

George Anastaplo, the reviewer, a lecturer in liberal arts at the University of Chicago and a professor of political science at Rosary College, has been declared persona non grata by the Greek Government because of his articles about American policy in Greece. His knowledge of the country, his political acumen, and his feeling for the Greek people permit him to offer insights that enable one to evaluate more clearly the present political situation in Greece and to judge more accurately U.S. policy toward Greece.

The article follows:
GENRE OF THE JOURNALIST: A REVIEW OF TWO BOOKS
(By George Anastaplo)

The two books reviewed on this occasion are John A. Katris's *Experiences in Greece: The Colonels Come to Power* (St. Louis: E. P. Dutton Co., 1971; 317 pages, \$9.95), and Bayard Stockton's *Phoenix With a Swoon: A Journalist's Insider Report on the Greek Revolution* (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Georgeown Publications, 1971; 300 pages, \$7.45).

Both of these exceedingly partisan books can be useful for the discerning American reader. Bayard Stockton, an American freelance journalist living in Greece, attempts to make a case for the Greek colonels' seized power in Athens in April 1967. John A. Katris, a Greek journalist with a very good reputation (who now lives in Minneapolis), makes the case against the Intervention, which will probably be accepted some day by most Greeks, a case which sees the colonels as little more than American agents. Perhaps, indeed, this day has already come.

The Stockton book, despite its effort to say all that can be said for the colonels—and, even more significant, despite its willingness to ignore much of what can be said against them—has not been received altogether enthusiastically in Athens. Mr. Stockton remains enough of a journalist to reveal here and there (often almost inadvertently) marked deficiencies in the regime he defends. In addition, one can detect the colonel's shortcomings by noticing the subjects skirted by their apologist. Most revealing was the measure by which the longstanding torture charges are handled by Mr. Stockton. He will not say outright that there has not been widespread deliberate recourse to torture as official government policy. Rather, he argues that such charges cannot be "totally proved or disproved" and then proceeds to treat them as frivolous. If not even frivolous, P. 184. The colonels themselves have been obliged to admit, both by the vituperative denials they issue and by the reprehensible deeds they conceal, that against their protest, but the country's plight has justified reliance on the torture which is alleged by their critics.

Had Mr. Stockton been willing, in assessing the torture charges, to apply the standards and the kind of evidence he would use to condemn the misdeeds of the colonel's predecessors, he would have been obliged to recognize the significance since 1947 of systematic torture techniques in any West European country today and unprecedented in peacetime Greece. Had he been willing to conduct the inquiries which foreign journalists make in Greece, he would have discovered those (if not hundreds) of cases of savage torture, cases which have been documented in even greater number in the United States' *Barbarians in Greece* (New York: Walker and Co., 1970) and in the thousand-page report (listed in 1970) of the Commission on Human Rights of the United Nations. For anyone to attempt by equivocation and obliquity to diminish or evade available evidence is to raise serious doubts

about his reliability. The reader should be reminded of the kind of pervasive self-deception, if not even dishonesty, which permitted intelligent men to ignore for so many years Stalin's barbarities.

Because he has been had to torture and to continued repression because the colonels have not been able, in their first year in power, to win the Greek people, The United States has been gulled into its unseemly support of the regime by repeated assurances of a speedy return to constitutional government and free elections. It should be evident that the colonels have neither the intention of ever giving up power voluntarily nor the ability to retain it constitutionally. Certainly, one does not need much personal exposure to these unfaithful army officers to realize they are crude opportunists who are ruthless, self-righteous and degenerate. "We have all learned, we all know," George Stefanou (the Nobel Laureate poet) observed in Athens in March 1969, "that in dictatorial regimes the beginning may seem easy, yet tragically ends as the end, inescapably. . . . The longer this abnormal situation lasts, the greater the evil."

