TESTIMONY OF JOHN ZIGHDIS ON
AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD GREECE

HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
AND ITS
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
MARCH 27, 1974
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

THOMAS E. MORGAN, Pennsylvania, Chairman

CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI, Wisconsin
WAYNE L. HAYS, Ohio
L. H. FOUNTAIN, North Carolina
DANTE B. FASCELLI, Florida
CHARLES C. DIGGS, Jr., Michigan
ROBERT N. C. NIX, Pennsylvania
DONALD M. FRASER, Minnesota
BENJAMIN S. ROSENTHAL, New York
JOHN C. CULVER, Iowa
LEE H. HAMILTON, Indiana
ABRAHAM KAZEN, Jr., Texas
LESTER L. WOLFE, New York
JONATHAN B. BINGHAM, New York
GUS YATRON, Pennsylvania
ROY A. TAYLOR, North Carolina
JOHN W. DAVIS, Georgia
OGDEN R. REID, New York
MICHAEL HARRINGTON, Massachusetts
LEO J. RYAN, California
CHARLES WILSON, Texas
DONALD W. RIEGLE, Jr., Michigan

PETER H. B. FRELINGHUYSEN, New Jersey
WILLIAM S. BROOMFIELD, Michigan
H. R. GROSS, Iowa
EDWARD J. DERWINSKI, Illinois
VERNON W. THOMSON, Wisconsin
PAUL FINDLEY, Illinois
JOHN H. BUCHANAN, Jr., Alabama
J. HERBERT BURKE, Florida
GUY VANDER JAGT, Michigan
ROBERT H. STEELE, Connecticut
PIERRE S. DU PONT, Delaware
CHARLES W. WHALEN, Jr., Ohio
ROBERT B. (BOB) MATHIAS, California
EDWARD G. BIESTER, Jr., Pennsylvania
LARRY WINN, Jr., Kansas
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York
TENNYSON GUYER, Ohio
ROBERT J. LAGOMARSINO, California

MARIAN A. CZARNECKI, Chief of Staff

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE

BENJAMIN S. ROSENTHAL, New York, Chairman

WAYNE L. HAYS, Ohio
LEE H. HAMILTON, Indiana
GUS YATRON, Pennsylvania
ROY A. TAYLOR, North Carolina
OGDEN R. REID, New York
DONALD W. RIEGLE, Jr., Michigan

PETER H. B. FRELINGHUYSEN, New Jersey
PAUL FINDLEY, Illinois
J. HERBERT BURKE, Florida
JOHN H. BUCHANAN, Jr., Alabama
GUY VANDER JAGT, Michigan
LARRY WINN, Jr., Kansas

CLIFFORD P. HACKETT, Subcommittee Staff Consultant
ARLENE M. ATWATER, Staff Assistant

(II)
CONTENTS

WITNESS

Zighdis, John G., former Greek Minister of Industry and leading member of the Center Union (Liberal) Party

Page

2

(III)
PREFACE

May 13, 1974.

The testimony of John Zighdis is being printed as a separate publication of the Subcommittee on Europe for several reasons:

First, the quality of Mr. Zighdis' statement, as an eloquent and poignant account of what has happened in Greece under 7 years of dictatorial rule, deserves proper recognition;

Second, our original intention to hear testimony also from Ambassador Henry J. Tasca was frustrated by the State Department's insistence that he be heard in executive session and by the requirement, under the rules of the House, that an executive session can be ordered only in open session when a quorum is present and when a majority of those present vote to close the session to the public. When a quorum failed to appear, the hearings ended without testimony.

I regret deeply that Ambassador Tasca's return to the United States to testify was thus rendered futile. I must add that the subcommittee, as an exception to its usual practice, accepted the executive branch's insistence on an executive session since I believe it is very difficult for an Ambassador to testify frankly before a congressional committee when he is returning to his post of assignment.

Mr. Zighdis testified in these hearings as a private citizen with a distinguished past in his country's political life. Since the 1967 coup, his experiences have, unfortunately, included many months of imprisonment for the offense of having suggested, in an interview, that a government of national unity would be preferable to the dictatorship for dealing with the problem of Cyprus.

Since his testimony on March 27, 1974, Mr. Zighdis has been attacked bitterly in the government-controlled press in Athens for his honest and persuasive testimony about the political developments in Greece since a second coup, last November, threw out the original colonels' junta. He testified at the invitation of the subcommittee which remains indebted to Mr. Zighdis for his clear and detailed account of the political and economic factors operating in a NATO country with which the United States has had a deep involvement for almost 30 years.

In the present confusion and uncertainty in Greece, one must assume that Mr. Zighdis' testimony was made with some personal risk to him. When he returns to Greece soon, I, and many other Members of Congress, will be watching closely his reception as an indication of the directions in which the present government may be moving.

Benjamin S. Rosenthal,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Europe.

(v)
TESTIMONY OF JOHN ZIGHDIS ON AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD GREECE

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 27, 1974

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 10:30 a.m. in room 2255, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Benjamin S. Rosenthal (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. Rosenthal. The subcommittee will be in order.

Under the Rules of the House of Representatives and the rules of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, an executive session may be ordered only when a majority of members of the subcommittee—7 out of 12 in the case of the Subcommittee on Europe—are present and when a majority of those present vote in open session to close the meeting to the public. In the case of today's witness the U.S. Ambassador to Greece, Hon. Henry J. Tasca, who we are very honored and pleased to have with us this morning, we have acceded to the State Department's request that Ambassador Tasca appear in executive session because of the obvious difficulties and sensitivities when an Ambassador is on leave from a post to which he will return and when he has, as in this case, asked to discuss frankly the situation in the country to which he is assigned.

Those present know, I believe, that the Subcommittee on Europe which I have chaired for 3 years this week has strongly favored open sessions whenever possible. Our acceptance today of the request for the executive session is therefore an exception to our normal procedures. We would have, of course, published these hearing as soon as possible after whatever appropriate security deletions were made as agreed to by the subcommittee and the Department of State jointly.

Unfortunately, only five of the seven members who are needed to cast their votes to close this session are present. Other members have other important commitments and are unable to be with us this morning although we have tried diligently, as we know they have tried diligently to join us. So we will not be permitted under the Rules of both the House of Representatives and the committee to go into executive session.

The State Department has again urged us to continue our agreement that Ambassador Tasca will appear only in executive session and because he is not in a position to waive that request and we have not pressed that point beyond our earlier agreement, it is regrettable that
we must announce that this subcommittee session will not in fact be held at this moment and for that reason the subcommittee stand adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 10:34 a.m. the subcommittee adjourned, to reconvene at 2 p.m. the same day.]

