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SURVEY

The Gizikis-Ioannides regime has survived for seven months now. However, it contains within itself the seeds of its own destruction as surely as did its predecessor. There is constant tension and mutual suspicion among the members of the junta, discontent is spreading through the officer corps; and the economy goes from bad to disastrous, while administrative paralysis remains the order of the day. There is no sign of political evolution, and the chief concern of those in power is to deter opposition by any method, including torture. With each month that this regime continues to survive, the chances of a painless transition to democracy diminish. A decisive intensification of international pressure this year still offers the best prospect of positive change in Greece.

This intensification may already be beginning. (1) Although the EEC Commission has not changed its views on the status of the Association Agreement with Greece, its public statements have become perceptibly stronger, and the European Parliament has shown new determination, both by the vigour of its debates and by appointing a Rapporteur on Greece. (2) The US Congress is on the point of deciding whether a ban on all arms sales to Greece should become law. The second phase of the homingporting agreement has been suspended, and anxiety over Greece is reported at all levels of the State Department, even if the Secretary of State appears rather unmoved himself. (3) There was reason to hope for a substantial initiative at the June NATO meeting, but given the special nature of the occasion the refererences to Greece were understandably, if regrettably, muted. On the other hand they were clear enough to elicit an unusually conciliatory statement from the Greek delegate and to find expression in the communique, while the new Ottawa Declaration provides a firm basis for the consolidation of our efforts in this context.

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**Ex-MP's back Mavros**  
Your faithfully HUGH GREEN, The European Association for Democracy in Europe.

THE NEW Declaration by NATO's 17 members at their meeting... 77 members... signed 121... 100-1000 in Warsaw...

## THE INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN

### NATO: Preliminary

It will be recalled that the December meeting of the NATO Council of Ministers saw a certain advance on previous achievements in that three Foreign ministers raised Greece explicitly and three of their colleagues endorsed their remarks in a more general way. At the time, the Committee regarded this advance as the basis for seeking more substantial action at the Ottawa meeting last month. Added encouragement was derived from the fact that in the middle of March the new UK Government demonstrated its commitment to the Greek democratic cause by cancelling a courtesy visit by two Royal Navy warships. Another obstacle in the way of an initiative on Greece was dramatically removed when the Portuguese dictatorship was overthrown by the armed forces on 25th April and a government of national unity subsequently formed. As soon as the Labour Government took office in Britain, a memorandum of this Committee was written for the Foreign Secretary, detailing opportunities to confront the Greek problem in the context of both NATO and the EEC. This was followed in May by a memorandum dealing specifically with action in NATO, explaining why such action would be effective, and suggesting that it was more likely to find favour among NATO governments than in the past. It was felt that, with Greece the one remaining anomaly in the alliance, a lead given by the British Government would carry great weight among those who had not spoken out openly before and might enable a broad consensus to be reached. In addition, it was hoped that a British initiative might stimulate the process of rethinking in the US State Department and persuade the US Administration not to stand in the way of NATO action. These views were elaborated in personal representations at Ministerial level in Britain and a number of other NATO countries. A further memorandum covering the same ground was addressed early in June to several NATO Foreign Ministers and other influential individuals, and to various European and American newspapers.

### The NATO Council

In the event, when the Ministerial Council met in Ottawa on 18th and 19th June, considerable care was taken to avoid issues regarded as potentially divisive and to maintain an atmosphere of harmony and unity in adopting the new Atlantic Declaration in the alliance's anniversary year. However, this did not prevent a number of Ministers from making remarks indirectly referring to the situation in Greece and acknowledged as so doing by the Greek delegate in his own address. Dr Mario Soares, the new Portuguese Foreign Minister was the first to do this. He is reported to have said inter alia that he "could not understand how regimes could continue to be accepted which respected neither the rights of man nor the rules of democracy which the Atlantic Alliance held sacred". According to our information, after Dr Soares had described Portuguese plans to establish democracy, the Dutch Foreign Minister in a thinly disguised reference to Greece regretted that some other countries would not follow suit. Among Ministers who took a similar position were those of Canada and Norway, while the British Foreign Secretary and the Danish Defence Minister also commended the Portuguese example in terms clearly implying their concern over Greece. As these remarks were made in closed session the details are not known, and it appears that in most cases they were not released to the press. While this to some extent muted their impact, the reaction they elicited from the Greek delegate was far removed from the belligerence that has characterised previous Greek utterances in NATO. Moreover, both the final communique and the Declaration, which are here considered separately, give some cause for satisfaction. It is also reported that the Greek issue was widely discussed in bilateral meetings, and neither Mr Tetenes of Greece nor the US Secretary of State was left in doubt about the strong feelings held by several of the allied governments.

