

for your information

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White House staff members were reimbursed in each by the Democratic National Committee for campaign travel with the President last year.

Some of the excess President's Club payments went to printers, ad agencies, and Washington hotels to satisfy bills run up during the campaign year.

SECRET CHECK REPORT

The President's Club filing marks the second time a Democratic group reported spending far in excess of the funds it said it had collected. In its second-quarter filing in 1965, the Democratic National Committee reported it paid out over \$200,000 more than it previously had reported receiving. Though officials at the time said this represented a "deficit," the amounts involved were payments made rather than bills still remaining to be satisfied.

Several other types of discrepancies marked the most recent Democratic filings.

Another fund-raising group—the Johnson-Bicentennial committee—reported out its activities last November 17, according to its filing with the House Clerk. On that day it reported transferring \$8,000 to the Democratic National Committee.

That committee's report, however, fails to record receipt of the \$8,000 in November or December, although both committees were operated out of the office of Democratic National Committee Treasurer Richard Maguire, recently resigned his post to enter private law practice.

In a similar transaction, the Democratic National Committee reported it transferred \$6,534.89 on December 1 to the President's Club.

The President's Club, in turn, reported on December 1 it received \$100,000 from \$49,034.29—from "Julius W. L.H.P." housed at the Democratic National Committee.

What happened to the \$500 and where "Julius W. L.H.P." fits into the fund-raising picture remain unanswered.

Such transactions, however, are seen as illustrating the need for another of the President's campaign reform proposals—action to prohibit the disclosure of names of contributors to committees which obscure the handling of campaign funds.

Another inconsistency within the recent Democratic report involves the date of alleged payments. The President's Club last month reported a September 14 payment of \$12,480 to Vogel Construction Co., Washington, D.C., which built the stage and platform at the Democratic January 1965 inaugural gala in the D.C. Armory. But a Voice official said last week the check was received in June rather than September.

Similarly, Turnpike Press of Alexandria, Va., which produced a series of campaign flyers for the Democrats, received a \$3,607.95 check in July rather than September, as the Democrats reported.

By postponing the reporting date of payments, the Democrats can attempt to keep their publicly filed figures of receipts and expenditures balanced and thus give the impression of activity at all times.

Another entry which has puzzled inquirers lists a payment late in November of \$2,467 as "reimbursement of expenses" to a former employee of the White House travel section. This now-retired, long-time civil service employee said last week he could not recall ever having received any funds or checks from the Democratic National Committee. He said, however, the committee called him last fall and asked him his home address, which was part of the report filed.

There has been no official explanation as to why, almost a year after the campaign, the Democrats decided to pay off several of their largest outstanding bills and reports, those payments as part of the President's Club filing. Recent stories have referred to an alleged \$1.7 million party deficit.

The recent filings would indicate the party still has unrecouped financial resources available to meet its financial needs.

One Democratic aid last week suggested President Johnson, faced with the need to replace retiring lawmakers, Maguire had taken new interest in the party's finances. It also was speculated that criticism of the Democrats' \$18,500 a page ad book to raise funds for this year's congressional elections had stirred Johnson to action.

SECRET CORRESPONDENCE WITH TURKEY RAISES DISTURBING QUESTIONS

MR. FINDLEY (at the request of Mr. McDiarmid) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Speaker, secret correspondence released last Saturday by the White House at the request of the Government of Turkey gives notice of a major new limitation in U.S. commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty, and therefore raises disturbing questions about the credibility of pledges to our allies.

In a letter sent June 3, 1964 to Prime Minister Inonu, President Johnson in effect sharply qualified our solemn pledge to defend Turkey against Soviet attack. This forced Turkey to drop plans for military intervention in Cyprus.

The limits of the Turkish problem in Cyprus are completely beside the point. The basic question is one of treaty obligation. In the North Atlantic Treaty the United States was committed without qualification to defend Turkey from aggression.

Here is the pertinent language:

Article 4. The parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all, and consequently they agree that if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the party or parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

The language you will note, pledges action automatically to assist any member which is attacked.

The key sentence is Mr. Johnson's letter:

I hope you will understand that your NATO allies have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to consider Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention without the full consent and understanding of its NATO allies.

In other words, U.S. action to defend Turkey against Soviet attack would be conditional—not automatic. The United States would first decide whether the attack was provoked, and then make up its mind on defending Turkey.