The colonels were able to seize power in 1967 because of the impudent and irresponsible leadership exercised by certain politicians in Greece during the preceding decade. This leading, which was magnified with the aid of an scribble press into a grotesque caricature, was the chief cause exhibited by the Katris book. Mr. Katris's disregard of the practical consequences of what he writes is an instructive example of the attitude which Greek politicians and journalists indulged before the colonels' attack. His intemperate denunciations of the Greek monarchy can only impede the progress of an effective search for the five many honorable men, royalists but republicans alike, who now find themselves in opposition to the colonels. How unrealistic his program it may be seen. In the conditions of the Greek people, for the replacement of the colonels by an acceptable regime; there is about such pronouncements considerable fantasy, as if the colonels' opponents are now able to decide who will govern Greece. It does not seem to be realized, that is, that the colonels are likely to remain in power for a generation, having chance development of a serious international crisis.

The only prospect for dislodging the colonels, once entrenched, depended upon patriotic support by the United States of the Greek people in their desire to rid themselves of their tyrants. But the influence of the United States has been fading, and with this the colonels have dared become more open in their contempt for the free world, its institutions and its values. Since 1967, seen at close range all the principal Greek political figures who are alive today as well as all the principal members of the colonel's conspiracy. I myself would much prefer to have any one of the former (e.g., King Constantine, P. Karamanolis, C. Karamanlis, G. Marro, C. Katsoulika, A. Constantinos, G. Kallis, G. Vassiliadis) as my governor than any of all the colonels. The best known opponents to the colonels seems to me, as an American, to lack mutual respect for civilization than any of them have in common with the colonels now in power.

Who is really responsible for the emergence of these colonels? Mr. Stockton virtually ignores the notorious role of the United States in the making and unmaking of Greek governments since the Second World War. He recognizes that the United States led the leading men in Greek political life between 1945 and 1947 (including the King) refused to do so. He would, I think, be glad to publicly compromise their constitutional deficiency. Mr. Katris's emphasis,

George Anastaplo, "Greece of the Journalists: A Review of Two Books," 118 Cong. Rec. E8149 (Sept. 27, 1972).

REVIEW OF TWO BOOKS ON THE RULING REGIME IN GREECE

HON. DON EDWARDS

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, September 26, 1972

Mr. EDWARDS of California. Mr. Speaker, I would like to call to your attention an article that appeared in a somewhat abbreviated form in the Saturday Review, February 12, 1972. A review of two recently published books on the ruling regime in Greece, this article pointedly reminds us of the highly criticized and deservedly questionable role of the United States, both past and present, in Greek affairs. The American Government has actively supported and publicly assisted the military junta now in power with both statements of approval and shipments of arms. Such actions blatantly contradict the ideals of democracy and freedom that the United States claims to represent.

on the other hand, is upon the failings of the Right and upon the decisive intervention of the United States. He does not appreciate the extent to which frequent street demonstrations and public services strikes in 1966 and 1967 (for which the Center and the press were largely responsible and of which he now writes with nostalgic approval) also helped prepare the way for the colonels. Many apprehensive Greeks, albeit mistakenly, saw these disturbances as harbingers of a breakdown of civil order and of a return to the civil war of a generation before. Mr. Katris virtually ignores that war and its traumatic effect upon contemporary Greece. An effect which may be seen both in the reluctance of the King to permit blood to be shed in resisting the colonels and in the concern of the colonels themselves that their regime not be identified publicly with executions. There would be much more violent resistance to the colonels among disaffected Greeks today but for the tacit agreement on all sides that the ferocious vendettas of the 1930s should not be revived.

Mr. Katris's inselence that the American CIA is really behind the colonels does not recognize that such covert need not be pointed in order for one to understand what happened in Greece in April 1967. To insist upon the CIA is deliberate in its underestimate the shortcomings of Greeks of all parties. It is to be a prisoner of that taste for the conspiratorial and the dramatic (with the degradation of the role of chance in human affairs) which can make Greeks both so engaging and so engagering. It ignores, furthermore, the growing realization among Greeks of all persuasions (at least among those who have remained in Greece) that something was seriously wrong with the old way of doing things, that leaders of all parties contributed to the colonels' irresponsible and posturing which recalled barbarians in their to install themselves as the saviors of their troubled country.