### Ottawa Declaration

The NATO Ministers individually gave their formal assent to the new Declaration published during the Ottawa meeting. Two paragraphs are especially pertinent to the Greek question, and their wording is welcome. Article 12 begins as follows: *"(The members of the alliance) recall that they have proclaimed their dedication to the principles of democracy, respect for human rights, justice and social progress, which are the fruits of their shared spiritual heritage, and they declare their intention to develop and deepen the application of these principles in their countries."* This renewal of the principles laid down in the Preamble to and Article 2 of the original North Atlantic Treaty will provide the framework within which NATO governments will be pointedly reminded of their responsibility regarding the dictatorship. The incongruity under present circumstances of allowing a Greek signature to appear beneath such professions as these may have been cloaked by the NATO birthday celebrations, but

a heavy onus will be upon the allies to face up to the implications very soon. Many NATO governments have expressed concern about the falling credibility of the alliance. Their reaffirmation of democratic values ipso facto dictates that they be energetic in seeking their application throughout. Article 13 will be of particular interest to the North Atlantic Assembly, usually described as having no official link with NATO. "They recognise that the cohesion of the alliance has found expression not only in co-operation among their governments, but also in the free exchange of views among the elected representatives of the peoples of the alliance. Accordingly, they declare their support for the strengthening of links among parliamentarians." This article provides a new basis for debate of the issue both in national parliaments and in the North Atlantic Assembly, which meets in London later this year. It hardly needs to be stressed that, after seven years without a parliament, Greece is in no position to make, let alone to honour, a commitment under article 13. In view of the remarks attributed to Secretary General Luns and reproduced below, it is to be hoped that NATO governments will find an early opportunity to stress the fundamental importance of these parts of the Declaration and the seriousness with which they are taken. They will certainly be pressed to demonstrate this to good effect at future NATO meetings.

#### Greek delegate

The Greek representative at the Ottawa meeting, who has since resigned, met the references to his regime with these words: "I am glad that the devotion of NATO to the idea of democracy has been reiterated. Certain delegates have been hinting about the internal situation in my country. For my part I wish to underline that Greece having signed the Atlantic Declaration has accepted its provisions wholly and unreservedly. My government has already stated that it aims at the restoration of democratic institutions, but for the sake of the maintenance of internal order and peace of the country for which it is responsible, it should be left alone to judge the method and time of the changes to be effected, the same as was done vis-à-vis other countries in similar circumstances. The restoration of democratic institutions will be effected at the earliest possible moment." While, as past statements of 'intention' have shown, this commitment cannot be taken seriously, and indeed is so hedged with qualifications as to be worthless, it is significant evidence that Tetenes felt under considerable pressure and could not resort to the usual display of defiance. In addition, other NATO governments may find it useful to have these words on the record when they return to the matter in future. There will be a strong case for inquiring what precisely is meant by "the earliest possible moment".

#### The Secretary General

If the remarks attributed to him in the junta-controlled Greek press are accurate (and no denial has come to our notice at the time of writing), Dr Luns carried his shielding of the Greek regime to outrageous lengths in his press conference after the Ottawa meeting. Asked whether article 12 of the Declaration had been applied in Greece, he is reported to have answered: "The Greek government has never declared that it wishes to maintain for ever the present system of government. It has declared and frequently repeated that it intends to restore democracy in that country. Besides, this article of the Declaration has been applied in one place more and in another less, Holland, of which I am a citizen, is not perfect itself. None of us is perfect." These remarks constitute a scandalous attempt to devalue the Ottawa Declaration insofar as it concerns democratic principles and human rights. In the first place, it is implied that article 12 is not obligatory, but that vague promises of some kind of democracy at some unspecified future date are good enough; and secondly it is suggested that democracy is such an elastic concept that the difference between the Greek regime and other NATO governments is only a matter of degree. It seems most unlikely that the Luns views have been fabricated or seriously distorted, but if this should turn out to be the case the obvious conclusions will be drawn about the sincerity of the Greek commitment to the Declaration. If not, Dr Luns must not be allowed to get away with such mystification.

