boston university journal

Winter 1973 $1.95

American Foreign Policy and Greece

Roy C. Macridis

THIS IS A sketchy survey of United States foreign policy towards Greece and an effort to evaluate it – to pass judgment. Every foreign policy decision is supposedly made to meet and alleviate predicaments that a country and its governing elites perceive – problems involving its survival, its power, its alliances or its position in the world vis à vis other powers.

The "predicament" that Greece presented for the United States was real. Beginning with 1946, after an effort to seize power in 1944 had failed, Communist-led guerillas became increasingly active until it became clear that the country was in a state of civil war and that the "government" was unable to cope with the situation. To the north the Balkan peninsula was in the hands of Communist forces – generally under the influence, if not the outright domination, of the Soviet Union. To the east Turkey was faced with pressure from the Soviet Union in the form of requests to control the Dardanelles and even of territorial claims over Turkish provinces. To the southeast lay the countries of the Middle East – in a state of turmoil but with an economic and strategic importance that few could at that time ignore. The Cold War and the manner in which Soviet domination had been implanted in Eastern Europe could have left no doubt that the Soviet Union would try to exploit every conceivable opportunity to extend its influences as far down the Southeast Mediterranean as possible. The famous agreement between Churchill and Stalin giving to the British control over Greece had been set aside when the United States and the British challenged the Soviet acts in Poland. But even if it were in force it could not have meant much. The British would have been unable to keep for long the small piece of real estate that they had allotted to themselves.

The "predicament" was clearly perceived by American policy-makers. Greece (and Turkey) were to be kept out of Soviet direct or indirect control if United States influence in that part of the world – rich in its strategic and economic resources – were to be maintained. Greece (and Turkey) were to be the first bulwarks in the containment policy. They were to provide the first major test in the Cold War. To do so, massive aid was needed and for the first time after the end of World War II the

ROY C. MACRIDIS is Professor of Politics and chairman of the department at Brandeis University. He is the editor and author of many books, including DeGaulle's Republic–the Quest for Unity *and* Political Parties.

United States assumed an open and militant stance of intervention and involvement. The obvious and unambiguous goal of American foreign policy was to build their defensive forces so as to contain further Soviet expansion and to serve, potentially, as convenient bases for counter-pressure. Nobody can deny the reality of the predicament; nor can anybody refute easily the validity of the goal posited. Tito's schism was yet to come; so was the emergence of the centrifugal forces that weakened the Soviet hold over the satellites. The experience of Eastern Europe clearly indicated at the time that Stalin would continue to seek the expansion of the Soviet sphere of control through what Isaac Deutscher has called "half conquest and half revolution."

In his message President Truman stated the predicament, the policy goals desired by the United States and the means to bring them about. In fashioning one of the most important landmarks of U.S. foreign policy he stated:

> At the present moment in world history nearly every nation must choose between alternative ways of life. . . . One way is based upon the will of the majority and is distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free elections, guarantees of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion and freedom from political oppression. . . .
>
> . . . The second way of life is based upon the will of the minority forcibly imposed upon the majority. It relies on terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio, fixed elections and the suppression of personal freedoms.

After this Mannichean opening, Truman stated the hard realities of international life, i.e., the strategic significance of Greece, in terms of the so much discussed and so much abused "domino theory."

> If Greece should fall under the control of an armed minority, the effect upon its neighbor, Turkey, would be immediate and serious. Confusion and disorder might spread in the Middle East. . . . Moreover the disappearance of Greece as an independent state would have a profound effect upon those countries whose peoples are struggling . . . to maintain their freedom and independence.

In addition to the $400,000,000 requested, the President asked for congressional authorization to dispatch civilian and military personnel in Greece and Turkey with authority to instruct and train Greek and Turkish personnel. On May 22, 1947, the Act to provide for assistance to Greece and Turkey was passed by Congress, as requested.

To discuss the particular means of the implementation of the Truman Doctrine we should now turn to the Greek domestic scene. But it would be wise to lay to rest the myth of non-intervention and agree for the sake of the argument that we actually intervened in Greek "domestic" politics and that it was inevitable, even desirable, that we do so; and that in doing so we had to take sides in favor of certain political forces and against others. The assumption that we were there to exercise the devil of Communism is too gratuitous and too simple-minded to need refutation. We threw our immense weight behind certain forces and individuals in order to eliminate or silence other forces and individuals.

