuing to deliver it in private.

It has been of great importance to the colonists that the United States should appear in public to regard the Greek regime as a respectable ally. Such internationalization tends to paralyze those elements in Greece which remain hostile to the colonists. If the United States continues to support the colonists, it is asked, what can we expect citizens to do to assist them? And, to further asked, would the American Vice-President be permitted to continue himself as he has in Greece if the United States does not really support the regime?

The political effect in Greece of the Vice-President's visit cannot be overestimated, ever he may have said in private to the colonists about a return by Greece (as part of "the Free World") to constitutional government. Typically, on whichever side of the Iron Curtain they may be entrenched, nations are argued out of office. The colonists have dug themselves in, partly by reporting since 1967 our public acquiescence, if, not support of, their regime. Our State Department's support is now strong that they were demoted into "going along" by the colonists' repeated assertions that international relations are necessary to constitutional government.

No matter what kind of welcome one can be staged in Athens for American leaders, there are leaders in Greece today who reasonably expect a proud people who can readily be led to regard themselves as having been subjected to a tyrannical rule in order to serve the strategic interests of the United States. Such resentment can damage the permanent national interests both of Greece and of the United States in the Eastern Mediterranean. In fact, the United States may have already so compromised itself in Athens that it is now limited to an effort to salvage what it can of its relations with Greece after the colonists do go.

How has a country which had been as influential in Greece gotten itself into the helpless position we now find ourselves? First, we relinquished the Greek constitution of 1926, in 1937, a crisis in which the legitimate leaders of Greece did conduct themselves responsibly. We did not do what we could have so that time to moderate the passions which had developed in Athens and in which we contributed.

Then, we relinquished the existing colonists who seized power in April 1967. We failed to see what should have been evident to everyone who saw these men close up; that they were ardent opportunists with a latent conservatism. We failed to see well that there was (and perhaps still is) available as a popular alternative to the colonists an experienced conservative, a former prime minister of considerable prestige in Greece, who was clearly friendly to the United States. In short, we betrayed our friends and the cause of decent government in Greece by permitting ourselves to be guided and used by the colonists.

We have, in our collaboration with the colonists, ignored the interests and wishes of the Greek people. We did not see that the nation's interests and sensibilities of the Greek people were necessary concerns for us to take into account if our policy was to be sound. Nor did we see that our much-proclaimed concern with the colonists was creating a permanent reservoir of resentment against the United States, resentment which may be found even among the conservatives, republicans and better army officers of that

country. We have, that is, succeeded in inspiring articulate opinion in Greece on one simple proposition, that the United States is in large part responsible for the system which the Greeks seem destined to endure for a generation.

Another effect of our policy has been that it has permitted the colonists to corrupt and exploit the Greek-American public. The public remains, despite its good intentions, curiously uninformed about Greek affairs. If the American government had been more perceptive and more concerned to inform the more influential Greek-Americans, would not have been so foolish and harmful as they have been in their overt and covert support of the colonists. But even Greek-Americans cannot help but notice, upon returning to Greece, the marked absence of discussion of political matters by ordinary Greeks in public places.

This unusual public silence of the Greeks is revealing, eloquent and ominous. The longer the present regime continues, the less likely it will be that a moderate revolution of "the Greek problem" will follow the departure of the colonists. Since it is unlikely that we Americans will do publicly what might well be done to help the Greeks rid themselves immediately of the colonists, we should begin to consider what can be done (in the interest of both the United States and Greece) to limit the effect of the passions which have been generated against the United States since the Greek-Atlantic Convention, passions which can lead some day to disastrous experiments by a liberated Greece.

Would it not be prudent for us (as part of our "aid") to encourage the Greeks to move into closer association with Western Europe and away from their recent dependence upon the United States? This may be a safe and legitimate way to minimize the potentially explosive results of our miscalculations and self-deceptions in Greece of the past decade. Greek democrats would help but notice that they deserved less and yet got more from European governments than from their American ally since the colonists struck in 1967. Thus, whereas the United States (like the Soviet Union) accepts without serious public criticism the Greek government as it is today, the governments of Western Europe refuse to do so.

The influence by Europeans to what democracy requires may be seen in the condemnation in the Council of Europe, despite American lobbying in opposition to this action, of the widespread and deliberate use of torture by the colonists. Such a repudiation of the American approach should make Western Europe appear more plausible than the United States as a reliable ally for a liberated Greece. Perhaps there can be satisfaction by an increased reliance upon Europe the effect of our failure in Greece, a failure which antagonizes the permanent loss of the permanent influence America has had there for a generation.

Is there not something shabby and undignified in the willingness of a great power to be used by the colonists? Have we not been using us since April 1967? Which is worse, that we did not know better or that we did not care? However that may be, we have permitted ourselves to be criticized by the self-seeking opportunist who continues to control Athens.

There remains for us Americans, whatever may happen in the Mediterranean, the duty of reflecting upon why our policy in Greece has been such a miserable failure and that that failure reveals about the way we conduct foreign affairs everywhere.

AMERICAN POLICY IN GREECE

Mr. FEILL, Mr. President, I recently read an informative article concerning American policy in Greece, written by George Anastasia, and published in the Baltimore Sun of October 31, 1971.

Because it is a piece which contains so many thoughts of value, I believe it will be of interest to Senators.

I therefore ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

AMERICAN POLICY IN GREECE: A DECLARATION OF BANKRUPTCY?

(By George Anastasia)

Greece continues to debate whether the United States should supply military aid to

* This article was published in a slightly edited form, in the Baltimore Sun, Sunday, October 31, 1971, p. E2.

George Anastasia, who was born in St. Louis and now lives in Chicago, is Lecturer in the Liberal Arts, The University of Chicago, and Professor of Political Science, Holy Cross. He is the author of *The Constitutional Crisis on the First Amendment* (published in 1971 by The Southern Methodist University Press).

Dr. Anastasia has been declared persona non grata by the Greek government because of his articles about American policy in Greece. Citations to these articles may be found in the Congressional Record, vol. 117, p. 8618 (June 13, 1971). See also Congressional Record, vol. 117, p. 18465 (July 24, 1971).