#### Final communique

Two paragraphs of the final communique of the Ottawa meeting appear to depart from past practice and to offer some hope that article 12 of the Declaration may indeed succeed in inducing further action on Greece in NATO. In paragraph 2 "Ministers declared their countries' continuing dedication to the aims and ideals of the North Atlantic Treaty. Ministers emphasised the desirability of developing and deepening the application of the principles of democracy, respect for human rights, justice and social progress" (our italics). This goes considerably further than the reaffirmation of principles on the occasion of the 20th anniversary (1969), and may be taken as a reflection of allied impatience with the situation in Greece. Paragraph 3 concerns a report by De Soares on recent developments in Portugal, and concludes: "Ministers welcomed the evolution towards the establishment of democratic and representative government in Portugal". Not only does this appear to be a radical departure from the hitherto inviolable rule that countries do not comment (even favourably)

on one another's internal affairs, but it also carries the implication that the NATO Council would similarly welcome a similar evolution in Greece. It will be the endeavour of this Committee to ensure that that implication is translated into an unmistakable signal at the next opportunity.

**North Atlantic Assembly** The spring committee meetings of the Assembly were held in Washington during the first week of June. As Rapporteur of the Political Committee, Mr Pieter Dankert drew the attention of its members to the deterioration of the situation in Greece, and a survey of that situation prepared by the European-Atlantic Action Committee was appended to his report, together with a reiteration of the case for an allied initiative on Greece. It is hoped that delegates to the Assembly will give particular attention to those parts of Mr Dankert's report which deal with Greece, and that they will pass a strong resolution on Greece when the Assembly holds its annual session from 11th to 16th November. It has already been pointed out that article 13 of NATO's Ottawa Declaration has direct relevance to the Assembly and raises the question of Greece in a very sharp form. These matters will be taken up again before the Assembly's meeting, and full advantage will be taken of the fact that this is to be held in London.

**European Commission** The first six months of 1974 have seen a marked escalation of concern at events in Greece on the part of both the EEC Commission and the European Parliament, and a foundation has been laid upon which still-stronger action may be sought. On 13th February a question was asked in the Parliament about the refusal of the Greek regime to admit a delegation of the Socialist International last December (see Bulletin No 8, p.6). Replying on behalf of the European Commission Dr Dahrendorf repeated the standard argument about the continuing administration of current business: "We cannot in law do less, and we do not under present circumstances wish to do more." Pressed in supplementary questions by members dissatisfied with this, he emphasised that the Commission had "never left any doubt about its views over the political situation in Greece", and added: "... one of the reasons for the freezing of relations is the fact that at the present moment there is no institution in Greece which merits the name of a freely-elected parliament." Six weeks later the Commission issued a forceful statement saying that it had "learned with deep indignation of the new wave of arrests and deportations now taking place in Greece". Once again it was repeated that the administration of the Association Agreement with Greece remained strictly limited to routine business since the situation there continued to be "very far removed from the democratic principles on which the Community is based". However, when the European Parliament met in Luxembourg on 4th April and M.Claude Cheysson replied for the Commission to an oral question initiating a debate on Greece, his remarks were described by the Times correspondent as "one of the most serious indictments of the Greek regime ever pronounced by a member of the European Community's executive body". Under some pressure for the suspension of the Association Agreement, M.Cheysson hinted that this course of action had been considered: "Every single member of the Commission, as well as the Commission itself as an executive body, is outraged and horrified by these dreadful events in Greece, and by this latest form of contempt for the rights of man and democratic freedom . . . . We are profoundly shocked by events in Greece and deplore them deeply, both for the sake of the Hellenic people and for Europe as a whole. . . . Rightly or wrongly the Association Agreement carries no cancellation clause . . . please be assured that we have looked into this point very closely indeed. . . . In other words, it is only because we are bound by legal obligations that we are carrying out the minimum obligations of the Agreement." And in winding up the debate, M.Cheysson emphasised that Commission and Parliament were at one in denouncing the situation in Greece and shared the same moral judgment and hopes for the future. He assured the Parliament that "we have given a good deal of thought to all this, and do not by any means feel happy about the position which the Commission is taking up." Finally, he pointed to the other side of the coin, namely that Greece could expect favourable treatment by the EEC as soon as democracy was restored, and that meanwhile every opportunity would be seized "to stress the bright perspectives which will open up for Greece - now suffering from every possible ill, including grave economic ones - the day the rights of man and democratic freedoms are restored . . . . (when) a very special effort will be needed to enable that country to make up for lost time in the economic field, so as to put it in a position to apply for membership of the Community. . . ." The other points raised in this discussion are considered briefly below.