Indeed the United States continued from where the British had left. The training and equipment of the Greek "government" forces during the Civil War were fashioned and controlled by United States personnel and General Van Fleet became the real head of the Greek army. Through the American Mission to Aid Greece (AMAG) and the establishment in November of 1947 of a Joint Greek-U.S. army staff, the United States began to exert paramount influence over the economy, the strategy and military operations of the Greek government. When the Greek Staff became apparently unable to pursue the guerilla war successfully, a Joint U.S. Military Advisory and Planning Group was established (JUSMAPG) to

coordinate operations and give tactical advice. JUSMAPG fashioned the strategy to be pursued and dictated the tactics – with American officers attached to Greek field units. Its decision became adopted as a matter of course. In 1948 there were more than 250 American officers in Greece; by March of the same year more than $100 million worth of military equipment – including 75mm guns, napalm bombs, German war material, and British rifles and ammunition were made available to the Greek forces. In the same year General Van Fleet and the commanding officer of the British Military Mission, General Rawlings, joined the Greek National Defense Council in an "advisory capacity," and in the same year the secretary of state and the secretary of the army visited Greece to urge the rapid conclusion of military operations against the guerillas – finally accomplished by the fall of 1949.

Military aid amounting during the period between the enunciation of the Truman Doctrine and the conclusion of the guerilla warfare to a total of at least 350 million dollars and involving the intervention of the United States military was only a small part of American "intervention." Ports, roads, bridges were rebuilt; the Corinth canal was opened to sea traffic. The Army Corps of Engineers and private construction companies were responsible for this while a number of other development programs were being promoted. Military and economic decisions were in the hands of American advisors. They provided the initiative and the planning and in the last resort could use their veto. The situation was not altered after the end of the Civil War. In 1951 Greece was brought within NATO; it continued to receive economic and military aid through the Marshall Plan and after 1951 through the Mutual Security Pact. By virtue of the first, the training, deployment and organization, and equipment of the Greek army remained under very tight American scrutiny and control; through the second, the fate of the Greek economy and its future became dependent upon the United States. It was an important investment. Between 1945 and 1962 a total of about four billion dollars was allotted for Greece under different programs, about half being earmarked for military aid. The investment had to be safeguarded – and rightly so. This took necessarily the form of political influence and at times outright control.

Influence is something that cannot be easily shown, and control is even more difficult to "prove." It is a matter of personal contacts, subtle considerations, implicit understandings, etc. We must accept *a priori* that a country, that invests a large sum of monies, has a permanent military mission, is responsible for the training and equipment of the instruments of coercion or defense, and considers the land to be of strategic interest, will be in a position both to influence the ongoing policies and attempt to maintain control. With regard to Greece, specific evidence is there – sometimes openly, sometimes by inference. The whole manner and purpose of United States intervention *forced* us to take sides in the internal political picture. The Civil War was not simply a military adventure. It created sides; sympathies and antipathies; deep loyalties and enduring hostilities. The United States had taken one side. The logic of its commitment – irrespective of the fact that it was both necessary and salutary – created an inescapable dilemma from which American foreign policy-makers were unable to extricate themselves. They were forced to continue to intervene on one side while constantly professing non-intervention.

First, the United States favored the return of the king. The referendum was held only a little over a year after the Battle of Athens – in March 1946, and the Greek army voted massively for the return of the king. As it often happens the form of a free expression of the "will" of the Greek

people was respected; the substance of freedom was not there. Secondly, the United States remained close to the top military authorities in Greece – and during the protracted Civil War they were in fact in charge of the Greek army. Thirdly, American military, economic, and diplomatic advisers and personnel developed contacts only with the very small and affluent part of the Greek bourgeoisie that naturally saw in them the protectors of their own wealth and status and only incidently of the integrity of the Greek territory. It was inescapable that Americans would side, as in Latin America, with these groups and with their political leaders.

No matter what the professed aims were in Washington, "advisers" in Greece from the ambassador down favored the status quo as it partly emerged and was partly fashioned by the end of 1949, i.e., after the end of the Civil War. More specifically they insisted upon keeping the Greek army "out of politics," as a separate and almost autonomous branch of the state, subject directly to the king and later on to the NATO supervisory organs. There was nothing reprehensible in this except for the fact that the Greek army was trained for a political task and emerged thoroughly cleansed of all "doubtful" elements. It was, it must be pointed out, the only force in Europe from which pro-Nazi elements and collaborationist forces had not been purged. In fact the very substance of the Greek state, and not the army alone, retained basically the same character it had since General Metaxas had established his dictatorship in 1936. This was true for the central administration as well as for the local and regional units until the early sixties. Until then the tight surveillance of the citizens by the police, the gendarmerie, and the military continued, and certificates of "civic integrity" were required in order to secure employment.