**AFTERNOON SESSION**

The subcommittee met at 2 p.m., in room 2255, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Benjamin S. Rosenthal (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

**Mr. Rosenthal.** The subcommittee will be in order.

We are very honored this afternoon that a very distinguished, respected, well-known, Greek national, John G. Zighdis is with us. We are very pleased that you could afford to take the time to be with us, Mr. Zighdis. We welcome you to the subcommittee.

I know you have a prepared statement, and we would be very pleased to hear from you.

**STATEMENT OF JOHN G. ZIGHDIS, FORMER GREEK MINISTER OF INDUSTRY AND LEADING MEMBER OF THE CENTER UNION (LIBERAL) PARTY**

**Biography**


Following the coup of April 21, 1967, he was arrested and held until December, 1967. On April 2, 1970, sentenced to 4½ years imprisonment on the charge that he advocated the formation of a Government of National Unity and the return to democratic order to enable Greece to deal with the Cyprus crisis. He was imprisoned in Koridallos jail until January 22, 1972, when his sentence was suspended for one year because of the danger of irreparable damage to his health. After the November 1973 student revolt, he was placed under house arrest while in a hospital following an operation.

Elected Member of the Greek Parliament and represented his native province until April 1967. Belongs politically to the democratic centre. Member of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe (1964, 1965–67). Also a member of the Mixed Parliamentary Commission for the Association of Greece with EEC (1965–67), and a member of the Parliamentary Committee of NATO (1966).


Active as a theoretical economist, writing numerous studies and articles on the economic problems of Greece, with industrialization as the main subject, including "The Course and Prospects for the Development of the Greek Economy" (1958), "The Aluminum Industry" (1960), "The Strategy of Industrialization" (1964), etc.

Honours: Commander of the Order of George I (Greece), Grand Cross of St. Andrew (Patriarchate of Constantinople), The Two Military Decorations (1940–44, Greece). Hobbies: Fishing and Travel.

**Mr. Zighdis.** Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your invitation to this forum. It is a privilege for me to address the elected representatives of the American people. This is especially so because I am conscious of the strong bonds of friendship and cooperation that have united our two peoples from the times of the Greek War of Independence to the present.
I am an old parliamentarian. I accept with particular feeling your invitation. I consider myself a representative of the last Greek parliament which was suspended so ruthlessly in 1967. Our parliament, however, continues to exist in the feelings and hopes of the Greek people.

My presence here should also serve as a reminder of the sufferings of many of my distinguished colleagues such as George Mavros, John Haralambopoulos, George Sterghiou, and Asimina Yannou who have been in the last few days brutally arrested and sent to prison and internal exile. They have suffered together with thousands of other Greek patriots because they have had the courage to remain faithful to their ideals of freedom and democracy and their duty to the Greek people.

WHY INVITATION WAS ACCEPTED

Finally, there is a major reason for my acceptance of your kind invitation. Our two countries, beyond their traditional close ties are also officially linked with an alliance for the defense not only of their independence and territorial integrity but also for the protection of a genuinely democratic way of life.

Alliances among free nations, in order to be effective in substance as well as in form, must always rest on the acceptance of the people involved as registered through their elected representatives. To paraphrase the famous dictum, freedom and democracy are too important to be left only to the executive branches of government.

With this understanding and being fully cognizant of my own responsibilities, I appear before you today as a member of the last Greek Parliament which will remain as the only legitimate representation of the will of the Greeks until genuine and free elections are held once more in my country.

CLOSE UNITED STATES-GREEK TIES

During the postwar period, our countries have been closely linked bilaterally and through the North Atlantic Alliance. I have the honor to have belonged to the government, which in 1952, brought Greece into NATO. Needless to say, entry into NATO took place with the consent of the overwhelming majority in parliament.

The preamble to the Atlantic Treaty specifies that parties to it

"are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law."

Article 2 specifies that the signatories undertake also to

"contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being."

Let me also add that the Truman doctrine, for which the Greek people are grateful, committed the United States to support freedom loving people against armed totalitarian minorities.

---

1 Mr. Zighalis was originally invited to testify in 1972 but was denied permission by the Greek Government to travel abroad.

32-247-74—2
It was upon such foundations that Greek-American relations have developed and subsequent bilateral Greek-American military agreements have been concluded.

It was also on such foundations that Greece entered into agreements such as the association with the European Economic Community, the Council of Europe, European Human Rights Commission and others.

WHY NATO IS DIFFERENT

It appears, then, that the defense of freedom and democracy is not just an empty ideological phrase for the allies of NATO but a solemn legal and political obligation for each and every one of the member states. This is precisely the characteristic which distinguishes the North Atlantic Alliance from the traditional military alliances of the past and which provides its historical justification.

Notwithstanding all this, democracy has been destroyed and our Nation while under the NATO umbrella, has been transformed to a military dictatorship, thus becoming the first West European country to retrogress into totalitarianism.

I will not attempt to identify here the complex causes of the destruction of democracy in Greece. This is a task best left to future historians. Let me stress, however, the Greek people neither deny nor minimize their share of responsibility for their present predicament. But they also believe that a definite part of the responsibility—perhaps a greater part—rests with their allies.

UNITED STATES HAS NOT FULFILLED OBLIGATIONS

Had the allies, and specifically the United States, fulfilled their treaty obligations to defend democracy and freedom, neither the imposition nor the survival of the dictatorship would have been possible. But, unfortunately, our allies accepted, cooperated with and eventually assisted the Greek dictators. Occasionally gestures of mild disapproval were made and wishes for the restoration of democracy were voiced, but all these remained below the threshold of real substance.

I must emphasize, at this point, that I am only being critical of our allied governments but certainly not of the European and American people, the European parliaments and the American Congress, the free and responsible press on both sides of the Atlantic as well as the numerous private citizen organizations that have relentlessly voiced their indignation for the abolition of democracy and offered moral and material support to the beleaguered Greek people.

I appear, Mr. Chairman, before you today as a friend and as an equal partner in a common cause. Permit me, therefore, to be a little blunt as one can only be with genuine friends.

When the coup of April 21, 1967, took place, the American Government hastened to declare that it had been caught by surprise and that it had no knowledge of or involvement in the coup whatsoever. But the Greek people have refused to believe this declaration of innocence. And they are also convinced that the military dictatorship in Greece could not have survived without U.S. support. This is not the time for providing detailed documentation on the basis of which Greek public opinion has been formed.
A PERSONAL EXPERIENCE RELATED

Let me just relate to you, however, one telling personal experience which is a typical illustration of U.S. behavior that has fed our suspicions regarding American complicity in the 1967 coup.