#### European Parliament

The 4th April debate in Luxembourg was opened on behalf of the Socialist Group by Mr Seefeld deputizing for Mr Fellermaier. He expressed the dissatisfaction of his Group with Dr Dahrendorf's statement in February, drew attention to the persecution of political opponents in Greece and to the current review of policy towards the dictatorship by members of the EEC as well as by the USA, and urged the Commission to take steps to terminate the Association Agreement. Other groups in the Parliament supported the Socialist Group in varying degrees, although the Conservative Group took the view that there was no legal basis for the suspension of the Agreement and therefore that everything possible should be done to encourage Greece to return to democracy while making it clear beyond doubt that until this happens any question of their being considered suitable for membership of the EEC is ruled out. Much of the discussion dealt with legal aspects of the case, and several speakers made the point that the Association Agreement could be terminated under the 'rebus sic stantibus' clause of the Vienna Convention on international agreements. However, the interpretation of the Commission was that although there had certainly been "a radical change of circumstances" this change did not involve the "radical transformation of the scope of the obligations still to be met" required under the Vienna Convention in order to validate the termination of a treaty. Attention was also directed to the supplementary protocol which the Commission maintains it will have no option but to conclude so as to put the three new member countries of the EEC on the same level as the others in their relations with Greece. No date has yet been fixed for signing this protocol, but every available avenue should be explored in Denmark and the United Kingdom with a view to blocking its ratification and thereby reopening the whole question of the Agreement itself. In the meantime it is at least desirable that there should be further scrutiny of the legal issues involved in the relationship between the EEC and Greece, and that the responsible bodies should, as M. Pierre Giraud suggested in the debate, be bold and imaginative enough to "find ways and means of widening the ditch we have dug between the Greek government and the Community."

Another important development in the EEC context is the recent appointment of Mr Peter Corterier as Rapporteur on Greece of the European Parliament's Political Committee and External Relations Committee jointly. This move is greatly to be welcomed since it provides the mechanism which will enable the Parliament to keep the situation in Greece under continuous examination. The European-Atlantic Action Committee will endeavour to contribute to this process and intends to return to the issue in the near future. Another initiative which may open additional channels for parliamentary thinking on Greece is the proposal put forward by Mr Peter Kirk last month to bring foreign policy and defence matters within the scope of the European Parliament. One procedure envisaged is that the Parliament should be able to make reports on specific political issues for consideration and reply by the Council of Ministers. Mr Kirk has also proposed public hearings by the parliamentary committees.

#### US Congress

The strength of Congressional feeling on Greece has continued to mount during 1974. In the last issue of this Bulletin it was reported that on 23rd January the US Senate had passed by a unanimous voice vote the bill sponsored by Senators Claiborne Pell and Henry M. Jackson, which would make all forms of military assistance and sales and credit sales dependent on a presidential certification to Congress that Greece was in full compliance with her political and military obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty. As noted then, an amendment had been added to the original version of the bill in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee providing the President with a loophole to avoid the prohibition. Subsequently, although introduced separately in the House by Representative Abzug on 10th April, the bill itself was incorporated as an amendment in the Foreign Aid Bill, and has therefore been subject to the delays of the Aid Bill as a whole. At the time of writing this is due to be considered shortly by the House of Representatives. Some determination has already been expressed to restore the teeth of the legislation on Greece which were drawn by the loophole provision. It has also been suggested that if emphasis were laid upon the positive aspects of the legislation - namely that once Greece fulfilled her NATO obligations the US Administration would be willing, if required, to resume all forms of assistance including direct grant aid (discontinued in 1973) - this would represent the strongest inducement to the Greek military to ensure that their house is put in order. At the same time, remembering that the Hays amendment of 1971 (the prohibition clause