As long as the structure of the military organization was respected, as long as the civil and local administrations were not tampered with, the political game could be played among the traditional political parties and the "independence" of the Greek government was respected. But relations between political parties and the affairs of state handled by the king, the army, and the administration could not be so easily compartmentalized. The ambivalence – so basic in American policy between professed democratic political objectives and the need of stability for strategic reasons forced the Americans to side with the status quo groups. The political objectives of American foreign policy – many of them explicitly stated in the Truman Doctrine – called for the development of democratic institutions, free elections, representative and parliamentary government. But strategic considerations called for stability and military security, for what became increasingly known as the southeast flank of NATO. Repression would not be encouraged by the United States, but how long would freedom be tolerated if its expression began to jeopardize the American military objectives? And in a world increasingly in ferment in the Middle East – a ferment aggravated in the eyes of American policy-makers by the ever growing presence of the Soviet fleet – to which considerations of the Truman Doctrine would priority be given?

Inexorably the United States was drawn into Greek politics. Inexorably decisions made by the Greek government were imputed upon the Americans and inevitably the Americans were blamed. But "blame" was not always given fortuitously. General Papagos and Premier Karamanlis, who governed for five years, were heavily supported by the American ambassador. When elections in 1961 returned a right-of-center coalition, the United States' ambassador had no scruples in calling them "free." Later on it was shown beyond any doubt that army intervention and intimidation had been widespread. When the Papandreou government was formed in 1963 – for the first time

with a majority to the left of center — tremendous weight was brought to bear by the king upon the faction-ridden party structure, succeeding finally in splitting the Papandreou forces. But the major conflict was one that involved the prime minister and the king. The object of the conflict was the control of the armed forces. The king, in effect, refused to allow the prime minister to become also the minister of defense, and there is hardly any doubt that in so doing he had the full support of the American embassy. When elections were finally decided upon after the resignation of the prime minister, the military coup of April 1967 — bringing the army back into the open — took place. Greece remained solidly within NATO; its land could be used as an American base; its ports were available to the Sixth Fleet; its army — within NATO. Despite the turbulence of Greek politics the status quo was preserved. The only unexpected victim was the king who hesitated first in organizing his own military coup and faltered when he decided to move against the junta. As a footnote it should be added that President Truman spoke from Independence, Missouri, in favor of the coup — though it underscored the failure of some of the most elegant principles he had set forth twenty years before — and General Van Fleet applauded the take-over whose purpose was to stop the ever-present Communist danger. But why had it not been laid to rest?

It is the take-over by the military junta — not so much our attitude or even the extent and degree of American complicity — that should provide us with the major landmark for the evaluation of our policy to Greece. I do not think the arguments that the United States was responsible either by ommission or commission; that we had prior knowledge; that we encouraged first a military coup by the king and that we then acquiesced to the military junta are particularly significant. Whether the junta came to power with the connivance of the State Department and/or the CIA; with the knowledge of the American military personnel in Greece but without the knowledge of the State Department; with a concerted effort by some of the military, the king and the CIA, but not the State Department or the U.S. embassy in Greece, are matters for speculation and it would be downright irresponsible for anybody to forward any judgment without definite proof.

What counts is that the military coup happened. The whys and the hows are intriguing for the historian. We can draw a number of inferences based on what was done and even more significantly on what was not done. But we must concede that no single actor, including even the USA, had full and unqualified freedom to choose or fashion one single course of action and prevent all others. For instance there is some indication that many of the USA advisers had expected and perhaps encouraged, the intervention of the king backed by the army and the postponement of the elections scheduled for late May 1967, in which the victory of the liberal Center-Left coalition was a foregone conclusion and that they were (or at least the State Department personnel was) taken completely by surprise by the quick intervention of the "colonels" and the brutality and primitiveness of political repression that followed. Even in one single incident, like the junta take-over, there is a seamless web of actions, counteractions, understandings, anticipations, and personal attitudes that cannot be easily made to fit either the theory of a plot, or a planned decision.