So far as I can determine, this is the first time any member of the NATO alliance has questioned the automatic character of the mutual defense pact.

The automatic character of allied response was absolutely clear in the treaty, so the NATO Council would have

no reason to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union. So far as I can learn, the NATO Council did not at any time authorize President Johnson to be the alliance spokesman in regard to Turkey's action in Cyprus.

In his reply, Mr. Inonu hit the issue squarely when he wrote:

Our understanding is that the North Atlantic Treaty imposes upon all member states the obligation to come forthwith to the assistance of any member victim of aggression. The only point left to the discretion of the member states is the nature and the scale of the assistance.

If NATO members should start discussing the right and wrong of the situation of their fellow-member victim of Soviet aggression—the very foundations of the alliance would be shaken.

Since the affair, Mr. Inonu has been replaced in office, United States-Turkish relations have been chilly and Turkey has been quietly trying to improve its relations with the Soviet Union.

This major treaty qualification in regard to Turkey—previously unannounced—may raise questions about the credibility of our commitments to other allies. No doubt Soviet leaders will read with intense interest the texts of these letters.

If, in a light and tense minor crisis, the most powerful member of the alliance will qualify its obligation to one of the less powerful and most vulnerable, what may be expected if a major crisis arises?

How would we feel if the situation were reversed, and our plan to protect U.S. interests in the Dominican Republic for example—were checkmated by a more powerful ally?

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT

At the request of the Government of Turkey, the White House is today releasing the texts of letters exchanged on June 3, 1964, between President Johnson and the then Prime Minister of Turkey, Ismet Inonu, on the Cyprus crisis. Steps subsequent to the exchange of letters led to the visit of Prime Minister Inonu to Washington later in that month and constructive discussions by the President and the Prime Minister of the issues involved.

A joint communique released at the conclusion of these discussions welcomed the opportunity for a full exchange of views by the two leaders and the occasion to consider ways in which the two countries could strengthen the efforts of the United Nations in regard to the safety and security of Cyprus. The communique noted that "the cordial and candid conversations of the two leaders strengthened the broad understanding already existing between Turkey and the United States."

The United States continues to value highly the close and friendly relations we maintain with Turkey.

PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S LETTER TO PRIME MINISTER INONU

June 3, 1964

Dear Mr. Prime Minister: I am greatly concerned by the information which I have had through Ambassador Hale from you and your Foreign Minister that the Turkish Government is contemplating a decision to intervene by military force to stop a power grab in Cyprus. I wish to emphasize, in the fullest friendship and frankness, that I do not consider this such a course of action by Turkey, fraught with such far-reaching consequences, is consistent with the communi-

ment of your Government to consult fully in advance with the United States. Mr. Hale has indicated that you have postponed your decision for a few hours in order to obtain my view. I put to you personally whether you really believe that it is appropriate for your Government, in circumstances of unilateral decision of such consequence to an ally who has demonstrated such staunch support over the years as has the United States for Turkey. I must, therefore, urge you to accept the responsibility for complete consultation with the United States before any such action is taken.

It is my impression that you believe that such intervention by Turkey is permissible under the provisions of the treaty of guarantee of 1960. I must call your attention, however, to our understanding that the proposed intervention by Turkey would be for the purpose of effecting a form of partition of the island, a solution which is specifically excluded by the treaty of guarantee. Further, that treaty requires consultation among the guarantor powers. It is the view of the United States that the possibilities of such consultation have by no means been exhausted in the situation and that, therefore, the reservation of the right to take unilateral action is not yet applicable.

I must call to your attention, also, Mr. Prime Minister, the obligations of NATO. There can be no question in your mind that a Turkish intervention in Cyprus would lead to a military engagement between Turkish and Greek forces. Secretary of State Dulles declared at the recent meeting of the Ministerial Council of NATO in The Hague that war between Turkey and Greece must be considered as mutually unthinkable. Adhesion to NATO, in its very essence, means that NATO countries will not wage war on each other. Germany and France have buried centuries of animosity and hostility in becoming NATO allies, and we have no doubt that Greece and Turkey. Furthermore, a military intervention in Cyprus by Turkey could lead to a direct involvement by the Soviet Union. I hope you will understand that your NATO allies have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union. If Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention without the full consent and understanding of the NATO allies.