Six days after the coup, I met at the home of friends with a high ranking official of the U.S. Embassy in Athens. She had spent the past 6 days and nights closeted at the Embassy. Her first words when she saw me went something like this: "Thank God everything went fine and everybody is happy." When I retorted firmly about my disappointment and the indignation of the Greek people about the coup, she advanced the following theory:

The people who seized power are a small group of puritan officers who, of course, do not have political experience. Very soon it will be necessary for them to ask for the assistance of honest and experienced politicians such as you, even though today they think that all politicians are useless and corrupt. Like Ayub Khan in Pakistan, they will come down to Earth and ask for your help and you should offer it to them in order for your country to progress, just like Pakistan.

We were indeed left speechless. The Embassy and the U.S. Government had officially declared that they did not know who the perpetrators of the coup were. How could, then, an important official express such comfort and clairvoyance about the future?

"NASSERISM" FORSEEN

The evening ended with yet another theory. At our insistence that the United States should use all its influence to help in the restoration of democracy, our official responded: "We cannot pressure them because there is always the possibility of their becoming Nasserites." This was said only 6 days after the coup. Yet this obviously prefabricated argument has been reiterated since that day with monotonous regularity by a variety of American officials in Athens and in Washington.

But regardless of involvement or noninvolvement of the U.S. Government in the 1967 coup, subsequent American policies toward the dictatorship have proven eminently supportive and accommodative and have helped the dictatorship to survive. Expressions of U.S. disapproval of the coup were seen as mere lip service by the Greek people who felt that their intelligence was being insulted—I underline insulted, if I may, Mr. Chairman—by contradictory words versus deeds.

For example, the United States announced the suspension of heavy military equipment assistance in 1967. This declaration was never substantively implemented. At the same time and contrary to the position of the Europeans—who, with a few exceptions, kept their distance from the dictatorship—the American Government chose to provide respectability to the Papadopoulos regime.

U.S. PRAISE FOR REGIME

The visits of Messrs. Agnew, Stans, Laird, and Rogers as well as countless admirals and generals sought to accomplish just that. These visitors invariably sang the praises of the regime. They made statements admiring the "Greek economic miracle", or the "superb profes-
sional readiness of the Greek Armed Forces" which systematically dis-
torted the actual record and demoralized the Greek people.

The United States, further, supplied the Greek dictatorship with ample economic assistance of various types.

On numerous occasions, the United States even intervened to pre-
vent European governments from taking strong measures against the
dictatorship in accordance with obligations deriving from NATO.

Interference of the United States to protect the Greek dictators
even took place in the proceedings of organizations, such as the Coun-
cil of Europe or the EEC, in which the United States was not even a member. The United States, for example, tried to prevent the Coun-
cil of Europe from pressing the Greek Government to either democra-
tize or face expulsion.

The net effect of all these American policies favoring the Greek
junta was to render the great majority of Greek officers—who believe
that Greece's defense is vitally dependent on the American factor—
passive observers of the destruction of democracy in their country.

PROJUNTA U.S. POLICY

You are, I am sure, familiar with the arguments advanced to jus-
tify the projunta policies of the U.S. Government.

First, "the Communist danger". It was stated repeatedly that the
coup saved Greece from communism. The experience of the last 7
years, however, has proved how baseless this assertion was.

Second, the allegation that had the Center Union Party won the
scheduled elections of May 1967, Greece would have left NATO. This, I am in a position to officially and categorically refute.

Third, the assertion that the Greek parliamentary regime was so
corrupt that it could not last for too long without destroying the
country. However, not a single case—underlined, not a single case—
of corruption among former parliamentarians has been uncovered in
the past 7 years. On the contrary, the latest coup d'état of Novem-
ber 25, 1973, took place, using as a major excuse, the duty to "cleanse
the 'revolution' from the corrupt leadership of Papadopoulos and
his associates" who are now threatened with facing court-martial for
their misdeeds while in office.

Fourth, that dictatorship is a "historical necessity" to accomplish
Greece's modernization and economic progress. The results, however,
have been just the opposite. There is now near total disintegration in
society and the political life. There is a definite regression in educa-
tion which has provoked a major and continuous revolt in the student
body. There is serious turbulence in the church. The system of justice
itself is on trial. The administrative apparatus is in virtual disarray.
And the previously robust economic system has entered a phase of
acute crisis.

HIGH RATE OF INFLATION

Inflation in Greece is the highest in OECD and has reached an an-
nual rate of 55 percent on the basis of the last 6 months' data. Salaries
and wages of the working classes have not kept pace with the infla-
tionary spiral. The deficit in the balance of payments has reached
$1,300 million in 1973. This is three times the deficit of 1972. The
foreign indebtedness of the country has risen from $1,100 million in 1967 to well over $3,900 million today. And despite all of this, no major productive investments have been made in the last 7-year period.

Furthermore, let me add that the annual growth rate of the gross national income, in constant prices, under the dictatorship has never surpassed that of the long period of parliamentary governments who started with an economy devastated by war, occupation and civil war. Thus the so-called economic miracle of the dictatorship has been exposed as no more than a pure myth.

Fifth, that the dictatorship is necessary for the safeguarding of strategic interests of the alliance. This argument is also unfounded. Greece entered NATO with the blessing of its people and through the parliamentary governments. Throughout the postwar period, there has never been any complaint against the latter which have fulfilled their NATO obligations to the fullest.

U.S. STRATEGIC INTERESTS

Equally unfounded is the argument that the legitimate strategic interests of America in Greece render the dictatorship necessary. The military agreements between Greece and the United States, that is, 1953, 1956, et cetera, have always been applied faithfully by the Greek Governments. But it is important here to differentiate intelligently between “strategic interests” on one hand and “conveniences” or even “luxuries”, such as homeporting, on the other.

Parliamentary governments will not volunteer to further so-called strategic American interests without proceeding fast and substantially to a careful evaluation of the results. Once more, let us take homeporting in the densely populated Athens area as an example. Homeporting has nothing to do with real strategic interests. It is purely an administrative convenience for the 6th Fleet. It exposes, however, the Acropolis and incidentally 3 million Greeks of the Athens area to great war dangers in the nuclear era. Homeporting further aggravates the pollution as well as other environmental problems in a major urban area and creates social and cultural problems of potentially serious consequences. It is indeed a spurious argument if a dictatorship is necessitated only to make available such “strategic interests”.

ARMED FORCES STRENGTH ENERGIZED

To conclude on this point we have to underline that the net result of the dictatorial government in Greece has been the weakening of the Greek armed establishment because practically all the senior officers with war experience and modern professional education have been removed for political reasons. The naval revolt of May 1973, demonstrates clearly the danger of disintegration of the armed forces.

None of the above five major arguments can justify even marginally allied policies which overlook the violation of human and civil rights, prisons, deportation, and sufferings of thousands of Greeks of both sexes, all ages, and social classes.