The significance of the coup relates more to the context within which it took place. The three years preceding the take-over by the junta were extremely important for Greece and the USA. They represented the historical moment of truth for Greece and the ultimate test for the Truman Doctrine for the USA. We were committed to the development of free and representative institutions. And at long last, with the rela-

tive economic modernization of the country, political freedoms began also to emerge. New men among the liberal groups began to make their presence felt – men committed to both democratic ways and economic reforms and planning. The army began to withdraw from active and overt political control and manipulation. The liberal Center had come to power, led by the old Papandreou, with the younger Papandreou serving as the link with the Left. In 1965 Greece had at long last a government openly elected and openly arrived at. Reform was in the air: of the antiquated education system; of the economy in terms of the planning of resources and investment, of subordinating outside investment to long range national goals; of the agriculture and of the economic relations with the Common Market countries. After twenty years the country was free and on the threshold of relative prosperity. The Truman Doctrine at long last appeared to be vindicated.

But it was the foreign policy and, more particularly, the military and defense options that had to be resolved. Would Greece remain within NATO? Would it move in the direction of a Gaullist formulation of independence? Would the liberal leaders try to find a symbiotic relationship between the political and economic realities that they seemed at long last to be free to shape and of the military realities that underwrote Greece's inevitable subordination to NATO and to USA strategic and military requirements? Would they dare press for a confrontation at the highest possible level – i.e., the military one, or would they show astuteness in managing and consolidating their newly found independence while acquiescing, at least temporarily, to the American military presence? To put the same question in a different way: would the liberal political leaders – notably the two Papandreous – try to gradually wear down the conservative forces and weaken the still powerful hold of the military over the country or would they seek confrontation with them knowing only too well that if they did so the USA was likely to side with the military and the conservative forces? I say "knowing only too well" because this had been Andreas Papandreou's perception. Anybody who reads what amounts to his personal biography in *Democracy at Gunpoint* cannot possibly doubt that Papandreou "knew" (or at least thought that he knew) what the "Americans" stood for! His indictment, therefore, of what he claims they finally did is disingenuous. As a prospective political leader, he should have taken into consideration the "American factor," as he calls it, and as a responsible political leader, he should have acted within its constraints – no matter how unpalatable.

Indeed the constraints were obvious and they amounted to what could have suggested a tacit agreement between the US policy-makers and the new Greek political leaders. Such an agreement would have entailed a temporary acceptance by both the parties of the realities of the situation as they were developing and a reconciliation of the two sides of the Truman Doctrine – Greece would move increasingly in the direction of an open democratic society with full autonomy for all internal affairs including the economy and the Common Market but under USA military protection and as a full member of NATO. Internally the society would be open and free as many, including American policy-makers, would have preferred; militarily the forces of defense would be under the direction or indirect surveillance of the United States as many Greeks desired. The dichotomy is hard to justify but politics is not the art of justification! Besides his tacit agreement would have only a limited and tactical significance. With a growing control over internal politics, of the civil service, of the regional administrators, a liberal government would slowly build enough internal strength and support to make it increasingly difficult for the military and their conservative spokesmen to return to power. By the same token

faced with a popular strong liberal government the U.S. advisers would find it increasingly difficult to side with the military. In other words, from 1964 to 1967 Greece was in a position to secure the maximum benefits of internal self-government with open and representative institutions while acquiescing to the minimal requirements of American military presence under NATO. United States policy-makers seemed willing, provided their minimal demands were met. What else was in store for a small country that had known a devastating war and a debilitating Civil War, straddling one of the most sensitive strategic (and beautiful) landscapes? The realities of how superpowers often act had been clearly demonstrated – in Guatemala, San Domingo, Hungary – and were again shown in the case of Czechoslovakia.

If politics is the art of the possible, the Greek liberal leaders failed to live up to this maxim. They even failed to heed the example of the most ardent exponent of national independence, Charles DeGaulle, who, from a position of incomparably greater strength, took nine whole years to confront the U.S. squarely on NATO and move out of it but *not* out of the Alliance. On the contrary, the Greek leaders quickly showed their impatience with NATO over the Cyprus affair – and again Papandreou's testimony of his meetings with Acheson and President Johnson is revealing. The U.S.A. wished, for obvious reasons, to see the matter settled under the auspices and within the council of NATO – since Turkey and Greece were members. Not the Greek leaders who opted for the United Nations. Even more significant was, at least for the sensitive ears of the American advisers, the support given to Papandreou by the left-wing forces with avowed anti-American objectives. To some, remarks made by Andreas Papandreou himself with regard to Greece's freedom to make her foreign policy and to decide upon her alliances, including the freedom to reconsider NATO, sounded the general alarm. The new Greek government, as was the case with the Hungarian leaders of the revolution in 1956, seemed to be seeking confrontation at the highest possible level – that of defense and military alliance. It is doubtful that this was in fact the case but one must concede that it was not unwarranted for many American advisers to draw this inference.