Further, Mr. Prime Minister, I am concerned about the obligations of Turkey as a member of the United Nations. The United Nations has provided forces on the island to keep the peace. Their task has been difficult but, during the past several weeks, they have been progressively successful in reducing the incidents of violence on that island. The United Nations mediator has not yet completed his work. I have no doubt that the general membership of the United Nations would react in a very strong manner to unilateral action by Turkey which would defy the efforts of the United Nations and destroy any prospect that the United Nations could seek to obtain a just and peaceful settlement of this difficult problem.

I wish also, Mr. Prime Minister, to call your attention to the bilateral agreement between the United States and Turkey in the field of military assistance. Under article IV of the agreement with Turkey of July 1947, your Government is required to obtain U.S. consent for the use of military assistance for purposes other than those for which such assistance was furnished. Your Government has on several occasions acknowledged to the United States that you fully understood this condition. It is my belief that in any case that the United States cannot give to the use of any United States supplied military equipment for a Turkish intervention in Cyprus under such circumstances.

Moving to the practical results of the contemplated Turkish move, I feel obligated to

call to your attention in the most friendly manner the fact that such a Turkish move could lead to the displacement of thousands of Turkish Cypriots on the Island of Cyprus. Such an action on your part would unbind the Parties and there is no way by which unilateral action on your part could be sufficiently effective to prevent wholesale destruction of many of those whom you are trying to protect. The presence of United States naval forces could not prevent such a catastrophe.

You may consider that what I have said is much too severe and that we are derogating of Turkish interests in the Cyprus situation. I should like to assure you that this is not the case. We have carried ourselves both publicly and privately to assure the safety of Turkish Cypriots and to insist that a final solution of the Cyprus problem should rest upon the consent of the parties most directly concerned. It is possible that you feel in Ankara that the United States has not been sufficiently forthcoming on this half. But surely you know that our policy has assessed the liveliest resentments in Athens (where demonstrations have been staged against us) and has led to a Latin alienation between the United States and Archbishop Makarios. As I said to your Foreign Minister in our conversation just a few weeks ago, we value very highly our relations with Turkey. We have considered you as a great ally with fundamental common interests. Your security and prosperity have been a deep concern of the American people and we have expressed that concern in the most practical terms. You and we have fought together to resist the ambitions of the Communist world revolution. We solidarily have received a great debt to us and I would hope that it means a great deal to your Government and to your people. We have no intention of leading any party or any section of Cyprus which contravenes the Turkish Cypriot community. We have not been able to find a final solution because this is, admittedly, one of the most complex problems on earth. But I wish to assure you that we have been deeply concerned about the interests of Turkey and of the Turkish Cypriots and will remain so.

Finally, Mr. Prime Minister I must tell you that you have passed the gravest hours of war and peace. These are hours which go far beyond the bilateral relations between Turkey and the United States. They not only will certainly involve war between Turkey and Greece but could involve wider hostilities because of the unpredictable consequences which a unilateral intervention in Cyprus could produce. You have your responsibilities as Chief of Government of Turkey; I also have mine as President of the United States. I must, therefore, inform you in the deepest friendship that should exist between us that your Government will not take such action without further and fullest consultation. I cannot accept your intention to Ambassador Hale of secrecy regarding the intervention in Cyprus. The meetings of the NATO Council and of the United Nations Security Council.

I wish it were possible for us to have a personal discussion of the situation. Unfortunately, because of the special circumstances of our present constitutional position, I am not able to leave the United States. If you could come here for a full discussion I would welcome it. I do feel that you and I carry a very heavy responsibility for the general peace and for the possibilities of a sane and peaceful resolution of the Cyprus problem. I ask you, therefore, to delay any decisions which you and your colleagues might have in mind until you and I have had the fullest and frankest consultation.

Sincerely,

LEWIS B. JOHNSON.

PRIME MINISTER MAMOUR'S RESPONSE TO THE PRESIDENT

JUNE 13, 1960.

His Excellency THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have received your letter of June 11, 1960 through Ambassador Hale. We have, upon your request, postponed our decision to exercise our right of unilateral action in Cyprus contravening to us in due regard to the spirit of candor and frankness in which your message is meant to be written. I will, in my reply, try also to explain to you in full frankness my views about the situation.

Mr. President, your message, both in wording and content, has been disappointing for an ally like Turkey who has always been giving the most serious attention to its relations of alliance with the United States and has brought to the fore substantial divergences of opinion in various fundamental matters pertaining to these relations.