American policymakers often resort to the following contention to justify their policies. “Greece’s form of government is a problem
for the Greek people to solve. We will not intervene in internal affairs of an allied country." Our answer to that is that the United States is indeed interfering already in our domestic affairs by aiding and abetting the dictators.

And then there is this other argument: Namely, that through friendly persuasion the United States can better influence the regime from within and urge it gently to take the road back to democracy. This kind of policy is useful only to mislead public opinion in the United States as well as other democratic countries. It does not, however, have the slightest effect on the dictatorship and its desire to remain in power.

**STRATEGIC REAL ESTATE**

It is no wonder, then, that the behavior of our allies, and especially the United States, has created justifiable in the minds of the Greek people the impression that their country is viewed as merely a strategically located real estate. In fact, it is within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance that Greek territory has been transformed into a vast concentration camp for its people.

It pains me to say that the result of this situation has been the erosion of the warm friendship and the traditional ties between our two peoples. Regrettably I see a wave of "anti-Americanism" which is becoming every day more intense and more threatening. It would be a pity if the Greek people irrevocably concluded that there is no other fate for them except to be a slave within the fold of the Atlantic Alliance. Then I can assure you that along with everything else your strategic interests will suffer irreparably.

And now what do we ask of our allies and especially of you Americans?

Certainly not intervention. This would be contrary to our national pride, our interests and our mentalities. We only ask that you be faithful to your obligations—moral ones as well as contractual—both of which derive from solemn international agreements. We ask that you cease interfering in our domestic affairs by undertaking specific actions or omitting certain other actions which allow the dictatorship to survive.

**SPEAKING FRANKLY**

We want you to declare your solidarity with the Greek people. I hope that you will not misunderstand me for speaking frankly and with some feeling. We are free men, equal partners in a common cause, which is the protection of our democratic way of life. Whatever we ask of the United States does not concern only the interests of our people. It is the basis of the real and long-term interests of our alliance, including you in the United States.

We do not want the intervention of the 6th Fleet. God forbid. Neither do we ask for any other type of dynamic interventions. We detest such "solutions" and we reject them.

But it is altogether unacceptable that NATO tanks should be used to abolish the freedoms of an allied people. And it is equally unacceptable for the 6th Fleet to be giving the impression that it supports these tanks when they are in fact keeping our people enslaved and when they shoot innocent students who ask for freedom and democracy.
I am not here to suggest specific measures that your Government should take in order to reverse its policy of support for the dictatorship. It is not up to me to dictate tactical steps and related policies. I only wish to say as a friend that it is necessary to restore in the conscience of free people everywhere and especially in the minds of the Greek people, that alliances and bilateral agreements do not mean condemnation to slavery in the periphery for the convenience of the center.

If instead of supporting a small self-serving group of officers upon which you base your policies, you had decided to support governments approved by popular will, then, gentlemen, you would have nothing to fear because our people always will believe in freedom.

Furthermore, our people realize that their future is irresistibly interwoven with that of the Free World.

I do not intend to scrutinize the plans of your Government vis-a-vis Europe. But as far as Greece is concerned I can say that it will be extremely dangerous to try and disassociate her from Europe and substitute her NATO relationship with a bilateral Greek-American one.

The lessons from the latest Middle East war tell us that it is foolish to count on excessive promises uncritically offered by eager to please dictators. I wish to add something else here. Very soon in Southeast Europe—a region in which Greece is a key country—there will be again a question of balance of power. Changes are to be expected in our northern neighbors, especially in Yugoslavia after Tito. And maybe we will be called again to defend freedom, but the political battle for freedom cannot be fought from a country whose people are enslaved. Consequently, neither the broad interests of the Free World nor those of the United States are served by the maintenance of a dictatorship in Greece.

**DICTATORSHIP A TRAGEDY**

In conclusion, the dictatorship is a tragedy for the Greek people. It is also a danger for the Free World. In fact it is the very negation of the ideals for which the Free World stands. The Greek people today are completely united against the dictatorship. The political leadership is also united absolutely in its opposition to the regime as well as in its determination to lead the country back to normalcy. On the other hand, the dictatorship, after the coup of November 25, 1973, is internally weak and shaky, and it has to face vast problems which cannot be solved with tanks.

The new regime faces the anger and the frustration of our people, aggravated by economic inflation and political oppression. The reestablishment of the infamous Yaros deportation camp has become the symbol of a regime which relies on fear to command order.

Last but not least within its ranks forces have developed which threaten the permanent attachment of Greece to the Western World.

Now is the time to redouble our efforts and rid Greece of the dictatorship once and for all.

We ask our allies to stop assisting the junta before time runs out. We ask our allies to stop the cliches of "friendly persuasion" or to rec-
ommend for Greece the so-called Turkish solution. That particular "solution" has never been appropriate for Greece, and in any case, it is entirely too late for it. Everything else is our business.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you.

THE OUTLOOK TODAY

Mr. Rosenthal. Thank you very much, Mr. Zighdis, for a very excellent and forthright and articulate and understanding statement.

Can you compare the present outlook for democratic restoration in Greece today with the prospects under the Papadopoulos regime? In other words, is the situation today more difficult than it was during the Papadopoulos regime?

Mr. Zighdis. The Papadopoulos regime was a stable dictatorship because it had a leader and the group who seized power was a homogeneous group. At the moment we have a regime which has no leader, and the groups which have seized power are not homogeneous. The situation, for the present, is a tyranny without a tyrant. A dictatorship without a dictator.

We have three groups which form the military government at the present, none of which casts the decisive vote. We are going to have confrontation among those three groups and God knows what will happen. The confrontation will take place according to available information before next June because the so-called strong man will try to seize by that time the complete control of the army by cashiering all his senior officers.

JUNTA FACING GRAVE PROBLEMS

The junta, at the present moment in addition to internal divisiveness, faces problems which are much more grave than the Papadopoulos regime has faced. The economic situation as a result of the dictatorship has come to an acute crisis; there are serious church, education, and administrative problems. Then the tremendous corruption problem is such a burden that the dictatorship finds itself in real difficulties and in very deep waters. They don’t seem to be able to impose sanctions against the perpetrators of corruption in the previous regime.

Thirdly, there are the people. After the 1967 coup, the people in their despair were, to some extent, passive. At present, after the 25th November coup, they have lost their patience. Anything may happen in Athens. Even while we are talking the junta factions may come to blows and the people may revolt. That is why it is time to act.

We won’t again have after this spring such a favorable situation for leading Greece back to democracy. If we lose this opportunity, by this summer the junta may be able to solve its internal problems and become, once more, homogeneous. If the junta manages to remain in power, then a revolt of the Greek people becomes a near certainty. But what may interest you more is that if the present junta stays in power, the international position of Greece may be in question within a very short time period because in the junta there are forces who do not belong to our Free World ideology. I made a hint in my statement—
A NEW IDEOLOGY

Mr. Rosenthal. What do you mean by that?