While the new Greek leaders seemed to press for a confrontation at the highest level, the American policy-makers showed an equal lack of astuteness in responding to the "threat." The instruments at their disposal were enormous. Andreas Papandreou himself was one – a relatively young, American-trained economist, he had been excluded by the U.S.A. advisers from the contacts he sought to establish with them. Gradually he withdrew into sullen resentment and sought his friends and allies elsewhere. The same was true for a number of his American-trained associates. Nor would it have been difficult to work with a number of the centrist leaders. The promise of economic aid, that had ceased but was constantly solicited, would have been persuasive. The king's moderation in handling the conflict between the prime minister and the military could have been solicited and secured. Instead the prime minister was summarily dismissed, thus raising, again unnecessarily, the constitutional issue. Why did the American policy-makers not attempt to use these instruments? The answers must again be sought in the ambivalence of the Truman Doctrine and in the interpretation American policy-makers and advisers in Greece gave to it. Once the confrontation appeared to be headed for the highest possible stake – control over the military and over defense – the American response was to stress security and military control at the expense of everything else. If the Greek leaders could not find a way to reconcile freedom with the requirements of defense as established through NATO, neither could the U.S.A.

reconcile its security requirements with the democratic freedoms that emerged. If the logic of political freedom was to lead the Greeks to undermine the U.S. strategic interests and commitments, the logic of the latter led the American policy-makers to renounce the former. The contradiction implicit in the Truman Doctrine was to be made explicit in practice! Given the conditions in Greece and in the Middle East and given the perception of our policy-makers about the strategic importance of the area, the freedom of choice was narrow. The U.S.A. failed to explore alternatives within the limits available. The military returned to power and democracy was put to rest in a manner that made American involvement and support, if not outright collusion, blatantly unmistakable.

In the year of grace 1972 Greece is militarily "secure." The Communists and the left-wingers and virtually all liberal leaders are in jail or under house arrest. Many are in exile agitating against the military junta and the American policy in Greece. The Council of Europe forced the country's withdrawal from its Assembly and serious efforts were made to dislodge it from NATO. Yet U.S. foreign policy has displayed the most remarkable "caution," often in the name of "non-intervention," only to come back to a full-scale outright control.

It is undeniable that our policy vis à vis the junta differed fundamentally, to put it mildly, from the manner in which we reacted to potential military coups or to popular uprising either in the Middle East or in Latin America. The laborious studiousness of our official response to the military take-over, the emphasis upon legal technicalities, the recurrent expression of hope that the country would return to "constitutional government," the shift from possible non-recognition to gradual *de facto* recognition and then to full recognition, the rechanneling of military aid and finally our efforts in the meetings of the NATO Council not to allow any resolution to be introduced or passed condemning Greece, made it painfully obvious that we looked upon developments, if not with joy and pride, at least with complacency that verged upon satisfaction. To be sure reservations were more often expressed by the State Department officials and the presidential spokesmen than by the Defense Department. This became embarrassing when it became known that the junta officers had used a NATO emergency plan to take over the country when in effect none of the envisaged kinds of emergencies were present.

In summary the arguments used by U.S. officials ever since the military take-over run as follows:

(a) the take-over by the junta was a domestic affair into which we need not intervene.

(b) deplorable as developments were in Greece there was no reason why democratic procedures could not be restored "soon."

(c) to pressure the junta by economic or military means might well have results diametrically opposed to the desired one. With their backs against the wall the junta might turn to Nasserism.

(d) the security of Greece and our security in that part of the world made it imperative for us to support the Greek government – an integral part of NATO – no matter what the political institutions are.

Within a matter of some five years there was a full passage from (a) to (d) and full-scale support of the Greek military government even when (b) had not materialized and (c) had never in effect been tested. The transition to (d) obviously refuted argument (a). We were actively intervening with full military support to a military dictatorship that pledged full military cooperation with the U.S.A. as we were supporting previous regimes who had made the same pledge. The arguments of State Department officials, the pious hopes about restoration of democratic government, the

extra reminder that Nasserism was not a phenomenon confined to Nasser, all of them were only transparent reminders of the reality of military considerations and of their superior and ultimate claims.