It is my sincere hope that both these divergences and the general tone of your message are due to the haste in which a representative message of good-will was prepared because of time, based on data hurriedly collected.

In the first place, it is being emphasized in my message that we have failed to consult with the United States when a military intervention in Cyprus was deemed indispensable by virtue of the treaty of guarantee. The necessity of a military intervention in Cyprus has been felt four times since the closing days of 1958. From the outset we have taken a special care to consult the United States on this matter. Soon after the outbreak of the crisis, on December 25, 1958 we have immediately informed the United States of our contacts with the other guaranteeing powers only to be assured that the United States was not a party to the crisis. We then negotiated with the United Kingdom and Greece for Intervention, and, as you know, a tripartite military administration under British command was set up on December 26, 1958. Upon the failure of the London conference and of the Joint Anglo-American proposals, due to the attitude of Makarios and in the face of continuing assaults in the island against the Turkish Cypriots, we lived through very critical days in February and taking advantage of the visit of Mr. George Ball to Ankara, we informed again the United States of the gravity of the situation. We tried to explain to you the reasons for our intervention to restore order in the island might arise in view of the vacuum caused by the rejection of the Anglo-American proposals and we informed you of our intention to intervene at any time. We even requested guarantees from you on specific issues and your answers were in the affirmative. However, the Security Council, because a problem was assured us that Makarios would get at the United Nations a severe lesson while all the Turkish rights and interests would be protected.

We complied with your request without any satisfactory result being secured at the United Nations. Moreover the creation of the United Nations Force, decided upon by the Security Council, became a problem. The necessity for intervention was felt for the third time to protect the Turkish community against the assaults of the terrorists in Cyprus who were encouraged by our doubts as to whether the United Nations forces would be set up immediately after the adoption of the Security Council resolution of March 1960. Assuming you are correct, we would be set up very slowly, you insisted again that we refrain from intervening.

Thereupon we postponed our intervention once again, awaiting the United Nations forces to assume their duty.

Dear Mr. President, the era of terror in Cyprus has a particular character which renders ineffective the diplomatic means so far. From the very outset, the negotiations held to restore security and the temporary set-up have all helped only to increase the bitterness and the determination of the Makarios administration. The Greek Cypriots have lately started to arm themselves overtly and considered the United Nations as an additional obstacle to their own political and unconstitutional rule. It has become quite obvious that the United Nations have neither the authority nor the intent to intervene for the restoration of constitutional order or to put an end to aggression. You are well aware of the intransigent attitude of the Greek Government toward the Greek Cypriots. During the talks held in your own name in the United States, we informed you that under the circumstances we would eventually be compelled to intervene in order to put an end to the atrocities in Cyprus. We also asked your Secretary of State at the Hague whether the United States would support us in such an eventuality and we received no answer. I think I have thus reminded you how grave those and the special responsibilities which rest upon the United States within the Alliance and of the necessity to be particularly careful and helpful to enable her to maintain solidarity within the Alliance. The U.S. Government had the intention to do everything you had a unilateral decision on our part. Our grave concerns stem from our inability to explain to you a problem which has become acute at the moment. A frank and firm stand on the issue as to which party is on the right side in the dispute between the two allies, namely, Turkey and Greece.

Mr. President, in your message you further emphasize the obligation of Turkey, under the provisions of the treaty, to consult with the other two guaranteeing powers, before taking any unilateral action. Turkey is fully aware of this obligation. For the past 6 months we have indeed complied with the requirements of this obligation. But Greece has, not only thwarted all the attempts made by Turkey to seek jointly the ways and means to stop Greek Cypriots from reproducing international terrorism, but has also supported their unlawful and inhuman acts and has even encouraged them.

The Greek Government itself has not hesitated to declare publicly that the international agreements which it has signed are no longer in force. Various examples to that effect were, in due course, communicated in detail, orally and in writing, to your State Department.

We have likewise fulfilled our obligation of constant consultation with the Government of the United Kingdom, the other guaranteeing power.

In several instances we have jointly with the Government of the United Kingdom, made representations to the Greek Cypriots with a view to restoring constitutional order. But unfortunately, these representations were of no avail due to the negative attitude of the Greek Cypriot authorities.