The most obvious feature of the Stockton book for Americans should be its ability of how barbarians can be prettied up as patient, well-meaning and determined protectors of law and order. It is to the credit of Greek politicians and journalists that no case of stature among them can be recruited by the dictatorship to serve as its apologist. Thus, however, irresponsibly passionate they have been, they do retain the sense of honor often accompanied such passion. Would a similar regime among us remain unable for five years to attract any serious support from established leaders and writers?

The colonels and their associates, usually the most disreputable elements in the army and out, realize they face imprisonment or execution if they should surrender power. That is, they realize that propaganda barages have not secured for them genuine popular support. It is significant, for instance, that the newspapers which are described by Mr. Stockton as most closely identified with the colonels are found (elsewhere in his book) at the bottom of the list of circulation figures for Athens newspapers, p. 164. Even he recognizes (almost as an aside), "The danger to the future of Greece lies in the fostering of apathy and sterility in a citizenry no longer used to the vitality of free thought. If the Revolution prevails, its drive for conformity could produce a generation too stultified to be fully responsible." p. 263. (That which the colonels call a "revolution" is called by their opponents a "military take-over" or a "takejacking".)

The colonels do not, and indeed cannot, solve any of the serious problems of their country. Instead, chronic ailments are concealed; bombast and deception are substituted for much-needed reforms; and the future is casually managed by the desperate efforts of opportunists to do what they can to perpetuate themselves in power. Characteristic apologists for the colonels should be

reinstated of the military regime in Pakistan which was long excused as a competent government but which was eventually revealed as having merely postponed (and hence made even more difficult) responsible treatment of problems of hoarding and economic stagnation.

One need not anticipate in order to anticipate that Americans will be discredited for a long time to come in Greece, that the United States covertly engineered the colonial coup. Our public conduct since April 1967, in supplying the colonels arms and other institutional of legitimacy and even of approval, suffices to earn for us a legacy of potentially explosive bitterness of which Mr. Katris's book is but a warning. Greek conservatives and royalists will dispute Mr. Katris's explanation of what happened in Athens before 1967, but they will not want to challenge his denunciations of what the United States has and has not done since the colonels seized power. The most prudent course for the United States in the years ahead, in an area so important to the interests of the free world, may be to encourage Greece to isolate itself against further American meddling by moving into closer political and economic association with Western Europe. Perhaps such an association can help stify that constitutional moderation which a faction-ridden Greece has all too often lacked. Federalist No. 39 comes to mind.

Note.

"Accompanied" should be "accompanying" at line 57, column 1, page E8150 of this review.

See, for other recent discussions by George Anastasio bearing on the subjects of this review,

- i) The Constitutionalist: Notes on the First Amendment (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1971);
- ii) "Canada and the Dilemmas of Decent Men," 116 Conn. Rec. E11057 (Jan. 2, 1971);
- iii) "American Policy in Greece: A Declaration of Bankruptcy," 117 Conn. Rec. E13889 (Dec. 17, 1971);
- iv) "Military Men and Political Questions; What the American Visitor Can Learn From Greece Today," 117 Conn. Rec. EG129 (June 17, 1971);
- v) "American Aid and Greek Tyranny: A Memorandum," 116 Conn. Rec. E10520 (Dec. 18, 1970);
- vi) "Swan Song of an Eagle: America in Greece," 117 Conn. Rec. E8492 (July 29, 1971);
- vii) "Preliminary Reflections on the Pentagon Papers," 118 Conn. Rec. S11560 (July 24, 1972);
- ix) "Vietnam, Insubordination and Self-Government," 118 Conn. Rec. E8414 (Oct. 5, 1972).