By 1972 Greece had become one of our choice allies—with intricate political, economic, and military ties spearheaded by the vice-president, the secretary of commerce, and the secretary of defense. It has become the "home" – literally – of the Sixth Fleet with American personnel shielded from the jurisdiction of the host country – the first return to the ignominious practice of "capitulations" that I know of since it was abandoned in China and the Ottoman Empire. President Nixon himself continued military aid despite a Senate vote to suspend it. Our NATO flank seems secure for some time to come!

It is time to evaluate American foreign policy. The immediate predicament that faced us in the years immediately after World War II no longer exists. The minimum goals of the Truman Doctrine – defense for Greece against communism and for the United States in the form of an important strategic and military base – have been secured. The maximum goals – the establishment of an open society with representative institutions in which the majority governs and the minority is tolerated are today as far away as they were during the worst years of the Civil War. We have bought time and real estate, in Greece and also in Turkey, but it is more than disconcerting – and our pusillanimous attitude towards the junta, to say nothing of the recent emergence of the Turkish military into a commanding political situation, clearly show – to realize that we have achieved little else. Both in Greece and in Turkey the regimes are precariously poised on the bayonets we have provided with all the risks that such a posture entails.

What have been the costs? They cannot be measured in terms of the four billion dollars or so that we have spent. The benefits derived appear to exceed by far the costs. Without American presence in this area, both the Turkish Republic and perhaps Israel may find themselves in severe difficulties. In classic traditional terms a fleet needs bases – and thinking in purely traditional terms we have done what came naturally. The military importance of Greece had been clearly perceived by American policymakers and there has been a remarkable tenacity in pursuing a policy of preserving Greece as a military base at the expense of every other consideration.

The losses, and with them, the failure of our policy, lie precisely in the unavoidable connection between military authoritarian regimes that we end up supporting and our foreign and military policy. The primacy of military considerations forces our policymakers to solutions that have a specious and comforting concreteness. In each and every case – if the example of Greece is to remain illustrative – this great democracy is going back on its democratic commitment for the sake of military real estate. We are losing the people in favor of dictators in order to maintain our armed might. The process has been noticeable ever since the end of World War II. Whether it is irreversible remains to be seen. Yet at the same time it is very hard to think of plausible alternatives. The conditions created after World War II were in great part beyond our control. They have been shaping our foreign policy in a manner that is antithetical to the vision that the United States offered to the world when the Nazis had been defeated.

The analyst will be able to record, as I have, the immediate benefits. Alas, it will be up to the historian to assess the real loss that our acquiescence if not complicity to the take-over by the colonels in Greece has entailed in the United States. For now the lines have been drawn in that small country. The junta is in the eyes of the man in the street nothing but American military power in an ugly disguise. The prospect of having to fight both is appalling and paralyzes the

resolution of even the most die-hard activists. But separated from the people the military forces can not survive for too long. The slightest change in the situation in the Middle East, a minor shift in Soviet political tactics in Eastern Europe and the Balkans will inevitably call for more support from the United States. For intervention and appeasement have the same logic. Neither can succeed until carried to its full logic of complete submissiveness or complete control.

The situation in Greece underlines then dramatically the over-all predicament of our foreign policy – perhaps the predicament this society faces in general. No democracy can sustain a foreign policy that calls for wide and extended and massive military commitments and remain true to its logic when the freedoms promised may lead other peoples to define their interest in terms that appear antithetical to that of the United States. We have not been able to allow, any more than the Soviet Union has, the development of different and many roads to democracy when they lead straight to the guts of international power politics – defense and military control. As a result the contradiction between democracy at home and alliances with and outright support of military regimes abroad has grown. But the contradiction may affect our society and the effort to balance democratic and moral principles with security and strategic necessities may well prove to be just as difficult to reconcile here at home as it proved to be in Greece! Greece is only an illustration – a small part of the history of our foreign policy since World War II. The ultimate evaluation of our foreign policy here in terms of success or failure will have to wait until we have been able to assess the impact of the "whole" of our foreign and military policy upon our own political institutions and our own society. Greece is now a silent witness. And it will be some time before the verdict can be given.

GRAVE THOUGHT

Because to grow older
is to become more aware of death,
I set aside Thursday
to think of what my absence from the world
would mean.
I found I had time
to do several other things that day.

William Sayres