As you see, Turkey has earnestly espoused every avenue of consulting jointly and setting jointly with the other two guaranteeing powers. This being the fact, it cannot be asserted that Turkey has failed to abide by her obligations of consulting jointly and setting jointly with the other two guaranteeing powers before taking unilateral action.

I put it to you, Mr. President, whether the U.S. Government which has felt the need

to draw the attention of Turkey to her obligation of consultation, yet earnestly and faithfully fulfilled by the latter, should not have reminded Greece, who reproduces treaties in violation of the accords by which she is the fundamental part of international law. This concept which, only a fortnight ago, was most eloquently characterized as that of survival by your Secretary of State himself in his speech at the American Law Institute, is now being completely and contemptuously ignored by Greece, our NATO ally and the Greek Cypriots.

Dear Mr. President, as implied in your message, by virtue of the provisions of article 4 of the Treaty of guarantee, the three guaranteeing powers have, in the event of a breach of the provisions of that treaty, the right to take concerted action and, if that proves impossible, unilateral action with the sole aim of reestablishing the state of affairs intended by the said treaty. The treaty of guarantee was signed with this understanding being shared by all parties thereto. The "gentlemen's agreement" signed on February 23, 1966, by the Foreign Ministers of Turkey and Greece, is an evidence of that common understanding.

On the other hand, at the time of the adoption of the Republic of Cyprus to the United Nations, the members of the organization were fully acquainted with all the international commitments and obligations of the said Republic and no objections were raised in this regard.

Furthermore, in the course of the discussions on Cyprus leading to the resolution adopted on March 4, 1964, by the Security Council, the U.S. representative has explicitly declared that the United Nations had no power to annul or assess international treaties.

I would like to underline in your message that the intervention by Turkey in Cyprus would be for the purpose of effecting the partition of the island has caused me great surprise and profound sorrow. My surprise stems from the fact that the data furnished to you about the intentions of Turkey could be so remote from the realities repeatedly proclaimed by us. The reason of my sorrow is that on the one hand, the obligations of the United States, would think that Turkey might lay aside the principle constituting the foundation of her foreign policy, i.e., absolute loyalty to international law, commitments and obligations, as tacitly evidenced in many circumstances well known to the United States.

I would like to assure you most categorically and most sincerely that if ever Turkey finds herself forced to intervene militarily in Cyprus this will be done in full conformity with the provisions and aims of international law.

In this connection, allow me to stress, Mr. President, that the postponement of our decision does not naturally, in no way affect the obligations of Turkey by article 4 of the treaty of guarantee.

Mr. President, referring to NATO obligations, you state in your message that the United States requires that allies should not wage war on each other. It is a Turkish intervention in Cyprus would lead to a military engagement between Turkish and Greek forces.

It was in full agreement with the first part of your statement, but the obligation for the NATO allies to respect international agreements concluded among themselves as well as their mutual treaties and commitments is an equally vital requisite of the Alliance. An alliance among states which ignore their mutual contractual obligations and commitments is unthinkable.

In the context you express your fear of the outbreak of a Turko-Greek war in case of Turkey's intervention in Cyprus in conformity with her rights and obligations stipu-

lated in international agreements, I would like to stress that Turkey would undertake a "military operation" in Cyprus exclusively under the conditions and for the purpose set forth in the agreements. A Turko-Greek war as properly described as "literally unthinkable" by the Honorable Dean Rusk could only occur in case of Greece's aggression against Turkey. It is our firm conviction that such intervention, in order to arrive at an effective collaboration, with the aim of restoring the constitutional order in Cyprus, both Greek and Turkish Kingdoms, is the only way of guaranteeing peace. If despite this invitation and its contractual obligations Greece were to attack Turkey, we could in no way be held responsible of the consequences of such an action. I would like to hope that you have already seriously drawn the Greek Government's attention on these matters.