of which the President immediately exploited his right to waive) imposed a ceiling of \$71 million on US aid to Greece, Congressmen may wish to inquire into the terms of the estimated \$400 million aircraft deal that the Greek regime is supposed to have signed with the United States on 14th June. At the very least it may turn out that the timing of this contract was influenced by the final sentence of the Pell-Jackson amendment: "The provisions of this section shall not apply to funds obligated prior to such date of enactment."

One or two individual contributions to this mounting Congressional pressure are worth recording before the current attitude of the Administration is examined. In February the House Foreign Affairs Committee published a report on a special study mission to Greece undertaken January 18-21st by Representative Donald M. Fraser and Mr Clifford Hackett, staff consultant to the European Subcommittee. This report, which received wide publicity in the USA, reached three general conclusions: (a) That the present regime in Athens cannot last very long. "Marked by inexperience, its members appear without the requisite talents or skills for extricating the country from its political and economic chaos." (b) That "the democratic opposition in Greece is united as never before while the government is divided among three or four groups each attempting to influence the present de facto leader . . ." (c) That the United States has "pursued a faulty policy since 1967 from which we must now extricate ourselves". In detailing why this policy has been wrong, the report includes the following reasons: "(2) The unity of NATO is seriously disrupted when the United States insists that NATO continue to support a dictatorial regime in Greece when the original purpose of NATO membership for Greece was to preserve its democratic government. The United States stands alone in NATO in insisting on this close relationship with a military Greek government." And: "(4) Whether or not there is justice in the charge that the United States condoned the execution of the 1967 military coup, there is a widespread perception in Greece today that our continued support of the military government contributed to its continuation. The United States has become, in the eyes of an increasing number of Greek democrats, an instrument of their oppression." Finally, after recommending appropriate steps, the study mission report has this to say: "Inactivity may be the principal hazard which Washington, preoccupied elsewhere, must overcome unless Greece is to become a major problem for the United States in the near future. For Greece, but also for the United States, the present dangers are great and the time is short." Now that some of these preoccupations at least are less critical, it is hoped that the views expressed above will penetrate to the highest levels of the US Administration and will be reflected in the translation of the reputed "rethinking" process into action that will confront the problem in all its urgency.

On 2nd April Senator Claiborne Pell made a speech in the Senate welcoming the suspension of phase two of the homeporting plan (see below), in the course of which he also believed that "the need is growing for the United States to indicate clearly that reliance on a junta antagonistic to the Greek people is a dangerous security risk for the United States and the North Atlantic Alliance." He also shared the fears of inertia in US Government circles: "I have found it disquieting . . . that the State Department has been silent for months on the deteriorating situation in Greece, which I believe only a return to free government and rule of law can cure. For years the Department declared it was working toward this end. Now it says nothing . . . Has the State Department given up hope?"

On 3rd April Representative Peter Frelinghuysen, a Republican member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee who has not in the past been hypercritical of US policy toward Greece, reported on a stop he had made in Athens during February. He told Congress: "My overall impression of the current Greek political scene . . . is one of uneasiness, mixed with foreboding. The mood of confidence which was evident at the time of my previous visit, in the fall of 1971, has changed to one of uncertainty and drift. Exactly where the government of Greece is drifting is not clear - in fact, just who actually controls that government is difficult to discern . . . What is clear to me, after my most recent discussions with Greek and American officials, is that at the present time there is no movement - or even a pretence of a movement - toward elections, nor even toward a more diversified political representation within the government."