Mr. Zighdis. They want to take Greece out of the Western World and turn it into a neutralist dictatorship. That is, indeed, the outcome of the “wisdom” of policies which supported the dictatorship. That lady of the Embassy on the 6th day of the dictatorship told us, “We can’t pressure these men because they may become Nasserized.” Well, those people could never have become Nasserized. They were officers with a Western-oriented mentality. The majority of the Greek Army has also been conservative and Western oriented.

At present, because of the foolishness of the policy of support for the dictatorship new forces have developed which do not cling to a permanent association of Greece with the West.

Mr. Rosenthal. What is their ideology?

Mr. Zighdis. Qaddafism. Qaddafi is their inspiration.

Mr. Rosenthal. I know who you mean.

Mr. Zighdis. He is our neighbor. Well, the difference between Qaddafism in Libya and in Greece is oil. They have plenty. We don’t have any yet.

[Laughter.]

Mr. Rosenthal. Where do you think that that would take Greece if they gained control of the destiny of the armed forces and the Greeks?

AN UNALIGNED STATUS

Mr. Zighdis. We may end up in a nonaligned status, and then your strategic interests for which so many favors and so much money has been squandered on the dictators will have suffered irreparably. But permit me not to talk too much about this problem.

Mr. Rosenthal. Let me ask a specific political question. Does the proposal for a government of national unity which was recently made public in Greece represent your views of a possible solution to the present political impasse?

Mr. Zighdis. It is the only solution.

Mr. Rosenthal. How can it come about?

Mr. Zighdis. If the great majority of the Greek officers are convinced that the dictatorship in Greece has lost the backing of Washington, then they will stop being passive observers of the abrogation of democracy.

Mr. Rosenthal. How could Washington prove that they are not under the command of Washington?

Mr. Zighdis. The British Government without spending a penny and just making a gesture the other day, made the greatest investment of good will in Greece. There are 1,000 ways.

Mr. Rosenthal. What did they do?

Mr. Zighdis. They simply made it clear they consider a visit of some warships unwise, saying that, “We cannot let our warships visit a country which has a dictatorial government.” This created a burst of anger among the dictators, but simultaneously relieved and gratified the Greek people.
SEIZURE OF MAVROS

My colleague, George Mavros, issued a statement voicing this feeling of relief, and the government seized Mavros. The military government broke his door down at 6 o'clock in the morning. They did not knock on his door. They did not call him to go to the police. They broke into his home at 6 o'clock in the morning. They seized him as if he were a criminal. They dragged him to the military police, and then they sent him to the infamous camp of Yaros.

Mr. Rosenthal. He had supported the British action?

Mr. Zichmis. Yes. As every Greek will support your action if you make a solemn declaration which will clearly demonstrate that you are not behind the dictatorship. But—sorry, Mr. Chairman—I am not talking about just declarations which are immediately contradicted by subsequent actions—such as official visits and other forms of tangible support of the dictatorship. Such charades insult our intelligence.

Mr. Rosenthal. Is anti-American sentiment on the rise in Greece today? Is it an important political consideration?

Mr. Zichmis. It surely is, but allow me to be specific on that. In Greece you had the overwhelming majority of the people staunchly pro-American. Immediately after the war, you were the only nation in the minds of our people which could be the guardian of freedom in the world. And then you spent so much money, you spent $4 billion to help our country, and all of us were quite grateful. I think that Greece has this particular merit, that is, of being grateful to those who really help her. But now, where are we?

LEFT PRISON IN 1972

If I, a man who left prison in 1972 and who has been several times exiled, dare to publicly utter a few good words in defense of U.S. policies, everybody will look suspiciously at me and will think that I lost my ability to reason, not to say my sanity. This is what you have managed to do with your real friends in Greece. I can tell you that the $4 billion investment in military and economic aid seen against today's background of anti-Americanism, appears to be one of the worst investments in the annals of international finance.

Mr. Rosenthal. Let me ask one domestic political question that it is kind of silly, and I apologize for it, but it intrigues me.

Why do you think it is so many Americans of Greek descent that live in my district in New York City supported the Papadopoulos regime and resisted any change?

Mr. Zichmis. That is very interesting. First of all, it appears to me that all Greek-Americans are romantically attached to whatever Greek government is in power at a given time. Beyond this I would say it is primarily a case of unquestioning conformity with what appears to be U.S. policy toward Greece. So they want to show that everything American is good for the Greeks. I think that you should ask your younger generation, not the older people. You will see that the younger Greek Americans are much more secure in their Americanness and they do not consider criticism of bad policies as a trait of bad citizenship.
I can assure you that in our contacts with the older generation of Greek-Americans over the years, we have been deeply disappointed by their prevalent mentality. We are very pained. We concluded that these people do not really understand what is happening in our country. But fortunately and more recently I have got proof that the younger generation, the enlightened generation, the people who look at themselves as genuine American citizens can have and do have different ideas from those of their parents. And it is this younger generation that will be predominant in the years to come in forming Greek-American attitudes.

Mr. Rosenthal. Mr. Frelinghuysen.

Mr. Zighdis. Mr. Chairman, allow me. I want to make clear one point regarding anti-Americanism. I can, indeed, assure you that the moment America finds herself again true to her historical mission, the Greek people will revert to the traditional friendship and love toward the United States. We the Greeks, if you allow me to use the analogy, see our relationship with the Americans as that of a lover with his girl friend. If the girl friend plays some tricks, her lover becomes angry. He becomes sad. He may kill the girl. But if she goes back to his arms, then all past difficulties are forgotten, and the love is rekindled—well, that is our conception of the Greek-American relationship. So you have nothing to fear if in time—if in time—you revert to the right policy.

Excuse me for the light tone of my remarks. [Laughter.]

Mr. Rosenthal. Congressman Frelinghuysen.

Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to apologize to you, Mr. Zighdis, for having to step out briefly. I missed your eloquence, but I certainly got a substantial amount of information both from your statement and from your last remarks.

WHAT SHOULD THE UNITED STATES DO

However, a basic point is still unclear to me and let me first note that I sympathize with your despair over the current political situation in Greece, I was there last month and I think it is an unhappy situation, and one that does contain real elements of instability. But, what in Heaven's name is it that you are suggesting that we do?

You say, "let's redouble our efforts and get rid of the Greek dictatorship." That is pretty strong language, particularly if you suggest that the United States should in some way redouble its efforts to get rid of a foreign government, and then you warn us against intervention. It sounds to me as if your philosophy would come pretty close to intervention.

Are you saying we must renew our belief in the Greek people? We surely have done that.