The part of your message expressing doubts as to the obligation the NATO allies to protect Turkey in case she becomes directly involved with the U.S.S.R. as a result of an action initiated in Cyprus, gives me the impression that there are as between us wide divergence of views as to the nature and basic principles of the North Atlantic Alliance. I must confess that this has been to us the source of great sorrow and grave concern. Any aggression against a member of NATO will naturally call from the aggressor an effort of justification. If NATO's structure is so weak as to give credit to the aggressor's justification, it means that the defect of NATO needs really to be remedied. Our understanding is that the North Atlantic Treaty imposes upon all member states the obligation to come forthwith to the assistance of any member victim of an aggression. The only point left to the discretion of the member states is the nature and the scale of this assistance. It is our belief that we should start discussing the right and wrong of the situation of their fellow-member victim of a Soviet aggression, whether this aggression was provoked or not and if the decision on whether to come forthwith to the aid of the member should be made to depend on the issue of such a discussion, the very foundations of the Alliance would be shaken and it would lose its meaning. An offer of assistance, if it is to carry any weight, should come into being immediately upon the occurrence of aggression. That is why Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty contains an attack against one of the member states as an attack against them all and makes it imperative for them to assist the party so attacked by taking forthwith such action as they deem necessary. In this connection I would like to further point out that the agreements on Cyprus have met with the approval of the North Atlantic Council, an early stage of the Alliance. It is our belief that the problem, i.e., even prior to the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, hence long before the occurrence of the events of December 1963.

As you will recall, at the meeting of the NATO Ministerial Council held 3 weeks ago at the Hague, it was acknowledged that the treaties concluded to be the basis for legality should be respected. In this connection I would like to further point out that the agreements on Cyprus have met with the approval of the North Atlantic Council, an early stage of the Alliance. It is our belief that the problem, i.e., even prior to the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, hence long before the occurrence of the events of December 1963.

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ing within the NATO alliance in a situation that asks, by its nature, be treated as an arbitrary act. Turkey, an opponent of thinking would lead to the repudiation and denial of the concept of law and of article 31 of the United Nations Charter.

In your message, Mr. Speaker, you expressed about the sentiments of Turkey as a member of the United Nations. I am sure, Mr. President, you will agree with me if I say that such a course which I do not share, is groundless especially for the following reasons: Turkey has distinguished herself as one of the most loyal members of the United Nations ever since its foundation. The Turkish people have been an effort to safeguard the principles of the United Nations Charter, and has even sacrificed her sons for this cause. Turkey has never failed in supporting this organization and, in order to secure its proper functioning, has borne great moral and material sacrifices even when she had most pressing financial difficulties. Despite the rights conferred to Turkey by the Treaty of Guarantee, my Government's respect for and adherence to the United Nations have recently been demonstrated once more by its acceptance of the Security Council resolution of March 4, 1964, as well as by the priority it has given to the said resolution. Should the United Nations have been progressively successful in carrying out their task as pointed out in your message, a situation which is of such grave concern for both you and I, would never have arisen. It is a fact that the United Nations operations in the island have proved unable to put an end to the oppression.

The relative calm which has apparently prevailed in the island for the past few weeks marks the beginning of a new era of Greek Cypriots for further tyranny. Villages are still under siege. The United Nations forces, suppressing Turkish Cypriots, make the Greek Cypriots more angry; but they do not try to stop the Greeks when the crops of Turks are snatched and they act as mere spectators to Greek assaults. These vitally important details will not reach you, whereas we live in the atmosphere created by the daily reports of such tragic events.

The report of the Secretary General will be submitted to the United Nations on June 15, 1964. I am seriously concerned that we may face yet another defeat similar to the one we all suffered on March 4, 1964. The session of March 4 had further questioned Makarios that the Treaty of Guarantee did not exist for him and thereupon he took the liberty of actually placing the United Nations forces under his control and directing them then on the assassination of Makarios and the besieging of villages have considerably increased.

Dear Mr. President, our allies who are in a position to arbitrate in the Cyprus issue and to orient it in the right direction have so far been unable to disentangle the problem from a substantial error. The Cyprus tragedy has been engendered by the deliberate policy of the Republic of Cyprus aimed at annulling the treaties and abrogating the constitution. Security can be established in the island only through the steps and further action of a authority above the Government of Cyprus. Yet only the measures acceptable to the Cypriot Government are being sought to restore security in Cyprus. The delicate position set up following the December events, the Anglo-American proposals and finally the United Nations command have all been founded on the untested basis and consequently have remained acceptable to Makarios has proved futile and has, in general, encouraged oppression and aggression.