#### US Administration

During the weeks following the November 1973 coup, there was some evidence that the US Administration did not feel altogether at home with the new regime. While it is possible to overestimate the extent to which a new attitude is developing in Washington, and certainly the extent to which this is shared by those in a position to change policy, it is interesting to note that Ambassador Tasca is said to have left the impression with Congress that there was a "new urgency" about the need to restore democracy (Washington Post: 29th March), and that the suspension of the second phase of the homeporting agreement may well arise out of a new view of the regime in Greece. Although State Department spokesmen attributed the homeporting decision to technical delays, Defense Secretary James Schlesinger clearly implied at a press conference on 29th March that the reasons were political: the plan would not be implemented until there was "greater harmony in our mutual perceptions than exists at the present time"; and its ultimate future "would depend on the evolution of political developments". Meanwhile, at Deputy Assistant Secretary level in the State Department a new team has taken over responsibility for relations with Greece (both bilateral and in the NATO and European context), which has recently been transferred to the competence of the European Bureau rather than that of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. Those now responsible at this level have not been associated with State Department policy toward Greece in the past, and indeed one Deputy Assistant Secretary was highly critical of this policy as a staff investigator for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee only three years ago. It is also worth mentioning that when Mr John Zighdis, a former Greek Minister, testified before the House Foreign Affairs European Subcommittee on 27th March what he had to say was actually transmitted to Greece by the Voice of America - an unprecedented policy decision. Nevertheless, the fact remains that the Secretary of State continues to frown on more active manifestations of disapproval of the Greek regime and, although at his Ottawa press conference he drew attention to the communique when asked about Greece, he is in fact said to have raised objections to the emphatic reference to democracy when the text of the communique was being decided. Now that such considerable progress has been made on the main US foreign policy worry in the Middle East, there is every reason for the pressure to be intensified so that the anxiety over Greece (especially concerning the economy and the discontent in the armed forces) that has been reported at all levels of the State Department may find its most authoritative expression. To this end, representations are needed at the same time from Congress, from the hierarchy of the Administration, and - of an importance not to be underestimated - bilaterally from other NATO governments.

#### US newspapers

The United States press has carried a great deal of editorial comment and news analysis in the last six months formulating the kind of demands that this Committee and others have made. To take but one recent example, the lead editorial in the Washington Post for 6th June opened with these words: "Greece presents the extraordinary spectacle of a government whose worth and staying power are questioned, at least privately, by virtually all of its allies." The writer goes on to analyse the problems of Greece and their implications for the United States, and concludes: "It becomes increasingly a question . . . whether grand strategy compels the United States to follow a policy which many democratically minded Greeks identify with an uncritical embrace of the junta. Grand strategy in the long term may well require the United States to ensure its position with the Greek people by stepping back a pace from the current regime now. At the very least it is time to stop the flow of high-level visitors and salutations and to start strongly asserting the American interests - the moral interests as well as the political interests - in Greece's return to liberty".

#### MISCELLANEOUS REPORTS

##### Royal Navy

One of the first foreign policy decisions taken by the new British Government was contained in a Foreign Office announcement on 14th March that a four-day courtesy visit to Greece by two Royal Navy warships, due to begin the next day, had been cancelled. Referring to British anxiety to see democracy restored, the Foreign Office statement said: "The Government did not wish a visit of this sort to cast doubt on their position in this matter." The position was defined by the Foreign Secretary two days later: "We