You say, "what we have said so far expressing our concern at the nature of the government since 1967 has been below the threshold of real substance." What is it that you want us to do? I always think that the Greeks put undue emphasis on the role of the Americans, and I don't think it does any good to wring our hands and say we could have done it differently in 1967. We are not in 1967. We are in 1974.

What should we do now? We cannot get the Greeks to throw out the present government because we don't think it is right for the
Greek people. If you suggest something specific, I wonder what it is that you would like us to do?

Mr. Zighdis. Well, Mr. Frelinghuyzen, I have to point out that during your absence perhaps you lost the thread of my argument.

NO MILITARY INTERVENTION

Mr. Frelinghuyzen. I was afraid that might be the case.

Mr. Zighdis. That was the point. What I was trying to say is that we don’t want an intervention of the kind of sending the 6th Fleet to make the change. I reject the idea of any type of intervention with contempt. So I don’t want you to interfere. I ask you to stop interfering and to redouble your efforts to convince the Greeks that you are not interfering. Past declarations to that effect have not been, unfortunately, backed by appropriate actions. You are still interfering in Greek affairs.

Mr. Frelinghuyzen. You flatter us, but specifically what does that mean? Again I would like to get it in plain English if we could. What is it that we are doing that we should not be doing? What is it that we should be doing that we are not?

A SIGN FROM BRITAIN

Mr. Zighdis. I think that you will see in my statement, and let me suggest that you reread it, you will see what you should not be doing. As to the things which you should be doing, I cannot add anything beyond the advice to disassociate yourself from the dictatorship. The British have given you recently a good example. If you do something of that sort, and you don’t send your warships, and you don’t send officers who say to the dictators, “Don’t worry about statements that are designed to appease Congress,” then you start really showing to the Greek people that you disassociate yourself from the policy that the administration has followed up to the present.

Mr. Frelinghuyzen. I understand you to say that we should end the homeporting concept as a measure of our disapproval. The administration should do that not as a gesture to appease Congress, but in order to show our hostility to the present regime?

Mr. Zighdis. The homeporting, if you take it as an example, is something which the dictators gave you in order to bind you more to themselves. It is such a silly thing, this homeporting. It is the worst thing the Americans could ask from any Greek Government. It is useless strategically and I see only drawbacks to it.

Mr. Frelinghuyzen. I think it makes it possible for us to maintain considerably more military units in the Mediterranean, in a much more efficient manner, and that could be valuable to Greece and to NATO.

DISAGREEMENT ON HOMEPORTING

Mr. Zighdis. We don’t question the presence of American fleets in the Mediterranean or the American armies in Europe.

Mr. Frelinghuyzen. You do not question our presence?

Mr. Zighdis. No. But you see the presence of the American Fleet for homeporting in the congested area of Athens serves no real strategic purpose, no real purpose. It is only an administrative convenience.
Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Obviously I disagree with you very strongly on that point, and we could talk 2 or 3 hours.

Mr. ZOGHDIS. You may disagree. After all we are going to be democratic here. If we have to agree on everything how can we enjoy a democracy.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I hope your argument does not have to hinge on whether or not homeporting makes sense. To some of us, at least, it does.

Mr. ZOGHDIS. Perhaps it does, to some of you. But we in Greece disagree.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. What I assume your point should be is that U.S. Fleet homeporting is important to Greece as a nation, and thus could become in your efforts a valuable weapon to weaken the existing regime. Then presumably the Greek people will bring down the government themselves if we in some way express our disapproval and thus put homeporting in jeopardy.

Mr. ZOGHDIS. Well, first of all I don't want to go into too many specifics in this forum in the House of the American Representatives. I mean that would not be good manners for me. I don't want to show myself as giving instructions or dictating specific policies to the Americans. I have limited myself to talking in general terms. Anybody who is cognizant of the facts in the situation will find a definite line of action if he cares to pay attention to what I am suggesting in my statement.

At this moment I am out of Greece. What is being said here will be immediately reported in Athens. I do not want to give the dictators the slightest opportunity to accuse me of hurting Greek interests when all I am doing is to antagonize the junta's interests.

A GENERAL PLAN OF ACTION

There always is this difficulty in a discussion like the present one, and I beg this to be taken into consideration. I don't want to give instructions and even if you press me, I will refuse to do so. I won't go into specifics and say what the Americans should do. It is up to them to find appropriate tactics. I stated my view. I underlined the general plan of action, and that the American Government and the American Congress should think about it. It is not for me to be specific.

On the other hand, I don't want the junta to exploit in the wrong way what I am trying to do here. Here I am trying to bring back Greek-American relations to their proper basis. The Greek-American relations at present are in great danger. I feel a strong sense of urgency to prevent the damage from becoming irreparable. I know that the restoration of democracy can be made within the next 2 or 3 months, and I came here to underline to you, as representatives of the American people, not to miss this opportunity because later on you will pay and you will pay dearly.

SPEAKING AS A FRIEND

A friend talks to you. He talks to you bluntly. But he has got a great sense of responsibility toward his country and toward our allies in the Free World. We don't overemphasize our importance, but don't
forget that during the last 25 years Greece has played a central role in world developments. Don’t forget that the first act of the cold war took place in Greece, and that is where your late President Truman realized that the Greek problem was not just an isolated case but one affecting the basis of the whole postwar international settlement.

I don’t want to be accused of overstatements, but I would not be true to myself if I did not tell you to beware of Greece. Don’t underestimate the importance of Greece in world affairs both as a people and as a geographical entity. If you don’t act in your true interests now, tomorrow perhaps it will be too late.

Mr. Freelinghuysen. Mr. Chairman, because we have so much in common with the Greek people, I wish that we were in executive session so we could talk more freely.

I sympathize with the sensitivity of your position and your unwillingness to spell out a course of action. However, if there is no time to be lost—and it does seem to me there is a reasonable degree of urgency, at least from your point of view—then I find your testimony tantalizing because I am not sure, not on the basis of past history, what we should do with respect to the present situation.

Mr. Zighdis. I appreciate—

Mr. Freelinghuysen. One other question. I realize that time is going on.

On page 6 you talk about the typical illustration of U.S. behavior that has fed Greek suspicions. Then you quote the prediction of an individual who said the military would soon have to ask for the assistance of honest and experienced politicians, such as you, even though today they think all politicians are useless and corrupt. I would think that might be the situation which one might say prevails today.

Mr. Zighdis. God forbid.

COLLABORATION EXCLUDED

Mr. Freelinghuysen. Does the military have the experience of politicians like yourself to—

Mr. Zighdis. You would like me, a representative of the people, to collaborate with its tyrants?

Mr. Freelinghuysen. No, I am not suggesting collaboration.

Mr. Zighdis. Helping those people who have enslaved our nation? God forbid.