Dear Mr. President, you put forward in your message the education in order to save Greece by the policy pursued by your gov-

ernment. Within the context of the Cyprus issue, the nature of the Greek policy and the extent of animosity of Greece indicate that she is apt to react to every means within her power to secure the complete annulment of the existing treaties. We are at pains to make our allies understand the sufferings we bear in a right manner and the irretrievable plight in which the Turkish Cypriots are living. On the other hand, it is not the character of our nation to export demonstrations of resentment. I assure you that our distress is deeply rooted since we cannot make you understand our rightful position and coerce you of the necessity of spending every effort and making use of all your authority to avert the peril inherent in the Cyprus problem by attaching to it the importance it well deserves. That France and Germany have buried their animosity is indeed a good example. However, our nation had already given such an example 40 years ago by establishing friendly relations with Greece, right after the Feroze demolition of the whole Anatolia by the armies of that country.

Dear Mr. President, as a member of the nation our nation is fully conscious of her duties and rights. We do not pursue any aim other than the settlement of the Cyprus problem in compliance with the provisions of the existing treaties. Such a settlement is likely to be reached if you lend your support and give effect with your supreme authority to the sense of justice inherent in the character of the American Nation. Mr. President, I thank you for your statement emphasizing the value attached by the United States to the relations of alliance with Turkey and for your kind words about the Turkish nation. I shall be happy to come to the United States to talk over the Cyprus problem with you. The United Nations Security Council will meet on June 17. In the meantime, Mr. Erik Sikkler, Secretary of the UNCTO, will visit the United States. Furthermore, the United Nations Mediator Mr. Tassoulois will have submitted his report to the Secretary-General. These developments may lead to the emergence of a new situation. It will be possible for me to go abroad to join you, at a date convenient for you, immediately after June 20.

It will be most helpful for me if you would let me know of any defined times and days you may have on the Cyprus question so that I may be able to study them thoroughly before my departure for Washington.

Finally, I would like to express my appreciation for the frank, fruitful, and promising talks we had with Mr. G. Bell, in Ankara just before forwarding this message to you.

Sincerely,

ISMET INÖNÜ,
Prime Minister of Turkey.

INTRODUCES BILL FOR VIETNAM VETERANS

(Mr. CRAMER at the request of Mr. McDANIEL was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. CRAMER. Mr. Speaker, I have today introduced a bill designed to extend GI educational benefits to veterans of the Vietnam war. In my judgment, this is most legislation and should be favorably considered by this body at the earliest possible time.

As I speak, over 100,000 American men are serving their country in Vietnam and thousands of others are supporting these men in various capacities. Many have delayed their education in order to serve their country. Others have had their

education interrupted. Although this country can never repay these valiant men for the precious time they have lost—lost, I might add, during the most productive years of their lives—it can help them either begin, continue or further their educational pursuits upon their return to civilian life.

This mighty Nation has always recognized and met its obligations to its fighting men. This has been true in two World Wars and Korea. Hopefully, it will be equally true today.

I might add, Mr. Speaker, that it was deeply disturbing to me that the President, in his state of the Union message, made only passing reference to the need for this type of legislation while not hesitating to ask, with great specificity, for the Congress to continue appropriating billions of dollars for some of the administration's wholly discredited programs. Hopefully such slight reference is not a reflection of the administration's lack of true support for our Vietnam veterans and that the White House will indicate to the Congress the President's support for adequate legislation to benefit these men.

My bill provides for education or training at the rate of 1½ days of education for each day of military service. The period of education or training to which an eligible veteran shall be entitled shall not exceed 36 months.

Education or training must be initiated within 3 years after the veterans' discharge or release from active duty or 3 years from date of enactment, whichever is later. Under special circumstances, these limitations may be waived.

THE GREAT SOCIETY NEGLECTS THOSE WHO DEPEND IT

(Mr. GURNEY at the request of Mr. McDANIEL was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. GURNEY. Mr. Speaker, in the ending and ever-increasing money spending program of the Great Society our young soldiers, who by their sacrifices have most earned their country's help, have been sadly overlooked.

Since 1953 nearly 6 million men have served America in her tasks as protector of freedom. Scores of thousands are even now risking their lives in the war in southeast Asia.

Yet in all this discussion in the state of the Union message of America's role in Vietnam, the debt owed the GI's was accorded only an oblique reference. This was the same speech that called for a plan to educate the children of the world—the very same world these young GI's have been fighting to save and protect.

To serve in the Armed Forces these young men have interrupted college and careers. For many of them, the place they left is no longer open, but is filled by another young man who was not called upon to serve. They are 2 or 3 years behind their contemporaries and find that those they left behind are now