have to differentiate ourselves from the dictatorships. We may not have the strength of a super power, but we can at least show on which side of the barricades we stand, and it is in that spirit I shall endeavour to carry out the manifesto of the Labour Government." During a subsequent foreign affairs debate in the House of Commons, Mr Callaghan amplified this statement: "There are nations whose internal repression of their citizens we deplore. Whether such nations fall on the right or on the left of the political spectrum, *the case for speaking is even stronger when silence might be deemed to be consent or indifference.*" After the anemic statements by the previous government about a return to democracy in Greece, this was a welcome initiative, and there will be no lack of opportunity in the future for the Foreign Secretary to follow his own precept on the matter. Doubts have been expressed in some quarters as to the wisdom and efficacy of this action. Of course nobody is under the illusion that such a gesture will of itself cause the overthrow of the Greek tyranny, but let it be perfectly clear that concerted and cumulative disapproval of this kind and of the kind now under consideration in the United States Congress, emanating both from individual governments and from the NATO and EEC authorities themselves, constitute the pressure most likely to activate the forces capable of restoring democracy in Greece. The strategy which this Committee believes must be followed - and must be followed with very great rapidity if turmoil and disaster are to be avoided in Greece - has been set out at length in innumerable memoranda during the last three years, and these views have been shared and endorsed in the parliaments and press of most NATO countries and in the relevant international organisations. Let there be no doubt, either, that the overwhelming majority of the Greek people are encouraged and strengthened by this kind of action. Centre Union leader and former Minister George Mavros, who was deported to an island concentration camp for two months after expressing his views, said: "I consider the decision of the British Government completely justified. Any move by the allies aiming at the restoration of democracy in this country, far from being an intervention in our internal affairs, is on the contrary an international obligation. It is impossible for the political, defence and economic organisations of the West to survive if any of their members violate the fundamental principles for which those organisations were created." A large number of former Ministers and parliamentarians as well as former Prime Minister Kanellopoulos publicly declared their solidarity with Mr Mavros, while another former Centre Union Minister, John Zighiox, in testimony to the US House Foreign Affairs European Subcommittee called the British action "the greatest investment of goodwill in Greece", which "created a burst of anger among the dictators, but simultaneously relieved and gratified the Greek people." Finally, while this Committee has suggested a range of options, some more immediately feasible and some more probably effective than others, we emphasise that it is up to the national governments and international organisations concerned to choose their options on what they consider, after studying all the arguments, to be the best criteria of feasibility and effectiveness. But if they do nothing, or if they choose innocuous steps, or if they declare one thing but carry out another, then they will be responsible for an eventual evolution in Greece which they may have cause to regret very deeply and which they will almost certainly be powerless to reverse.

#### M. Giscard d'Estaing

On 30th May, in his first message to the French National Assembly, newly-elected President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing had this to say about his intended foreign policy: "France will confirm and accentuate the liberal mission of its diplomacy by supporting throughout the world the cause of freedom and the right of peoples - and I mean peoples - to determine their own future." In this connection he went on to promise that his government would stop the sale of arms to illiberal regimes. This pledge came at about the same time as the announcement of contracts worth a total of £130 million to supply to the Greek regime 40 Mirage F1 fighter-bombers, 125 AMX-30 tanks and four missile-launching boats. Given this massive programme to rearm an obvious dictatorship, it would seem that the French Government has a very early opportunity to redeem the Presidential pledge. However, there is little encouragement to be drawn from the Ministry of Defence statement of 12th June that the pledge would be carried out but that it was too early yet to determine to which countries it would apply. On the other hand, in view of the decrepit state of the Greek economy and the worsening balance of payments crisis, it is difficult to understand how the French authorities can have any confidence that the Greek commitments will be met.



### General Goodpaster

Angered by the Zygdis Congressional testimony in March, in which the debilitating effect of the dictatorship upon the Greek armed forces was mentioned, government-controlled newspapers in Athens hastened to publish under banner headlines an interview with the supreme military commander of NATO. Several editorials followed commending General Goodpaster's praise of Greece for "maintenance of her forces to an excellent level of training and to a high degree of readiness" - a description regarded by informed observers as totally inaccurate. Hitherto the political capital made by the dictatorship out of such statements has largely been ignored, but on this occasion Ambassador Tasca sent a strong telegram complaining that the Goodpaster interview contradicted official US policy. This policy had only recently been distorted in the Greek press when testimony by Dr Kissinger was so reported as to imply his support for the junta: his assertion that "the domestic structure is not one which we should recommend" was omitted, and the correct text printed later only at the US embassy's insistence. But the Goodpaster affair was not to rest there. The "cat's-paw of Athens", as he was called in the Washington Post, was questioned by the House Foreign Affairs Committee on 19th June, when he professed to be "chagrined that my interview, which was given in good faith, may have had some influence on the domestic political situation". General Goodpaster further acknowledged that an army is harmed by purges of senior officers since "inevitably there is a period of time before their successors have fully regained the level of effectiveness of leadership". This time reports in the Greek press were not so conspicuous, but still misleading, for in the single paragraph given to the General's testimony the only remark quoted was once again that Greece maintains a high level of military readiness. Perhaps General Goodpaster would do better to remain silent.

### INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS

#### Little change

In recent issues of the Bulletin a considerable amount of space has been given to describing the situation inside Greece. Owing to the importance of international developments in the last six months - which we take to represent a perceptible tightening of the ring of foreign pressure on the dictatorship, of which full advantage must be taken in the months ahead - space is not available for a comprehensive analysis in this already enlarged issue. However, during this period there has been little qualitative change in that situation, but in general only an extension and exacerbation of trends examined earlier. In consequence, the comments below are designed merely to bring the picture up to date, and do not touch on student activities, the latest junta move in Cyprus, or the current tension over the Aegean.

#### In general

More than at any time between 1967 and 1973, the present phase of the Greek dictatorship is characterized by instability, stagnation and repression. After the inevitable failure of the Papadopoulos-Marxism experiment, the political world is united in its opposition to "bridge-building" tactics or any other partial "solutions". Discontent with military rule has spread to all sections of the community including the officer corps of the armed forces, among whom the feeling is growing both above and below the regime itself that their prestige has suffered immense damage as a result of the November bloodshed, the ineptitude with which the country is run, and the airing of the corruption tolerated and often practised by military leaders after 1967. Yet the long-running sideshow of the corruption trials has not distracted people's attention from the administrative paralysis of today. Congressman Fraser reported after his study mission that "it is a common complaint of businessmen that no decision comes from the present government: and that answers can seldom be obtained to the most routine questions of policy. Meanwhile the economy continues to deteriorate, with a savage rate of inflation (still by far the highest in Europe) and a massive current account deficit on balance of payments - trebling in the first two months of 1974 to \$352.3 million - that will be aggravated by expensive arms deals and by a slump in the traditional areas of foreign exchange earnings. The US State Department is said to fear imminent economic chaos in Greece, and leaders of the Greek business community are more than ever conscious of the penalties of

prolonged alienation from the E.F.C. Against this background, who in fact holds power? It appears that Brigadier Ioannides with his military police still has the upper hand. To maintain this, he is heavily dependent on the support of a number of senior army officers, many of whom hold much more moderate political views than his own and who fear the influence which a small group of nationalist officers also represented in the junta may begin to wield if no way can be found out of the present impasse. In this uneasy balance the first priority of the most active elements in the junta is to forestall opposition by all possible means.

#### Repression

The methods are familiar. Suspected opponents are arrested, held for a few days with deterrent beatings, and then released. For some the process may be repeated. Selected representatives from areas of potential opposition are imprisoned or deported, or in the case of newspapers put out of action. The conservative paper *Vradyni*, closed for six months in December, was not allowed to resume publication in June when it became apparent that it would be most popular. Journalists and publishers have been harassed, and at least two are among the fifty or so persons currently deported to the island prison camp on Yaros once condemned by the International Red Cross. Including some 280 people detained without trial by security or military police there are now estimated to be nearly 400 political prisoners in total. The names of at least 60 people killed in November are now known but not officially admitted, and there may be more. Martial law remains in force, but even that is not observed by the military police, who act as a law unto themselves. Overwhelming evidence has emerged in recent weeks that torture is still practised systematically and on a wide scale. Teenage schoolgirls are said to have been among the victims.

#### Ellinikos Vorras

Events in Portugal have particularly disturbed the junta, who strictly limit relevant news reporting in Athens. However, it is significant that the 3rd Army Corps controlling northern Greece has allowed the propagation of independent views (as well as criticism of handling of the Aegean dispute). On 17th May the Salonica newspaper *Ellinikos Vorras* wrote on this subject that the effect of suspending free political institutions is to destroy the non-communist parties and strengthen communism. The present need, the paper argued, is democracy, on a fair social basis. These comments provide some evidence in favour of the view that there are forces in the army likely and able to take steps to restore democracy if concerted international persuasion and pressure are applied.