Mr. Freelinghuysen. I am not suggesting that you help these people. I am suggesting that if the military prove themselves inadequate to run their country they may well turn to experienced politicians. I would think this would be what you would be hoping for rather than saying, “I hope they don’t think of that idea because it might help bail them out of a difficult situation.” I would think that civilian participation would be useful if the military had proved themselves inept—and I might add that since 1967 we could all fairly characterize the government as inept, and I certainly don’t think that that November coup has helped improve that situation.
A ROLE FOR POLITICIANS

I am speaking as an individual now so I would think the military themselves might realize the dangers inherent in a military government. In fact, if the present government is saying anything with its appointments and so forth, it seems to be saying there should be a withdrawal of the military from the government of Greece. If that is the case, maybe the vacuum could be filled by experienced politicians—not that they would be collaborating, not that they would be in charge of the operation—but that there would be a beginning of the restoration of democratic processes which presumably is what we all would like to see.

Mr. Zighis. You know, that piece of my evidence you took to base your remarks upon was given by me in order to demonstrate that the American Government’s declaration of innocence in the coup was not exactly the case. On one hand we had an official statement declaring that the United States knew nothing about the junta. The U.S. Embassy even sent people to us to inquire who General Arghelis was. On the other hand, we had that important Embassy lady who knew everything about the Colonels. She told us about their being puritans, possessing no political experience and she tried to convince us that the Pakistani precedent was the right road for us to follow.

A LACK OF CONFIDENCE

You know what has happened to Ayub Khan and how he collapsed. You know about the corruption of his so-called puritanical regime and what was the fate of those foolish politicians who went to collaborate with him.

I have reiterated this incident just to illustrate the discrepancy between official pronouncements of your Government and revelations, perhaps unintended, by relevant American functionaries. Our hosts of that evening, still living in Athens, are in a position to corroborate the details of this incident.

Mr. Freelinghuyzen. But how do you read anything of great significance in that? All she said was, “The people who seized power are a small group of puritan officers who, of course, do not have political experience.”

Mr. Zighis. But they were dictators. The sixth day after the coup, when Greece was still shocked, when Greece was in despair, after hearing the rattling reverberations of the tanks which destroyed her freedom, there was a member of the American Embassy who dared to tell me to betray my people and become a collaborator of the tyrants. That kind of advice I will never forget or forgive. And I wish that no American official will have the temerity and the foolishness in the future to repeat it in any other country under a similar predicament.

Please reread my statement. You will then understand the true meaning of that dialog. Apparently you have taken it out of its proper context. You have picked it up, and I shall later——
A QUESTION OF MEANING

Mr. Frelinghuysen. I am not trying to, I assure you, Mr. Zighdis. What you are saying now is that this American woman was urging you to collaborate with the government?

Mr. Zighdis. Yes.

Mr. Frelinghuysen. You don’t say that in the statement.

Mr. Zighdis. That is what I mean.

Mr. Frelinghuysen. Well, I don’t see it.

Mr. Zighdis. That is my meaning.

Mr. Frelinghuysen. You have to read the Greek statements in English twice to get the significance of them.

Mr. Zighdis. Now, Mr. Frelinghuysen, I am not English and so the English language should not separate me from you to refer to Oscar Wilde’s aphorism. I think that we still can understand each other. Please reread the lady’s statement to see how shocking it is. First, she denied unequivocally the official statement of innocence of your Government. Second, she foolishly suggested—and others have done the same since that time—that we should betray our people, and collaborate with the tyrants, with the dictators. Imagine somebody who would have told Mr. Brüning or the other democratic leaders of Germany in the early 1930’s, “Go and collaborate with this nice young man, Mr. Hitler. He is a little inexperienced but he is a puritan and if you give a helping hand Germany will see very nice days.” Imagine them following such advice.

Mr. Frelinghuysen. Your statement of course didn’t refer to collaboration at all. Your amplification does, but your statement does not refer to collaboration with the regime.

Mr. Rosenthal. Let’s see if we can go on to another subject.

ROLE OF HOMEPORTING

Congressman Yatron.

Mr. Yatron. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Going back to homeporting, how important has homeporting been in the assessment of Greek public opinion about the role that the U.S. Government plays in supporting the dictatorship?

Mr. Zighdis. Well, in the opinion of the Greek people a request of that sort could only be approved by a government which had not the sense of responsibility toward its people. If we had a responsible government in Greece and the U.S. Government were to say that it needs certain facilities for the fleet then this government would examine the request in the light of the real interests of Greece and the alliance. But to offer homeporting facilities in the Athens area uncritically is sheer foolishness.

You see, it is quite natural when these boys, the marines and the sailors, come out in Athens and create some unfortunate incidents that these incidents are often magnified in the great metropolis. Then there is the question of so many families going there, you see, and creating difficulties with the housing problem such as contributing to higher rents and increasing the cost of living.

Then there is the pollution. The area between Salamis, Megara and Elefsis, is quite congested. The presence of the fleet there aggravates already existing environmental difficulties.
There is also this other thing. During the last war the Athens area had been declared an open city; that is to say, even the Nazis respected that area because of the Acropolis. Now when the American fleet has these facilities next to the Acropolis it immediately creates, to tell the truth, war dangers for the Acropolis. This is the surest way to feed anti-American propaganda. Mr. Khrushchev once had said that he would not hesitate to bomb the Acropolis with nuclear weapons if strategic reasons warranted it. Then the whole of Greece rose to a man in horror and indignation.

A FOOLISH NOTION

So it is foolishness to match the symbol of liberty—that is the Acropolis—with a high priority nuclear target such as an aircraft carrier. If I were in the government, I would say to my American friends. “Gentlemen let us see what really helps our relations. Homeporting in the Athens area creates anti-Americanism. Why should we pour oil on the fire?” Have I made myself clear?

Mr. YATRON. I think so but I also look at it from the American point of view that homeporting is important to our naval forces there. But in your opinion you feel that the fact that we are there, our presence, indicates a support for the dictatorship?

Mr. ZIGHDIS. Yes. And only a dictatorship could so easily grant such facilities in that area, mind you, in that particular area. That is what I am underlining. That area is sacred and should be kept clear of strategic military installations.

A DANGER SEEN

Mr. YATRON. Why do you say on page 17 that it would be extremely dangerous for Greece to leave NATO and for the United States to rely on bilateral ties to Greece instead of alliance ties?

Mr. ZIGHDIS. Well, I think that your question takes us to deep strategic waters. I submit that we can’t have a credible defense of Greece outside the general framework of Western collective security. If we rupture our ties with Europe, our defense position will be weakened very much and we feel quite strongly about that.

