

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT OF

DR. KISSINGER'S TESTIMONY ON GREECE

BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE

7 JUNE 1974

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14 terest to this particular Senator, at least Greece.

15 As you know, the Senate passed without objection  
16 unanimously, at least nobody objected, I won't say unanimously  
17 but there was no objection, a bill saying that no credit  
18 sales could be granted Greece unless the President would  
19 certify as to the ability of Greece to adhere to the political  
20 and military requirements of the NATO preamble and provisions.

21 I know in your projected budget here you have \$  
22 million for credit sales to Greece.

23 Does this mean you presume either the bill will not  
24 pass the House, which is conceivable, it might even be vetoed  
25 by the President, or that you believe the President can certify

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1 that Greece really is able to live up to its NATO military  
2 commitment?

3 Secretary Kissinger. Well, when we submit the program  
4 we have to do it within the framework of the existing legisla-  
5 tion and the bill as of now has not passed the House.  
6 Therefore, our program was framed on the basis of existing  
7 legislation, it made no presumption of what the ultimate House  
8 action would be or attempted to foresee what the President's  
9 reaction to such a bill would be.

10 In general, our problem with respect to credits to  
11 Greece is one that we have discussed previously in this  
12 committee in public sessions or in my confirmation hearings  
13 and in many executive hearings which is the relationship  
14 between our approbation of a domestic structure of a country  
15 and the importance politically and strategically that may be  
16 attached to relations with that country apart from its  
17 domestic structure.

18 Given Greece's strategic role in the southern flank of  
19 NATO, it has been the judgement of the Administration to sub-  
20 mit this request even though the political form, the domestic  
21 structure of Greece is not one which we would recommend and,  
22 therefore, pending Congressional action to the contrary we  
23 submitted our best judgment.

24 Senator Pell. In this regard, I know that the Defense  
25 Department stated that Phase II in the home porting of the

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1 Navy vessels there is Navy vessels there is being suspended  
2 because of political conditions in Greece while the Department  
3 of State announced the suspension because of technical diffi-  
4 culties.

5 It would seem to me that is sort of a reversal of the  
6 normal role.

7 I was wondering if your view was that you could give  
8 some expression here in a public forum as to the view of the  
9 American government with regard to the Greek Government, because  
10 one of the problems in Greece now is that the people there are  
11 of the opinion that the present junta is fully supported  
12 by our government and is embraced by it, and I was wondering  
13 if you would be in a position to at least indicate there is no  
14 approval or approbation for it.

15 Secretary Kissinger. Military relations with Greece  
16 should not be considered approbation of the form of government  
17 in Greece. It is based on our interpretation of the American  
18 national interest and of the alliance interest in the defense  
19 of the Mediterranean.

20 With respect to the contradictory statements that may  
21 have been made, that were made, by the Defense and the State  
22 Departments, as I understand it, in the negotiations, cer-  
23 tain conditions were raised that were considered unacceptable.

24 My colleagues seem to have interpreted it as technical.  
25 the Defense Department as political.

Senator Pell. Would you like to see a change of government in Greece, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary Kissinger. Well, I don't think it is appropriate for me to comment on my hopes for the domestic structure of other countries. I have already stated that one should not conclude from our military cooperation necessarily our approbation for the political form of government,



1 preferable instrument. However, we have a number of special  
2 items in our request.

3 Indochina is one, the beginning of our Middle East  
4 program is another, which have to take amore bilateral  
5 form. We would expect with resepect to the Middle East that  
6 after the initial bilateral grants that as time goes on  
7 consortiums can be formed which would put the foreign assist-  
8 ance on a more multilateral basis.

9 Senator Pell. You would agree with the objective of  
10 moving in that direction as we can?

11 Secretary Kissinger. I would agree with the general  
12 objective, yes.

13 Senator Pell. Moving in the specific areas of in-  
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