Mind you, Papadopoulos, in order to be pleasant to the Americans was prone to making quite a lot of promises above and beyond the NATO framework. But then came the Arab-Israeli war. Did he fulfill these promises? No, I submit. He didn’t fulfill them. And I think that there has been strong criticism from the American Congress for President Nixon’s heavy reliance on and political embrace of the dictatorship.

Mr. YATRON. I have one final question, Dr. Zighdis. In my view, and based on information that I have, I feel that the present government in Greece has the following three alternatives: One would be to continue as it is with no changes; two, to have the present regime repeat the previous government’s experiment to return to a democratic form of government; or three, to have a new government formed with one main objective, to restore the democratic form of government with free elections.
Now if the choice is the third one that I have mentioned, are there any individuals in Greece right now that might play a role in the attempt to restore a democratic government in your country?

**ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED**

**Mr. Zighdis.** May I ask again exactly what was the third alternative?

**Mr. Yatron.** All right. The third one was to have a new government formed with one main objective, to restore the democratic form of government with free elections in Greece.

Now if the choice is the third alternative, are there any individuals, in your opinion or in your view in your country, that might play a role in this attempt to restore the government back to a democratic form of government?

**Mr. Zighdis.** If the military people handed over authority to the political world, all of us are ready to assume power and lead the country to free elections. But when the military insists on retaining political control we don't trust them. We distrust their intentions. We have got 7 years' experience with them and we won't become fools. Mr. Markezinis tried to work with them and he failed miserably.

No other Greek of some standing will repeat that.

I think, Mr. Yatron, you are of Greek extraction.

**Mr. Yatron.** I am.

**Mr. Zighdis.** And you must know then that we have had two cases since World War I when the military seized control, but they acted as real patriots. In 1922, after the Asia Minor disaster, we had the military government of General Plastaras. But soon after the emergency he conducted free elections and then he went to parliament and handed over power to it and to the people.

Then again General Kondylis, after ousting the dictator Pangalos in 1925, said, "I shall carry out free elections. I won't be a candidate, and the government which will come out of these elections will be the respected government of the country and I will submit to it."

**DESIRE FOR POWER**

It we had such people in the present military government we would of course help them to carry out such plans. But the people who are now in control have no such selfless aims. They want to remain forever in power.

**Mr. Yatron.** Are there any individuals that could rally everybody together and get your country back to where it should be? That is my question. Are there any individuals that you know of?

**Mr. Zighdis.** Of course. You know all of us in the political world, are united. Sometimes certain people are mentioned as acceptable candidates to head a government of national unity. We would accept any competent person to become prime minister the day we are sure that the army had relinquished its aspiration to control the government. We would then form our government and lead the country to normalcy.
OPPOSITION UNITED

There is no difference among us. I belong to the Center Union party. We have no differences of opinion whatsoever on this point with the ERE party—the conservatives—and the various resistance movements, the Socialist parties, et cetera. We are all united. I can tell you that even the left—that is, the EDA party—are agreed with this orientation. We believe that a government of national unity will safely lead the country back to normalcy. We are not convinced that the people controlling the army at the present want this for Greece. They will not allow their regime to evolve into democracy.

Mr. YATRON. Thank you.

Mr. ROSENTHAL, Mr. Buchanan.

Mr. BUCHANAN. I would just very briefly speak with the same friendship and the same candor that you have spoken to us and I am impressed by your testimony and appreciate it.

It would appear to me that if this is a strategic time for Greece, and one in which there is real hope because of the weakness of the present junta or the rebirth of democratic government in Greece that people like you are very important and there must be found a way to give expression to those democratic forces within that society.

Now just a couple of things. First, the chairman of our committee, Mr. Rosenthal, and I, he is a Democrat, I am a Republican; he represents a city in New York, I represent a smaller city in the Deep South. We, along with other members of this committee have been united on certain things concerning Greece in our position to the colonels who did away with democracy and with so many of individual rights in Greece and supporting various measures along with our subcommittee and full committee toward cutting off funds or in other ways expressing our disapproval of the junta.

GREEK COMMUNITIES IN THE UNITED STATES

Now we both have this in common. We both represent significant Greek communities in our own constituencies. The people of the Greek community that it is my privilege to represent are united on a number of things. They are united in being excellent citizens of our country and good Americans. They are united in their pride and their heritage. They are united in their own love for and concerns about Greece. They are united in their support for Greek-American friendship.

But I have not heard a united voice on the subject of the Government of Greece and as the chairman has indicated, he has not. I would respectfully suggest that all who feel as you do ought to have something to say to the American-Greek community on this subject because I have not caught the unity and degree of concern as to the nature of the government there that might be helpful to it about which you feel so strongly.

Then secondly, I have a very uncomfortable feeling, Mr. Chairman, I wish I didn't have, that there are many Americans who are very critical of politicians and some of our polls have said the Congress
rates lower than not only the President but even the used car salesmen. I wonder how many Americans, if they had some smart, bright, as we would say spit and polish military officers who know how to do things efficiently and who are handsome and dashing and courageous, I just sometimes could have nightmares over what if such a group of people were to take charge of the American Government, how much support would they get against us politicians trying to recapture our positions as the people's representatives and recover our democracy?

A CONCERN FOR DEMOCRACY

I do think that the Greek people must speak with a commanding voice as you have done today, and as the students so courageously did and to let the world know they still do want and hunger for democracy and freedom. I have some real concerns about that, whether it was your country or our own country.

I didn't mean to turn it into an oration. If you have any response.

Mr. Zimmis. Yes. Regarding the first point—the Greek-Americans. I already had the opportunity to differentiate between the younger generation of Greek-Americans and the older one. I gave the younger generation credit for looking at the Greek problem more objectively and for understanding our position better. The older generation has a different way of perceiving things. But I agree with you that we need a campaign to enlighten those people as much as possible.

NOT ALLOWED TO LEAVE

This campaign is not, however, for me to undertake. As you know I just came out of Greece for the first time in 7 years and I must return as soon as possible. Last time I was in this House was in 1966 as a member of the delegation of NATO parliamentarians who visited this country to view NATO and U.S.A. defense installations. The last American I saw was the late President Johnson. When I went back to Greece the door was shut and I was not allowed to leave the country for practically 7 years.

On the second point, the spit-and-polish officers who seized power in my country proved in most instances, to be inefficient, corrupt, and unreliable. I am very proud that I belong to the political world and that I have been an elected representative of the Greek people. I think you should also be very proud that you are the elected Representatives of this great people and great Nation which is America.

It will be a very sorry day for America and for the world if instead of ballots there will be tanks and machineguns to determine the Government of this great democracy which leads the world in its struggle for freedom, decency and the protection of the highest human values.

[Applause.]
Mr. Rosenthal. Thank you very much.
Mr. Zigidis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rosenthal. Anything I said after that would be superfluous. The subcommittee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 3:24 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]